The NNICC Report is produced annually for the use of NNICC member agencies and other entities and individuals interested in this subject. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the:

Table of Contents

Preface

Executive Summary

Cocaine

Opiates

Methamphetamine

Cannabis

Chemicals, Diversion, and Dangerous Drugs

Drug Money

PREFACE

This report is the 19th assessment prepared by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC). The NNICC Report 1996, entitled, The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, is a comprehensive assessment of the worldwide illicit drug situation prepared for the Federal Government; it is the product of a cooperative effort by those Federal agencies with drug-related law enforcement, foreign and domestic policy, treatment, research, and intelligence responsibilities. The report is based on the best data currently available and on the combined expertise of those agencies.

The NNICC was established in April 1978 to coordinate the collection, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of strategic drug-related intelligence, both foreign and domestic, that is essential to effective drug policy development, resource deployment, and operational planning. The 1996 NNICC membership was comprised of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, Department of Defense, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Department of State, and Department of the Treasury. The Office of National Drug Control Policy was an observer. The Assistant Administrator, Intelligence Division, Drug Enforcement Administration served as Chairman.

Since cultivation, production, and distribution of illicit drugs are hidden from view, all too often there are little reliable data upon which to base estimates. In recent years, the NNICC has reviewed and updated the methodologies it uses to estimate illicit drug production. This continuing effort has resulted in a number of revised cultivation and production estimates for previous years.

Information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administrations Country Attaches and Field Divisions as well as sanitized data supplied by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) are included as appropriate. The Department of States International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is another primary source for production estimates and drug control efforts in foreign countries. The INCSR is prepared annually in accordance with the provisions of Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291), as amended. In order to facilitate the timely publication of the NNICC Report 1996, partial year abuse and seizure data available as of April 1, 1997, have been used.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 1996, major changes occurred in the illicit drug trade, many of which were brought about by aggressive drug law enforcement. In Latin America, the Cali Drug Mafia experienced setbacks with the arrests, surrender, or death of key leaders. The Shan United Army in the Far East collapsed and Khun Sa was detained by Burmese central authorities.

Yet challenges remained. Just to our south, drug gangs in Mexico transported cocaine to the United States, and increased their involvement in U.S. domestic cocaine distribution. They continued to produce not only heroin and marijuana, but, increasingly, methamphetamine for the U.S. market. These groups expanded their foothold in the United States, replacing outlaw motorcycle gangs as the principal suppliers of the drug. Couriers controlled by West African criminals continued to flood through U.S. airports with high-quality Southeast Asian heroin, and South American heroin suppliers increased their U.S. market share, particularly along the East Coast of the United States.

In major urban areas, and in many smaller cities and towns as well, drug distribution was accompanied by far too many homicides and drug-related violence. The following summarizes, by drug and in the area of drug money laundering, the major events and trends of 1996:

Colombia-based drug mafias continued to dominate all aspects of the cocaine trade, from acquisition of cocaine base to cocaine production in South America, and transportation of the drugs to wholesale distribution in the United States. These organizations, as well as other smaller groups, were serviced by a complex infrastructure that transported cocaine by land, sea, and air conveyances principally to the United States and Europe. In recent years, this infrastructure has become heavily dependent on the smuggling services of drug gangs operating from Mexico, which has enabled the drug gangs there to emerge as sophisticated and powerful international drug trafficking organizations within their own right. These powerful gangs, for example, have increased their involvement in the distribution of cocaine in the United States on their own initiative and in concert with the Colombian mafias. In addition to the Mexican drug gangs, the Colombian mafias employed Caribbean-based transportation groups to ship cocaine to the Southwest and Southeast United States, respectively.

In 1996, Cali mafia drug lords Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela and Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela remained incarcerated in Colombia. In March, the Colombian Government announced that Cali drug lord Jose Santacruz-Londono, who had escaped from prison in January 1996, had been killed in a shoot-out with police at a roadblock outside of Medellin, Colombia. In October, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera, the last of the old-guard Cali drug mafia leaders to remain at large, finally surrendered. Incarcerated Cali drug lords, however, continued to operate their drug empires from behind prison walls by shifting day-to-day control of their organizations to trusted lieutenants or relatives still at large. Moreover, a new generation of relatively young North Coast, North Valle del Cauca, and Cali traffickers conducted more independent action.

Potential cocaine production was estimated by the U.S. Government to be 760 metric tons in 1996, compared to 1995 potential production of 780 metric tons. Operation BREAKTHROUGH, a DEA-managed comprehensive coca cultivation and cocaine base processing research project, estimated an actual cocaine production amount of 700 metric tons in 1996, down from 715 metric tons in 1995. The amount of cocaine seized worldwide, meanwhile, exceeded 200 metric tons in 1996. U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies alone seized 108 metric tons of cocaine in Fiscal Year 1996, compared to 102 metric tons seized in 1995.

Traffickers continued to use intermodal means of transport, frequently concealing larger shipments in commercial maritime containerized or bulk cargo. They also used fishing vessels to convey multimetric-ton shipments from Colombia to Mexico. Traffickers also used specially designed vessels to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to northern Caribbean islands or Puerto Rico. Frequently, general aviation aircraft were used to convey cocaine to Mexico from South America.

The drug mafias in Colombia continued to dominate wholesale cocaine distribution in the United States through what is recognized as a sophisticated organizational structure. Cocaine wholesale-level distribution and drug money laundering networks were comprised of multiple cells functioning in a number of major metropolitan areas. These cells maintained meticulous records and used available technology, including personal computers, pagers, and facsimile machines, in their daily operations. U.S. operations were coordinated on a daily basis by key managers in Colombia. Primary U.S. bulk cocaine distribution centers included southern California, southern Florida, southern Texas, and New York City. From these centers, cocaine was shipped throughout the United States for delivery to lower level distribution groups in secondary source cities.

Trafficking organizations from Mexico were responsible for smuggling cocaine across the Southwest border into the United States. Colombian suppliers routinely paid many of these organizations for their services with a percentage of the cocaine to be smuggled across the border. As a result, these organizations gained a foothold in the lucrative cocaine wholesale business in the United States.

Distribution groups were comprised chiefly of the African-American street gangs and the ethnic Cuban, Dominican, Haitian, Jamaican, Mexican, and Puerto Rican criminal groups that controlled cocaine and crack sales at the retail level. Gangs, including the Crips, Bloods, and Dominican gangs as well as Jamaican posses, were primarily responsible for widespread cocaine and crack cocaine-related violence. The migration of gang and posse members to smaller U.S. cities and rural areas resulted in increases in drug-related homicides, armed robberies, and assaults in those areas.

The price and availability of cocaine in the United States remained relatively stable. In the first half of 1996, cocaine prices ranged from $10,500 to $36,000 per kilogram nationally. Average purity for cocaine at the gram, ounce, and kilogram levels remained high. Average purity at the gram (retail) level for the first half of 1996 was 57 percent. The average purity per kilogram (wholesale) was 82 percent for the same time period.

While cocaine use in the United States has declined over the past decade, the rate of use in recent years has stabilized at high levels. These rates were driven largely by crack cocaine, the use of which has reached the saturation point in large urban areas throughout the country.

Heroin was supplied to the United States from four source areas: Southeast Asia (principally Burma), Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey), Mexico, and South America (Colombia). In 1996, worldwide opium production was 4,285 metric tons, an increase over the 1995 worldwide opium production total of 4,165 metric tons. Opium production in Southeast Asia, estimated at 2,564 metric tons in 1995, increased to 2,790 metric tons in 1996. An estimated 117 metric tons of opium was produced in Latin America in 1996. However, virtually all of this opium was converted to heroin and shipped to the United States.

South American heroin was distributed primarily by independent traffickers from Colombia. These criminals established themselves in the U.S. heroin market by distributing high-quality heroin--frequently above 90 percent pure--and by undercutting the price of their competition. Most reports indicate that heroin traffickers from Colombia expanded their efforts to supply multikilogram quantities. Much of this heroin was distributed in East Coast markets through connections between Colombian traffickers and Puerto Rico-ased criminal gangs or ethnic Dominican street gangs active in the U.S. Northeast.

In the Golden Triangle, the Shan United Army (SUA), formerly headed by drug lord Khun Sa, found itself in disarray and for all intents and purposes dismantled in 1996 as the Burmese Army secured its positions in Ho Mong and other SUA bases. Heroin operations controlled by the SUA reportedly were shifted to make greater use of Laos, and possibly Cambodia and Vietnam, to ship heroin westward. Elements formerly associated with the SUA and other insurgent traffickers also turned to the production of methamphetamine. Khun Sa purportedly was placed under house arrest in Rangoon and his monies used by the Burma Government to invest in infrastructure building.

From Southeast Asia, heroin was transported to international markets by independent brokers and shippers. These brokers provided suppliers with connections to ethnic Chinese criminals in the United States who acted as wholesale distributors. The United States-based groups supplied local criminals, who distributed heroin at the retail level. Nigerian and West African groups, meanwhile, smuggled Southeast Asian heroin internationally and distributed it in the United States through their own contacts with United States-based criminal groups.

Importation and distribution of Southwest Asian heroin was much less centralized than that for Southeast Asian heroin. In the United States, a number of ethnic groups from Southwest Asia and the Middle East were active in the importation and distribution of heroin. These included ethnic Afghans, Greeks, Iranians, Israelis, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Turks. Much of this heroin was smuggled to ethnic drug distribution groups in the United States.

Virtually all of the heroin produced in Mexico was destined exclusively for distribution in the United States. Drug trafficking organizations in Mexico remained inveterate polydrug smugglers. They produced and/or transported large quantities of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine into the United States on a daily basis. Black tar and brown heroin were produced by traffickers in Mexico and sold in the western United States by ethnic Mexican-American criminal networks. Organizations controlled from Mexico made distribution at the wholesale level; local U.S. gangs often managed street sales.

In 1996, a number of heroin seizures in excess of 100 kilograms were made in Southeast Asia and Europe, including 190 kilograms seized in Turkey in January, 600 kilograms seized in China in April, and 217 kilograms seized in Italy in May. No comparable seizures were made in the United States. Worldwide seizures of morphine base/heroin amounted to about 23 metric tons in 1996, with 1.5 metric tons seized in the United States by Federal law enforcement authorities in Fiscal Year 1996.

The U.S. market continued to be dominated by high-purity South American and Southeast Asian heroin prevalent in the northeastern United States and along the East Coast. In the United States, heroin was readily available in many cities, as evidenced by the high level of retail purity. Indicators reflected significant use in many East Coast cities, due to increased availability of high-purity South American heroin.

Data obtained from DEAs Domestic Monitor Program (DMP), a retail-level heroin purchase program, indicated that the availability of South American heroin has steadily increased in northeastern U.S. cities. Drug traffickers from Colombia have expanded their foothold in the U.S. heroin market and are well on their way toward dominating open air drug markets.

Nationally, in the first half of 1996, Southeast Asian heroin ranged in price from $95,000 to $210,000 perkilogram. Southwest Asian heroin ranged from $80,000 to $260,000. Wholesale-level prices for Mexican heroin were the lowest of any type, starting from $50,000. South American heroin sold for $85,000 to $185,000. The typical price for a kilogram of heroin varied by type of heroin from city to city. For example, one kilogram of Southeast Asian heroin in New York City cost approximately $120,000; a typical price for one kilogram of Southeast Asian heroin in New York City was $80,000. In Chicago, a kilogram of Southeast Asian heroin sold for $130,000; a kilogram of Mexican black tar heroin sold for $100,000 in Chicago. In San Francisco, a kilogram of Mexican black tar commonly sold for approximately $40,000. A kilogram of Southeast Asian heroin in San Francisco generally sold for $90,000. The wide range in kilogram prices reflected variables such as buyer-seller relationships, quantities purchased, purchase frequencies, purities, and transportation costs.

During the first 9 months of 1996, the nationwide average purity for retail heroin from all sources was 35.9 percent, much higher than the average of 7 percent reported a decade ago, and considerably higher than the 26.6 percent recorded in 1991. The significant rise in average purity corresponded directly to the increase in availability of high-purity Southeast Asian and South American heroin.

The retail purity of South American heroin was the highest for any source, averaging 50.3 percent, followed by Southeast Asian heroin with an average of 35.1 percent. Southwest Asian heroin averaged 30.9 percent at the retail level and Mexican heroin averaged 30.4 percent.

Heroin purity at the street level was generally highest in the northeastern United States, where a large percentage of the nations user population lives. New York City continued to serve as one of the major importation and distribution centers for South American and Southeast Asian heroin.

Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the United States have been on the rise over the past few years. As a result, this drug is having a devastating impact in many communities across the nation. Although more common in western areas of the country, this impact increasingly was felt in areas not previously familiar with the harmful effects of this powerful stimulant. In some areas of the country, methamphetamine is now the "drug of choice" surpassing cocaine.

This expansion of the methamphetamine trade was driven, in large part, by the extensive involvement of criminal organizations from Mexico. Traditionally, the suppliers of methamphetamine throughout the United States have been outlaw motorcycle gangs and numerous other independent trafficking groups. Although these groups continued to produce and distribute methamphetamine, organized crime drug groups operating from Mexico dominated wholesale methamphetamine trafficking in the United States. They already control well-established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks throughout the western United States, enabling them to supply methamphetamine to a large retail-level market. Their expansion into the methamphetamine trade added a new dimension to their role in the U.S. drug market and redefined the methamphetamine problem in the United States. Presently, these organizations are poised to supply methamphetamine to the rest of the country in response to any increases in demand.

Historically, methamphetamine use was associated with white males between the ages of 19 and 40. Reporting indicated that this population continued to dominate the data. However, reporting from epidemiologists and treatment personnel revealed shifts in user profiles. There were reports of increased methamphetamine use among women, college students, and young professionals at all-night dance parties called raves. During 1996, a typical price for one gram of methamphetamine in the United States varied from region to region. For example, in San Francisco one gram cost $45; in San Diego, $60; and in Kansas City, Missouri, $100.

The number of methamphetamine laboratory seizures in the United States reported to DEA increased dramatically during 1996. This significant increase reflects the widespread proliferation in the manufacture, trafficking, and use of the drug across the western, midwestern, and portions of the southern United States.

There were 879 methamphetamine laboratory seizures in which DEA participated in 1996, the highest figure ever reported by DEA. This compares to 327 laboratories seized in 1995. The 1996 figure represents a 169-percent increase over 1995, and marks the most significant annual increase in the number of seizures ever reported by DEA. The manufacture of methamphetamine was based primarily in the West, Midwest and portions of the South.

Although there were 235 methamphetamine laboratories seized in the State of Missouri alone, California remains the predominant area for methamphetamine production in the United States. According to the Western States Information Network (WSIN), State and local authorities reported that 892 methamphetamine laboratories were seized in California during 1996.

Mexican-operated laboratories continued to be based in California and produced large quantities of methamphetamine. In addition, methamphetamine increasingly was produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States.

Methamphetamine is produced most commonly by using either an ephedrine/pseudoephedrine reduction method or a P2P method. Approximately 51 percent of the laboratories seized in 1996 were identified as, or suspected of, using pseudoephedrine compared to 45 percent for ephedrine. Only 3 percent of the methamphetamine laboratories seized during the year used a P2P method of synthesis.

Pseudoephedrine/ephedrine was obtained from various sources. Illicit laboratory operators obtained pseudoephedrine (in tablet form), and in a number of cases ephedrine, from over the counter (OTC) products often designed for illegitimate use such as those products sold through mail order distributors and some retailers and from legitimate OTC cold preparations sold in retail stores.

Use of the "Nazi method," which uses ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, sodium/lithium, and anhydrous ammonia to produce methamphetamine, has been identified in approximately 12 percent of the laboratories seized in 1996. Use of this method increased significantly from 5 laboratories in 1995 to 104 in 1996.

Methamphetamine laboratory operators often were well-armed, and their laboratories occasionally were booby-trapped and equipped with scanning devices employed as security precautions. Weaponry, ranging from single firearms to arsenals of high-powered weapons and explosives, were found commonly at laboratory sites. Not only were methamphetamine laboratories used to manufacture illegal, often deadly drugs, but the clandestine nature of the manufacturing process and the presence of ignitable, corrosive, reactive, and toxic chemicals at the sites resulted in explosions, fires, toxic fumes, and irreparable damage to human health and to the environment.

The most frequent method of methamphetamine use was by injection. Chronic, high-dose methamphetamine abusers, often called "speed freaks," are generally undernourished with a gaunt appearance, poor hygiene, and rotten teeth. These individuals inject methamphetamine every 2 to 3 hours and often as much as 1,000 milligrams each time. Due to the high level of methamphetamine in their systems, "speed freaks" are extremely paranoid.

Marijuana was the most widely abused and readily available illicit drug in the United States. A resurgence of marijuana trafficking and abuse has taken place in urban centers across the nation. Mexico was the major foreign source of marijuana smuggled into the United States, although substantial quantities of marijuana also were imported from Colombia. Jamaica also was a significant source country.

Domestically, marijuana distribution was controlled by a variety of groups and individuals, ranging from large, sophisticated organizations that controlled cultivation and interstate trafficking, to small independent traffickers operating on the local level. State and local drug law enforcement officials reported that small groups of between 5 and 10 individuals controlled distribution at the retail level. Domestic street gangs and ethnic groups (usually immigrants from source countries) made for a wide range of retail sellers.

Cannabis was cultivated illicitly in the United States in remote locations and frequently on public lands. Major domestic outdoor cannabis cultivation areas were found in California, Hawaii, Kentucky, New York, and Tennessee. Significant quantities of marijuana also were cultivated domestically in indoor grow operations. The number of indoor operations seized in 1996 was 3,532, compared to 3,348 seized in 1995. The controlled environment of indoor operations enabled growers to use sophisticated agronomic techniques to enhance potency and production.

Prices for marijuana, which varied in accordance with potency, availability, source of origin, and/or proximity to the point of entry into the United States, have increased dramatically during the past decade at the high end of the price range. Commercial grade marijuana that sold for between $400 and $600 per pound in 1984, sold for between $200 and $4,000 per pound in the first 9 months of 1996. Sinsemilla in 1984 sold for between $1,200 and $2,500 per pound, compared to prices of between $700 and $8,000 per pound in mid-1996. One of the primary factors influencing price was potency, which has increased substantially for both commercial grade and sinsemilla, with THC content averaging 4.62 and 8.95 percent, respectively, in 1996. Potencies in 1984, by comparison, averaged 3.78 percent for commercial grade marijuana and 6.67 percent for sinsemilla.

A recent trend in marijuana use, the smoking of hollowed-out cigars referred to as blunts, initially was confined to younger users, but the trend has expanded with such use now widespread throughout the United States.

The term dangerous drugs refers to the broad category of illicitly manufactured controlled substances other than cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and to licit controlled substances diverted to the illicit market. Dangerous drugs include depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and controlled substance analogs. Clandestine laboratories are responsible for the overwhelming majority of illicitly manufactured dangerous drugs available in the United States.

MDMA is related to methamphetamine and is known by several street names, such as ecstasy, XTC, clarity, essence, and doctor. MDMA was popular among college students, and often was found at all-night raves. Often, it was sold in tablet form, in dosage units of 55 to 150 milligrams. MDMA was shipped by independent traffickers by post or express mail services from source areas in Texas and the West Coast to distributors across the country. Three MDMA laboratories were seized in the United States in both 1995 and 1996. A large amount of the MDMA imported from foreign sources is now smuggled through Mexico.

LSD was available in retail quantities in virtually every State. LSD production facilities were most likely located on the West Coast, in the northern California and Pacific Northwest areas. A proliferation of mail-order sales created a marketplace where the sellers were virtually unknown to the buyers. The drug was relatively inexpensive, costing from $1 to $20 per dosage unit or "hit," and often selling for as little as $0.25 or less in wholesale lots. The vast majority of users were white, middle-class junior high school, high school, and college students attracted by the low prices and who perceived the drug as harmless.

PCP production was centered in the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. Los Angeles-based street gangs, primarily the Crips, continued to distribute PCP to a number of U.S. cities through their cocaine trafficking operations. They posed a particular problem because of their propensity for violence. One PCP laboratory was seized in 1996, compared to six seized in 1995. Nationally, PCP sold for between $100 and $3,000 per ounce in liquid form and between $800 and $3,000 per ounce in powder form.

In 1995, there was an influx of flunitrazepam, or Rohypnol, tablets into the Gulf Coast and other areas of the United States. Abuse of the drug continued in 1996. Rohypnol is a benzodiazepine manufactured in Colombia, Mexico, and Switzerland by Hoffmann-LaRoche; it is neither manufactured nor marketed legally in the United States. Rohypnol is reported to be from 7 to 10 times more potent than Valium and produces amnesia as a serious side effect. The street price for Rohypnol was between $5 and $8 per pill.

Controlled substance analogs presented a unique problem to drug law enforcement authorities. Most analogs were produced domestically by independent laboratory operators in relatively small quantities. In 1992, DEA first encountered methcathinone, a methamphetamine-like analog that originated from clandestine laboratories in northern Michigan. In response, DEA arranged for methcathinone to be placed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act in October 1993. Ten methcathinone laboratories were seized in 1996, down from 19 seized in 1995. Methcathinone production and distribution, originally limited to Michigans Upper Peninsula region, took place throughout much of the Midwest and sold for between $50 and $120 per gram.

Abusers of dangerous drugs also used legitimately manufactured controlled substances diverted to the illicit market. Illegal or fraudulent prescribing and dispensing, as well as theft from legitimate channels, were employed to divert these drugs. Major sources of domestic diversion shifted from the wholesale to the retail level. Domestically, organized groups of "doctor shoppers" operated interstate, often ranging across four or five States in search of sources. Diversion commonly involved depressants such as benzodiazepines, particularly alprazolam and diazepam.

In recent years, United States-based cocaine traffickers, primarily Colombians, have shipped their profits out of the country in smaller amounts than in previous years, although bulk seizures of cash continued to be made, particularly in the U.S. Southwest. Worldwide, money laundering methods varied by country and region of the world due to a number of factors, including the relative sophistication of banking and financial centers, and the existence of underground banking systems that operated largely along ethnic ties. Money laundering methods continued to evolve in response to variations in law enforcement pressure.

Ethnic Pakistanis have established businesses in the United States that serviced Southwest Asias hundi underground banking systems. Invoice manipulation was used to move drug proceeds into and out of the United States. Russian immigrants, newly arrived in the United States, closed real estate deals with cash carried in shopping bags and used casinos to launder illicit proceeds generated from a variety of criminal activities. Other money laundering methods that drew attention included the use of the following: swaps (international currency transactions); payable-through-accounts held by foreign banks in U.S. banks; "smart cards" for structuring deposits and transferring money internationally; and cyberbanking for instant multinational layering of deposits.

COCAINE

In the first half of 1996, cocaine hydrochloride (HCl), commonly referred to as cocaine, was readily available in all major U.S. metropolitan areas. Generally, the price of cocaine remained low and stable at all levels of the traffic. In the first 6 months of 1996, nationwide prices ranged from $10,500 to $36,000 per kilogram, unchanged from 1995 prices.

During the first half of 1996, ounce-quantity cocaine prices nationwide ranged from $250 to $2,000, while gram-quantity prices ranged from $20 to $200. In 1995, ounce and gram prices ranged from $300 to $2,200 and from $30 to $200, respectively.

Cocaine purity remained relatively high and stable. The purity of gram amounts of cocaine averaged 57 percent in the first half of 1996, compared to 61 percent in 1995. Purity per kilogram averaged 82 percent in the first half of 1996 and 83 percent in 1995. Purity per ounce averaged 69 percent in the first half of 1996, as opposed to 65 percent in 1995

Abuse

The 1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse* is the latest survey for which statistics on nationwide drug use are available. Results for 1995 show that, while cocaine use in the United States has declined over the past decade, the rate of use has stabilized at high levels. These rates are driven largely by "crack" cocaine use, which has reached the saturation point in large urban areas throughout the country.

In the survey, Americans who reported using cocaine sometime in the past year numbered 3.7 million in 1995, while past-month users numbered approximately 1.5 million. This compares with an estimated 3.9 million past-year users and 1.3 million past-month users in 1994. These numbers represent a significant decrease in the casual use of cocaine since the peak year of 1985, when past-year and past-month users numbered 9.8 million and 5.7 million, respectively.

According to the 1996 Monitoring the Future Study,* the use of cocaine in any form continued a gradual climb among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders, although most changes between 1995 and 1996 did not reach statistical significance. Crack cocaine use also continued to rise gradually among 8th and 10th graders, but not 12th graders. The annual prevalence rates for cocaine use in any form were 3 percent for 8th graders, 4 percent for 10th graders, and 5 percent for 12th graders, while the percentage for crack use was 2 percent for youngsters in all three grades. Survey results also showed that 8th, 10th, and 12th graders expressed less disapproval of cocaine or crack use in 1996 than in 1995.

Survey results as to the perceived harmfulness of drugs were mixed, with an equal or greater percentage of youths in each grade attaching "great risk" of harm in trying cocaine or crack once or twice, and a smaller percentage in each grade attaching "great risk" to the occasional use of cocaine and crack.

The survey data cited above measure trends in the prevalence of cocaine use. Another key drug abuse indicator, which measures the adverse consequences of drug use rather than prevalence, is the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).** DAWN shows that the estimated number of nationwide cocaine-related emergency room admissions, which had been increasing at a fairly constant rate since 1990, leveled off in the first half of 1995, and then decreased in the second half of 1995. It is too early to determine whether these 1995 figures signal a reversal of the previous trend, or whether they are simply an aberration. In any case, the 142,494 episodes reported in 1995 were significantly above the low of 80,355 episodes reported in 1990. DAWN data for 1996 are not yet available.

DAWN survey results for 1995 also contained evidence of an aging group of abusers. The percentage of cocaine-related episodes in which abusers ages ranged between 20 and 29 was 28.7 percent, compared to 46.5 percent in 1989. The percentages of abusers aged from 30 to 39 and from 40 to 49 were 45.7 percent and 18.9 percent in 1995, compared to 36.5 percent and 8.3 percent in 1989. These data appear to lend credence to the theory, advanced by a number of drug epidemiologists and treatment specialists, that current high-episode numbers are an indication that many hard-core cocaine users now are experiencing the consequences of long-term addiction. As a result, an increasing number of users are seeking public medical assistance.

International Cocaine Trade

Colombia-based drug trafficking organizations continued to direct the cocaine trade. Of these, the two most powerful were referred to collectively as the Cali and the Medellin drug mafias. In 1996, the Cali drug mafia maintained primary control over cocaine trafficking to the United States, despite the incarceration of its most powerful kingpins. In Mexico, drug gangs continued to grow in power, sophistication, and reach. These gangs increased their involvement in domestic U.S. cocaine distribution as well.

The cocaine trade, however, continued to be rooted in South America, where the bulk of the cocaine available worldwide was produced. [Cocaine is produced from the coca plant, which is cultivated primarily in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.] In 1996, excluding hectarage lost to government eradication, farmers cultivated the coca plant on 209,700 hectares of land. Theoretically, the amount of land under cultivation was capable of producing approximately 303,600 metric tons of coca leaf. These data represent a slight decrease from 1995, when 214,800 hectares of cultivation potentially yielded approximately 309,400 metric tons of coca leaf. This coca leaf could have potentially produced 760 metric tons at cocaine HCl, commonly referred to as cocaine.

Most of the coca leaf was produced in Bolivia and Peru, while cocaine HCl processing laboratories were concentrated in Colombia. After harvesting the coca leaves, traffickers processed the leaves into a crude, impure form of cocaine--known as cocaine base--in facilities located near the cultivation sites. Traffickers transported the cocaine base to Colombia for final processing and subsequent shipment to international markets.

Traditionally, the transport of cocaine base to Colombia was accomplished by general aviation aircraft flying between clandestine airstrips located near processing facilities. However, in recent years, flight interdiction efforts by the Colombian and Peruvian air forces have forced traffickers to change their methods. As a result, traffickers have begun to rely increasingly on river and land transport to move shipments of cocaine base to staging sites in areas outside the traditional trafficker air routes, beyond the range of interdiction aircraft. In 1996, traffickers continued to avoid air routes and to favor river transport of cocaine base.

Trafficking Routes

Colombia is located in the northwest corner of South America, with coasts on both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. This location enables traffickers to smuggle cocaine to the United States by a variety of routes. Moreover, traffickers transported cocaine from South America from countries other than Colombia. Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, in particular, also have become significant cocaine transit sites.

Traffic through Mexico

A large part of the cocaine traffic between South America and the United States was routed through Mexico by using a number of routes and methods.

Traffickers relied primarily on air and maritime transportation to move cocaine into Mexico from South America. Maritime activity included shipping cocaine from Colombias western coast by bulk cargo ships or fishing vessels sailing from the Port of Buenaventura, following eastern Pacific routes to either Mexico or Central America.

High-speed "go-fast boats," freighters, and fishing vessels sailed from Colombias North Coast; from the Ports of Cartagena or Barranquilla; from the Gulfs of Uraba or Morrosquillo; or from the Guajira Peninsula. Vessels with cocaine shipments to be transported through Mexico followed northwesterly routes into the western Caribbean, en route to locations off the coast of Mexicos Yucatan Peninsula, where the cocaine shipments would be off-loaded on shore, or transferred to Mexican vessels for delivery to shore.

General aviation aircraft were used to fly eastern Pacific routes to air-drop bales of cocaine into southern Mexico. In addition, general aviation aircraft flying from Colombias North Coast landed and off-loaded in Mexico. Large cargo aircraft reportedly continued to deliver cocaine shipments to Mexico, although such flights were much less frequent than in 1995.

Traffic through the Caribbean

Cocaine was smuggled through the Caribbean by air and sea, often moved in the direction of Puerto Rico where it was repackaged and staged for direct shipment to major U.S. East Coast markets. Seaborne smuggling operations consisted primarily of go-fast boats that departed from Colombias North Coast and Venezuela, typically carrying between 800- and 1,200-kilogram shipments of cocaine. Sailing and fishing vessels also were used, although to a more limited extent. These vessels departed the North Coast of Colombia, hugged the Venezuelan coast, and either proceeded directly to Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, or Haiti, or kept close to the coasts of the eastern Caribbean islands until they reached their final destinations. Traveling up the island chains allowed traffickers to blend with other vessel traffic, which minimized opportunities for detection. Vessels sometimes off-loaded to locally built open fishing boats, known as yolas, positioned from 40 to 150 nautical miles off the coast of Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, or in the Leeward Islands. The yolas proceeded to Puerto Rico and off-loaded cocaine on Puerto Ricos east coast.

General aviation aircraft typically flew from airstrips in eastern Colombias Vichada Department, overflying Venezuela on the way to delivery sites in the vicinity of the northern Lesser Antilles, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or the Dominican Republic. Other aircraft flying from Colombias North Coast reportedly air-dropped waterproof bundles of cocaine in the vicinity of The Bahamas. Airdrops typically were made to waiting boat crews, who then delivered the cocaine to shore. From staging points in the Caribbean, smugglers then delivered the cocaine by sea to southern Florida.

Routes from South America to the United States

In addition to smuggling along routes to the United States that stretched through Mexico and the Caribbean, traffickers transshipped cocaine from South America to the United States using commercial maritime cargo vessels. While such shipments often arrived directly from Colombia in 1996, many loads also were transshipped through third countries--most often Haiti, Mexico, and Panama. Traffickers also used commercial maritime cargo to move cocaine from South America to European markets. In the first half of 1996, approximately 11 metric tons of cocaine were seized from commercial maritime vessels, with most seizures made in the Port of Miami. Most of this amount was concealed in containerized cargo shipments of coffee or furniture.

Traffickers also used commercial air cargo flights to smuggle cocaine directly to the United States; most often these air cargo shipments were off-loaded in Miami and New York. The largest of these shipments normally were concealed in cargo aboard legitimate commercial cargo flights, and usually arrived in the United States from Panama or directly from South America.

Trafficking Methods

Traffickers concealed multiton shipments of cocaine within commercial maritime cargo carried by legitimate shipping services from South America into the United States. In addition to concealing the shipments of cocaine within maritime cargo, traffickers frequently attempted to circumvent inspection by altering shipping documents at intermediate transshipment points, and by using counterfeit customs seals.

As in previous years, traffickers used a variety of concealment methods to ship cocaine within maritime cargo. In some instances, cocaine was secreted within container walls or floors, as was the case with over 660 kilograms of cocaine discovered in July in the floor of a container of plantains that arrived in Miami from Ecuador. Cocaine also was placed within boxes or bags commingled with legitimate cargo. In August, 2.7 metric tons of cocaine were found in 64 canvas bags placed in a 2-container shipment of coffee beans imported into Miami from Colombia. In other instances, cocaine was concealed within compartments in legitimate cargo. For example, in February, U.S. Customs Service (USCS) inspectors at Port Everglades, Florida, discovered 95 kilograms of cocaine concealed within three aluminum ingots. In September, customs inspectors at the Port of Galveston, Texas, discovered 1.1 metric tons of cocaine concealed in a large roller used in paper manufacturing en route from Cartagena, Colombia, to Houston, Texas.

Bulk cargo ships frequently were used to smuggle cocaine to staging sites in the western Caribbean-Gulf of Mexico area. These vessels typically were 150- to 250-foot coastal freighters that carried an average cocaine load of approximately 2.5 metric tons. The most common storage locations for cocaine were hidden compartments within fuel or ballast tanks. Modifications sometimes were made to the structure of the vessel, which made access to hidden compartments impossible without literally tearing the vessel apart. Additionally, compartments in some cases were mounted on the exterior of the ships; this was the case with a cargo vessel that arrived in July in Bridgeport, Connecticut, from Turbo, Colombia. USCS inspectors and the Connecticut State Police discovered a 5-foot sealed metal tube attached to the underside of the vessel; the tube contained 40 kilograms of cocaine.

Commercial fishing vessels also were used for smuggling operations. Fishing vessels were well-suited for mother ship operations because they typically had capacities for large shipments and were equipped with sophisticated navigation and communication instruments. Consequently, they did not require refitting that would indicate the vessels roles in smuggling operations. Fishing vessels also were able to stay at sea for long periods and travel long distances. Additionally, fishing vessels were difficult to monitor and tight-knit fishing communities made infiltration by drug law enforcement authorities difficult. In addition to the above factors, fishing vessels were able to blend into the local surroundings. The use of fishing vessels for trafficking operations was demonstrated in October 1996, when Ecuadorian authorities at the Port of Esmeraldas seized nearly 7 metric tons of cocaine discovered aboard the fishing vessel Don Celso.

Noncommercial maritime vessels used by traffickers tended to be locally available vessels that could blend into the local surroundings. In areas with a high volume of recreational traffic, smugglers used the same types of boats as the local population, such as go-fast boats and yolas. Additionally, smugglers operated during weekends and at other times of peak boating activity to blend in with local traffic.

Smugglers also made attempts to avoid detection by operating at night without navigation lights. Smugglers received off-loads during at-sea transfers from mother ships that arrived from source countries, and then landed with the cocaine at marinas, isolated inlets, bays, bayous, beaches, or other areas that would hinder surveillance. Landing sites typically were located near major roads that connected to interstate highway systems, thus providing smugglers with easy access to escape routes.

There often was little effort made to conceal cocaine shipments transported by noncommercial maritime vessels, either because the cocaine had just been retrieved after airdrops and the boat crews had no opportunity to attempt concealment, or because the vessels simply were too small to provide much concealment.

Maritime craft known as low-profile vessels (LPVs) also were used to smuggle cocaine to Puerto Rico. LPVs are small, sleek vessels that ride low in the water and often have light gray camouflage paint schemes--all factors that make LPVs difficult to spot at sea at distances of over 1.5 nautical miles.

Aircraft were used to transport cocaine from South America both to staging sites in Mexico, Puerto Rico, elsewhere in the Caribbean, and, on occasion, directly to the United States. Aircraft used in flights to Mexico and the Caribbean most commonly were dual-engine, general aviation aircraft. Transportation directly from South America to the United States, on the other hand, was typically accomplished by airliner, with the cocaine concealed in either airfreight cargo or courier luggage. USCS inspectors at Miami International Airport uncovered a number of such shipment attempts in 1996. For example, in February, 91 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in four rolls of injection molding that arrived on a cargo flight from Medellin, Colombia. Also in February, 149 kilograms of cocaine were found in unclaimed luggage that arrived from Colombia. Less frequently, cocaine was concealed within the airliner by personnel with access to the aircraft. For example, in March, mechanics working on electronic components in a Boeing 757 at Miami International Airport discovered 30 kilograms of cocaine hidden behind overhead and side panels in the aircrafts cockpit.

Smuggling into the United States

Cocaine shipments transported through Mexico or Central America generally were moved overland to staging sites in northern Mexico, although intelligence suggests a substantial amount of cocaine also was moved to the border area by aircraft. At these staging sites, the cocaine was broken down into smaller loads for smuggling across the U.S.-Mexican border.

The primary cocaine importation points within the United States were in Arizona, southern California, southern Florida, and Texas. Typically, land vehicles were driven across the Southwest border, and then either left in parking lots or driven directly to storage sites in the United States. One such storage site was discovered in December 1996, when a raid on a Tucson, Arizona, residence led to the seizure of over 5 metric tons of cocaine. Other storage sites uncovered during 1996 included a Houston residence where 1.4 metric tons of cocaine were seized in August; an El Paso residence where 884 kilograms were seized in September; and a Los Angeles storage business where 750 kilograms of cocaine were seized in November.

Colombian organizations relied on Mexican groups based in such locations as Guadalajara, Matamoros, Sinaloa, and Tijuana to convey their cocaine into the United States. Mexican trafficking groups have established themselves as land transportation specialists for smuggling drugs across the Southwest border. Frequently, these trafficking organizations were comprised of polydrug smugglers who transported marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin in addition to cocaine. When operating on behalf of the Colombians, these Mexican groups maintained control of drug shipments until the cross-border movement was completed and delivery was made to Colombian drug mafia distribution cells operating in the United States. However, in 1996, with greater frequency, Mexican groups also transported cocaine obtained in payment for their services. Since the early 1990s, these groups based in Mexico often demanded upwards of 50 percent of the Colombian cocaine shipments as payment. In 1996, the Mexican traffickers purchased cocaine directly from the Colombians to transport to Mexican controlled distribution networks in the United States. (see textbox on page 6)

Typically, cross-border cocaine shipments were smuggled across the U.S.-Mexican border in concealed compartments within cars, trucks, and recreation vehicles, as well as hidden in legitimate tractor-trailer cargo. Using this method, traffickers were able to take advantage of the tremendous numbers of people and vehicles crossing the Southwest border.* These cocaine shipments typically consisted of 20- to 50- kilogram loads in concealed compartments, primarily under floors and in gas tanks of passenger cars, pickup trucks, and vans. Larger quantities, however, have been seized. In March, for example, 420 kilograms of cocaine were found in the rear seat area of a car crossing the U.S-Mexican border at the Calexico, California, port of entry. Traffickers also moved cocaine across the borders in trucks, with the cocaine commingled with perishable items such as frozen fish or produce. In April 1996, USCS inspectors at the Colombia International Bridge, in Webb County, Texas, discovered over 1 metric ton of cocaine in the false ceiling of a tractor-trailer that entered the United States from Mexico through Laredo, Texas. And in an October case, USCS inspectors at the Mariposa Cargo Facility in Nogales, Arizona, discovered 437 kilograms of cocaine concealed within the walls of a tractor-trailer transporting a shipment of squash.

Cocaine also was carried across the U.S.-Mexican border by couriers known as "mules," who crossed into the United States either legally through Southwest border ports of entry, or illegally through undesignated points along the border. The mules typically carried small, kilogram quantities of cocaine, thus minimizing the loss in the event they were stopped and searched.

In order to avoid interdiction, traffickers monitored drug law enforcement activity along the U.S.-Mexican border using sophisticated surveillance and counter surveillance equipment, such as high-powered video recorders. Traffickers used radios with computer-controlled frequencies to make monitoring difficult. To escort cocaine shipments across the border, traffickers hired armed scouts, who increasingly have resorted to violence to evade U.S. border officials.

There was limited smuggling of cocaine into the United States by general aviation aircraft. The operation of ground radars and land-based aerostat radar systems along the U.S. Southwest border had made such operations rare. The threat of cross-border air smuggling was greatest in the Arizona and New Mexico area, where the terrain was conducive to attempts by pilots to evade radar detection. In 1996, several smuggling attempts by general aviation aircraft were detected. On July 23, authorities detected an apparent attempted airdrop near Iron Mountain, California. Mexican authorities reportedly seized 177 kilograms of cocaine after the aircraft abandoned the airdrop attempt and returned to Magdalena, Sonora, where it crashed on a highway. On August 6, U.S. authorities seized 200 kilograms of cocaine after airdrops near Desert Center, California. After making the drops, the aircraft was tracked to an area south of Punta Penasco, Sonora.

Puerto Rico remained a major transit point in the Caribbean for U.S. destined cocaine shipments. Also in 1996, increased seizures and intelligence reports pointed to a renewed interest by traffickers to smuggle cocaine into the United States through Florida. Seizures of cocaine from commercial and noncommercial vessels in Florida, intelligence reports on noncommercial vessels destined for Florida, and known movements going into The Bahamas suggested that increased quantities of cocaine were being transported by vessel to Florida. Increased drug law enforcement pressure on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border may have prompted traffickers to diversify their trafficking routes to the United States.

Caribbean-routed cocaine shipments also were smuggled into the United States through the Gulf of Mexico. The proximity of the U.S. Gulf Coast to Mexico and Colombia, and the presence in the region of many undeveloped waterways, bayous, and inaccessible coastal areas made the region an attractive entry point into the United States. Cocaine was delivered to the region by go-fasts that typically off-loaded along the Caribbean side of Mexicos Yucatan Peninsula, in the areas of Bancos Chinchorro, Cancun, Isla Mujeres, and Cozumel. From these areas, shipments were transported by land, air, or maritime conveyances along various routes.

Fishing vessels presented a substantial smuggling threat, while Mexican shark boats* were suspected of smuggling activity. In one incident that may have involved shark boats, on February 15, Federal and local authorities in Cameron County, Texas, converged on a beach at Andy Bowie Park, near South Padre Island, immediately after a ship-to-shore transfer of drugs by several boats. Authorities seized 336 kilograms of cocaine and 755 kilograms of marijuana, arrested three suspects, and confiscated two vehicles.

Intelligence indicated South American traffickers used commercial maritime cargo as their primary means to transship multiton loads of cocaine into the U.S. West Coast. The majority of the shipments originated from South American source countries and were transshipped through Central America and Mexico. Traffickers employed private maritime vessels to smuggle cocaine throughout the Pacific region.

On the U.S. Pacific coast, Southern California had the greatest likelihood of being exploited for noncommercial maritime smuggling, due to the large volume of pleasure craft activity in and around Los Angeles and San Diego, as well as the areas proximity to Mexico. The central California coast likewise posed a threat, due to both the large amount of pleasure craft activity into which traffickers can blend, and the many small bays, hidden coves, inlets, and remote beaches that served as delivery sites.

Distribution in the United States

Wholesale cocaine distribution within the United States continued to be controlled primarily by the Cali drug mafia, which had sophisticated and highly compartmentalized methods of operation and operational cells in many U.S. cities. Cell managers, operating independently of other cells, received their orders directly from Colombia. Colombian traffickers distributed multihundred- and multithousand-kilogram quantities of cocaine, primarily from Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City. The Cali drug mafia controlled most of the cocaine brought into New York City, shipping the drug from staging sites in California, Florida, and Texas. Cocaine supplied by smugglers operating from Mexico was temporarily stored at staging sites in the Southwest.

Proceeds from the sales of cocaine were collected from cities and towns all over the country and consolidated in several cities for collection and, increasingly, for direct transfer to Colombia. The primary collection points were located in Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City.

While Colombian criminals still dominated the U.S. wholesale market, groups from Mexico also played a role in cocaine distribution. As already noted, the Colombian drug mafias often employed transportation groups based in Mexico to smuggle cocaine through Mexico into the United States. Because the Colombians frequently paid these Mexican transportation organizations for their services with a percentage of the cocaine shipments, they have enabled the groups controlled from Mexico to become wholesale distributors of cocaine within the United States. (see textbox on page 6)

From the main distribution points, cocaine was transported to markets throughout the United States through the use of commercial and private vehicles, including trains, buses, airlines, and the postal service. U.S. drug law enforcement authorities frequently encountered smuggling operations that involved concealed compartments within vehicles, such as campers, recreational vehicles, trucks, and vans. Smuggling cocaine in concealed compartments was demonstrated by a number of seizures made across the United States in 1996. For example, in April, police in Memphis, Tennessee, seized 195 kilograms of cocaine that had been secreted in electronically controlled traps in the floor of a van en route from Dallas to New York City. And in February, Illinois State Police in LaSalle seized 126 kilograms of cocaine found in the floor of a motor home en route from Los Angeles to Staten Island, New York. In March, U.S. Border Patrol agents in Amarillo, Texas, discovered 122 kilograms of cocaine in the ceiling of a motor home en route from Austin, Texas, to Chicago. In other cases, attempts at concealment were either less elaborate or even nonexistent. In a February seizure made by police in Shelby County, Tennessee, over 240 kilograms of cocaine were found in luggage in the rear of a van being driven from Dallas to New York City. In Houston, 1.28 metric tons of cocaine were seized in January from a truck destined for New York City, and 845 kilograms were seized in August from a tractor-trailer en route to Chicago.

At the retail level, distribution was controlled by a variety of highly ethnocentric criminal groups. In major U.S. cities, organized groups of Cuban, Jamaican, and Mexican criminals, as well as African-American and Dominican gangs, dominated the retail market. The Crips, Bloods, and Dominican gangs, as well as Jamaican posses, were responsible primarily for widespread cocaine and crack cocaine-related violence. The migration of gang and posse members to smaller U.S. cities and rural areas resulted in increases in drug-related homicides, armed robberies, and assaults in those areas.

Developments in North and Central America

In 1996, Canada continued to serve as both a destination and a transshipment point for cocaine. Canadian authorities preliminarily reported the seizure of over 1 metric ton of cocaine in 1996, compared to 1.5 metric tons in 1995. Cocaine was smuggled into the country by a variety of methods. Several substantial seizures were made from maritime vessels arriving from South America. For example, in June approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine were seized from a cargo consignment of cookware imported into Vancouver from Colombia. Other shipments arrived by air. This was the case with a number of airfreight shipments, such as the 52 kilograms of cocaine smuggled into Montreals Mirabel International Airport from Barcelona, Spain, in February, and 62 kilograms of cocaine smuggled into Toronto International Airport from Trinidad in August. A more unusual airborne delivery occurred in September, when 510 kilograms of cocaine were air-dropped into a lake near Clova, Quebec, from a Cessna Caravan aircraft that had flown nonstop from Guajira, Colombia.

Canadian officials believed that at least 70 percent of the cocaine smuggled into Canada was destined for the United States. Smuggling to the United States through Canada was facilitated by the vast, remote land border between the two countries, as well as by the extensive waterways along the border. These geographic factors also made detection of cross-border smuggling difficult. By the same token, these geographic factors also enabled traffickers to smuggle cocaine from the United States into Canada. Several seizures in 1996 were indicative of this northward flow of cocaine. For example, in July, 400 kilograms of cocaine were seized from a container shipment of liquid soap imported into Toronto from Manta, Ecuador, by way of Philadelphia. Another shipment of 212 kilograms of cocaine was seized by USCS inspectors at the Port of Newark from a container shipment of coffee beans destined for Montreal. And in November, Arkansas State Police seized 175 kilograms of cocaine secreted in hidden compartments in a flatbed truck destined for Canada.

Mexico continued to be the primary transshipment point for cocaine destined for the United States. Mexican authorities seized 23.6 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, compared to 22 metric tons in 1995. The vast bulk of the cocaine smuggled through Mexico originated in Colombia.

Four major Mexico-based drug mafias controlled drug smuggling throughout Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border. The most powerful group is based in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and is headed by Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the most important figure in Mexicos trafficking hierarchy.

The second most powerful group, headed by brothers Benjamin and Ramon Arellano-Felix, is based in Tijuana. For years, the Arellano-Felix brothers have eluded arrest, while a third brother, Francisco, remains in prison. The power and ruthlessness of the Arellano-Felix brothers were demonstrated vividly in 1996, when sources linked the organization to the assassination of a number of active or retired Tijuana drug law enforcement officials.

A third drug mafia, headed by Miguel Caro-Quintero and based in the northern State of Sonora, reportedly was associated closely with the Arellano-Felix organization. This polydrug organization was active in northwestern Mexico smuggling cocaine, marijuana, and heroin across the border into the United States. Cross-border smuggling activity also reportedly involved smuggling arms into Mexico from the United States.

Mexicos fourth major drug mafia, based on the Gulf of Mexico in Matamoros, Tamaulipas State, was headed until 1996 by Juan Garcia-Abrego. However, he was arrested in January 1996 by Mexican authorities in Nuevo Leon, and expelled to Houston, Texas. In Houston, Garcia-Abrego was tried and convicted on 22 counts of drug trafficking, money laundering, and operating a continuing criminal enterprise. He received a sentence of 11 consecutive life terms in prison and was fined $128 million. Garcia-Abregos arrest and conviction, unfortunately, had little effect on cocaine trafficking into the United States, as elements of his organization remained intact. Moreover, any reduction in territory and influence suffered by the Garcia-Abrego organization was balanced by an increase in the power of the rival Carrillo-Fuentes organization.

In 1996, Colombian traffickers delivered cocaine to Mexico using a variety of methods. Smuggling by aircraft continued, although the use of cargo jet and passenger jet aircraft for multiton smuggling ventures reportedly was less common than in previous years. Seizures of cocaine shipments transported to Mexico by aircraft included the March seizures of 428 kilograms of cocaine delivered to Mexicali, Baja California Norte State, by a Cessna 210 aircraft, and of 700 kilograms delivered to Veracruz State by a Beechcraft Queen Air. In June, an even larger quantity was seized by authorities on Mexicos west coast. Authorities in that case seized approximately 1 metric ton of cocaine delivered to the Lake Chacahua area of Oaxaca State by a Beechcraft Super King Air. This seizure, in turn, was overshadowed in November, when authorities in Trinidad, Sinaloa State, seized a Gulf Stream I aircraft and approximately 1.6 metric tons of cocaine.

Colombian traffickers also continued to use maritime vessels to smuggle cocaine into Mexico. For example, two seizures made during February at the Port of Altamira in Tamaulipas yielded over 1 metric ton of cocaine. In one of the seizures, authorities found 600 kilograms in the false bottom of a shipping container of bathroom fixtures that arrived from Buenaventura, Colombia. In the other case, over 400 kilograms were found in a container shipment of polypropylene fabric from Cartagena, Colombia. An even larger quantity of cocaine was seized in October, when authorities discovered 3.2 metric tons of cocaine in a container shipment of pipes imported into the Port of Salinas Cruz, Oaxaca, from Guayaquil, Ecuador.

While traffickers relied primarily on air and maritime transportation to move cocaine into Mexico from South America, they relied on land transportation to move cocaine from Central America into Mexico and from Mexico into the United States. A major route for cocaine traffic is the Pan-American Highway, which extends through Central America. Tractor-trailers were the preferred method of transport for large loads, while smaller vehicles with false compartments moved smaller quantities. Examples of significant seizures from land vehicles included the seizure in March of 658 kilograms of cocaine made at a checkpoint between Gomez Palacios, Durango, and Jimenez, Chihuahua. The cocaine was discovered in false ceilings in two tractor- trailers en route from Torreo, Coahuila, to Villa Aldama, Chihuahua. In April, authorities at a checkpoint between San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora, and Mexicali, Baja California Norte, seized 818 kilograms of cocaine from a false ceiling in a tractor-trailer en route from Guadalajara, Jalisco, to Mexicali. Also in April, Federal police at a highway checkpoint in Chihuahua seized 568 kilograms of cocaine hidden in two truckloads of plantains en route from Tabasco to El Paso, Texas. The years largest seizure from a land vehicle, however, took place in September, when authorities in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, discovered 3 metric tons of cocaine after stopping a truck en route from the port city of Tampico, in southern Tamaulipas, to the northern Tamaulipas city of Reynosa.

In another noteworthy drug law enforcement event, Mexican military authorities in December seized a cocaine HCl conversion laboratory discovered in the desert near Hermosillo, Sonora. The laboratory was a permanent structure, complete with stoves, plumbing, and bunks for 40 workers. Authorities believed that an abandoned ice factory served as a chemical storage facility for the laboratory. Authorities estimated 1.5 metric tons of cocaine already may have been produced at this laboratory, which was the most sophisticated cocaine production facility ever seized in Mexico. The laboratory appeared to represent a move by a Mexican trafficking organization to expand into the production phase of cocaine trafficking. A large-scale shift to cocaine production by Mexican traffickers, however, remains unlikely, given the friction such a move would cause between the Mexicans and the Colombian drug mafias that control most of the cocaine moved by the Mexicans.

Traffickers continued to transship cocaine through Belize by airdrop and maritime vessel for further transshipment to the United States, either directly or through Mexico, Jamaica, or the Cayman Islands. The countrys 370-mile coastline, 100-plus unmonitored airstrips, and 2 deep-water ports made Belize particularly accessible to traffickers. The total quantity of cocaine seized in Belize in 1996 amounted to approximately 440 kilograms, a decrease from 840 kilograms seized in 1995. The 1995 figure, however, included one unusually large seizure of 636 kilograms of cocaine in January. The most significant seizure in Belize in 1996 took place in May in Cartagena when authorities found 364 kilograms of cocaine aboard a Cessna Crusader aircraft that had been tracked from Honduras, through Mexico, and into Belize. In addition, in January, 1.4 metric tons of cocaine were seized approximately 100 miles east of Ambergris Cay, Belize.

Costa Rica has a total of 800 miles of coastline on the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, and, therefore, is accessible to pleasure boats and fishing vessels sailing from Colombia along both Caribbean and Pacific routes. Additionally, the country is easily accessible by land from Panama, another known transshipment nation, and by air with 200 unmonitored airstrips. These factors, combined with the countrys proximity to Colombia, made Costa Rica a convenient staging point for traffickers operating out of Colombia. Cocaine seizures reflected this assessment since approximately 2 metric tons of cocaine were seized in 1996, a huge increase over 412 kilograms in 1995. In fact, the 1995 seizure total was surpassed in one November 1996 operation, when authorities in Limon seized 645 kilograms of cocaine being readied for transport to Miami and New York City in containerized shipments of agricultural products. In 1996, other significant seizures included the January seizure of 122 kilograms of cocaine on southern Costa Ricas Osa Peninsula, and the March seizure of 150 kilograms of cocaine at the Paso Canoas port of entry on the Costa Rican-Panamanian border.

In El Salvador, authorities seized 100 kilograms of cocaine in 1996, an increase from 75 kilograms in 1995. Traffic through El Salvador was facilitated by links between Salvadoran criminals and members of drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the United States. Drug traffickers moved cocaine through El Salvador primarily by land and sea. Traffickers reportedly smuggled cocaine in commercial maritime cargo through the southern Port of Acajutla, which is connected by a highway system to three crossing points on the Salvadoran-Guatemalan border. Tractor-trailers were used mainly to smuggle cocaine into Guatemala for eventual delivery in Mexico. Traffickers also smuggled cocaine into El Salvador by aircraft, albeit to a lesser extent. Uncontrolled airstrips in the San Miguel and La Union Departments, near the Pan-American Highway, provided convenient transshipment points for traffickers smuggling by general aviation aircraft. Additionally, cocaine reportedly was air-dropped into waters off El Salvadors Pacific coast. Cocaine delivered in this manner was then transported northward by maritime vessels operating out of the small Salvadoran fishing port of La Libertad.

In Guatemala, trafficking organizations transported shipments of cocaine northward through Central America into Mexico. Traffickers received large cocaine deliveries by both air and sea, which they then broke down into smaller portions for overland movement. This movement usually was accomplished in tractor-trailers or in commercial maritime cargo. In 1996, authorities seized approximately 4 metric tons of cocaine, an increase from 1 metric ton in 1995. Of the 1996 amount, authorities seized 1.2 metric tons in August, after a delivery from a 30-foot fishing boat off the coast of Punta Manabique. An additional metric ton was seized in November from a tractor-trailer in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, Escuintla Department. Other cocaine seizures included 340 kilograms in February from several pickup trucks stopped at the Guatemalan-Mexican border, and 362 kilograms in December from a tractor-trailer stopped at the Pedro de Alvarado port of entry on the Guatemalan-Salvadoran border.

Significant seizures in Guatemala also were made from aircraft. In July, for example, a helicopter-borne drug law enforcement team followed a Cessna Centurion to an airstrip in Aldea Guacamaya, Department of Izabal, and seized 359 kilograms of cocaine delivered by the aircraft. And in October, authorities raided a remote airstrip and seized 1 metric ton of cocaine. Legitimate air cargo services also were used for cocaine transshipment, as demonstrated by the October seizure by authorities at Guatemala Citys La Aurora International Airport of 274 kilograms of cocaine from a consignment of handcrafted handbags destined for Miami.

Honduras lies midway between Colombia and the United States. Because of the countrys long Caribbean coastline and offshore islands, traffickers took advantage of difficulties in detecting and interdicting maritime smuggling. Honduran and Colombian drug trafficking organizations primarily used maritime vessels to transport cocaine along the Honduran north coast. The Honduran Bay Islands served as a transit site where cocaine was concealed in legitimate cargo such as seafood and then shipped to the United States. Occasionally, cocaine reportedly was picked up in fishing vessels in Nicaraguan and southern Honduran waters, and then moved to Jamaica by way of the Bay Islands. From Jamaica, cocaine was transported to The Bahamas or directly to the United States. The use of Honduran waters for cocaine smuggling was demonstrated in January, when the U.S. Coast Gurad (USCG) seized 1.4 metric tons of cocaine jettisoned by a go-fast boat approximately 20 miles northwest of Santanilla, Honduras.

In addition to serving as a staging point for maritime smuggling, Honduras also served as a transit point for cocaine shipments being transported by land northward along the Pan-American Highway. This was illustrated in 1996 with the seizure of three cocaine shipments from tractor-trailers at the El Guasaule, Choluteca Department, a port of entry on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. These seizures included 225 kilograms of cocaine en route from Panama to Mexico, 684 kilograms en route from Costa Rica to Guatemala, and 307 kilograms en route from Costa Rica to Mexico. In total, approximately 3.3 metric tons of cocaine were seized in Honduras in 1996, a dramatic increase from 400 kilograms in 1995.

Nicaragua continued to play an important role in cocaine trafficking to the United States, largely due to its location near traditional air and sea smuggling routes. Drug traffickers shipped cocaine from Colombias San Andres Island to Nicaraguas Corn Island and Cayos Miskitos Islands, as well as the Port of Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas. From these points, traffickers were able to reach Florida by go-fast boats in as little as 6 hours. Cocaine shipments also were transported overland, along roads stretching from Puerto Cabezas to the Mosquitia region of Honduras, as well as along the Pan-American Highway. In 1996, 560 kilograms of cocaine were seized in Nicaragua. This was down from 1.5 metric tons in 1995, but of the 1995 amount, 1.4 metric tons were seized during one operation. In addition to seizures by Nicaraguan authorities, the U.S. Navy in November 1996 recovered 14 bales containing 400 kilograms of cocaine in international waters off the Nicaraguan coast. The cocaine had been jettisoned by the crew of a go-fast boat destined for Nicaragua, after the crew became aware of U.S. air surveillance; another 10 bales jettisoned by the crew while they were under surveillance were not recovered.

Panama is a key transit country for cocaine destined for the United States. A substantial quantity of the cocaine smuggled to the United States by commercial maritime cargo reportedly passes through Panamas Colon Free Zone (CFZ)--the largest free trade zone in the Americas.

In a cocaine smuggling operation, traffickers transported cocaine to Panama from Colombia primarily by maritime vessel. The cocaine then was stored at stash sites, normally in the CFZ, before being loaded into maritime commercial cargo vessels or commercial and noncommercial land vehicles destined for the United States.

In 1996, a total of 7.8 metric tons of cocaine were seized in Panama. This figure, however, was inflated by the August seizure of 2.4 metric tons of cocaine from the fishing vessel Oyster, which was escorted to Rodman Naval Base in the Panama Canal Zone specifically for inspection purposes. The Oyster reportedly was en route from Colombia to Mexico when it was intercepted off the Colombian coast, and probably would not have transited Panama but for its interception. Among other significant seizures, police in September discovered over 1 metric ton of cocaine in two vehicles following a car chase and a brief gun battle. The chase began when the vehicles ran a roadblock near the Port of Samba Bonita, Colon. In addition, 417 kilograms of cocaine were seized by police in Colon in June, and 539 kilograms were seized by authorities in Distrito de Baru, Chiriqui, in July.

Several other significant enforcement events also took place in Panama in 1996. In April, for example, police in Panama City arrested Colombian cocaine trafficker Jose Castrillon-Henao. Castrillons trafficking organization has been linked to two cocaine seizures off the coast of Panama--12 metric tons from the Nataly I in July 1995 and 2.5 metric tons from the catamaran Michael Angelo in October 1995. Also in April 1996, the Panamanian Government extradited Colombian national Fernando Hernandez-Arias to the United States. Hernandez had been indicted in the Federal District of New Jersey on charges of drug trafficking, money laundering, and income tax fraud.

Although the country is not considered a major coca producer, coca is cultivated in Panama to a limited extent. In February 1996, Panamas National Air Service completed a successful aerial coca eradication effort in an area of Darien Province, near the Colombian border, destroying approximately 125 hectares of coca plants.

Developments in the Caribbean

The Bahamas are made up of 700 islands and over 2,000 islets that occupy 100,000 square miles of ocean in the Atlantic. The island chain, which lies as close as 52 miles from Miami and which stretches as far south as Haiti, is a favorite staging ground for drug smugglers. Aircraft fly from South America and Jamaica to The Bahamas, where they make airdrops or land to make deliveries. Maritime vessels also smuggle cocaine from Jamaica to The Bahamas. Drugs that arrive in The Bahamas are then moved to Florida or to States on the Atlantic coast, typically by noncommercial maritime means. In 1996, 410 kilograms of cocaine were seized in The Bahamas, an increase over the 391 kilograms seized in 1995. This increase was due in large part to a single July seizure of cocaine by authorities in Matthewtown, Great Inagua initially thought to be as large as 1 metric ton. The ,cocaine was discovered aboard a go-fast boat that ran aground after developing engine trouble. The cocaine reportedly had been air-dropped off the coast of Jamaica and retrieved by the boats crew.

Drug law enforcement authorities from The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the United States continued their successful 14-year operation conducting joint patrols in Bahamian and surrounding waters. The operation is known by the acronym OPBAT (Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands). OPBAT enforcement teams include Bahamian officers, who provide local enforcement authority, and U.S. Army and USCG personnel who provide helicopter support for the teams. Additionally, U.S.-Bahamian agreements allow U.S. authorities to engage in patrols in and near Bahamian waters and o exercise jurisdiction over non-Bahamian vessels. Royal Bahamas Defence Force officers are assigned to a number of USCG cutters in order to better coordinate drug interdiction operations. Since its inception, OPBAT activity has resulted in the seizure of 59 metric tons of cocaine and 318 metric tons of marijuana and the confiscation of aircraft, vehicles, and vessels valued in excess of $32 million.* Additionally, approximately 1,000 drug traffickers have been arrested, nearly one-third of whom were considered major violators.

OPBAT successes had contributed to a shifting of trafficker smuggling methods from aircraft delivery to a less detectable method--maritime smuggling. In 1996, however, traffickers continued to transport cocaine to the region by aircraft, and then airdrop to waiting go-fast boats for delivery to Florida. Aircraft landing and unloading in The Bahamas, however, remain rare. The only trafficker aircraft that continued to land in The Bahamas were flights originating from Jamaica. Air traffic between Jamaica and The Bahamas was more difficult to detect because of the proximity of the islands and the ability of low-flying aircraft to avoid radar.

Cocaine shipments transitted Cubas airspace and territorial waters en route to the United States. Traffickers reportedly sought to avoid law enforcement presence in The Bahamas by crossing Cubas airspace, using international air corridors to avoid detection. In addition, traffickers transited Cuban territorial waters in the course of maritime smuggling operations. Available information indicates that Cuban authorities seized a total of 6.3 metric tons of cocaine in 1996. [Although full-year data for 1995 are not available, it has been reported that Cuban authorities seized only 155 kilograms of cocaine in the first 8 months of 1995.]

The most significant seizure of 1996 in Cuba occurred on October 1, when the USCG intercepted and boarded the M/V Limerick, which had been en route from Barranquilla, Colombia, to Freeport, The Bahamas. The ultimate destination for the cocaine appears to have been Miami. The USCG seized 6.2 metric tons of cocaine, discovered in hidden compartments aboard the Limerick, which had to be evacuated after taking on water. The ship eventually drifted into Cuban waters, preventing further U.S. action. The Cuban Coast Guard, however, towed the vessel into Santiago de Cuba Harbor, where it was refloated and searched. In December, Cuban officials transferred the seized cocaine to U.S. authorities in order to facilitate the prosecution of the Limericks crew members. Other significant seizures included the confiscation in February of 360 kilograms discovered aboard a go-fast boat en route from Colombia to Haiti, and another February seizure of 180 kilograms discovered aboard the freighter Spiritus, which ostensibly was transporting a shipment of cement mix from Colombia to Haiti.

The Dominican Republic continued to be a transshipment area for cocaine. A number of favorable factors contribute to the nations popularity with cocaine traffickers. First, it lies 61 nautical miles from Puerto Rico, making smuggling by fishing boat to Puerto Rico fairly simple. Second, it shares a long and sometimes desolate border with Haiti. Third, the countrys long coastline and dense thickets of mangroves are ideal areas for airdrops and noncommercial smuggling from Colombia and Venezuela.

In 1996, Dominican authorities seized a total of 1.2 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 3.6 metric tons in 1995. Authorities interdicted shipments transported by sea and air, by both commercial and noncommercial methods. Examples of maritime cocaine shipments included 100 kilograms seized in June from a maritime containerized cargo shipment of marble tiles imported into the Port of Haina, and 630 kilograms seized near Monte Rio Beach, City of Azua, in August, after off-loading from a 32-foot go-fast boat that sailed from La Viguay, Colombia. In addition, approximately 560 kilograms of cocaine were seized in February from a container shipment of avocados that arrived in Newark, New Jersey, from the Dominican Republic.

Examples of shipments delivered by air included 270 kilograms of cocaine seized south of Isla Catalina in February after an airdrop off the Dominican coast from an aircraft flying out of Colombia, and 23 0 kilograms discovered in December in two airplane engines shipped by air freight to Santo Domingo.

Despite USCG patrols off the northern coast of Haiti, maritime shipments of cocaine continued to reach Haitis shores in 1996. Seizures in 1996 totaled 1.4 metric tons. Drug traffickers exploited Haitis numerous uncontrolled airstrips, an unguarded coastline, and a remote interior. In addition, widespread corruption in Haiti continued to be a problem in 1996.

Cargo ships, fishing vessels, and go-fast boats sailing from Colombia reportedly delivered cocaine shipments to Haitian fishing and sailing vessels off the Haitian coast; these vessels then delivered the cocaine to Haiti. Once smuggled into the country, cocaine destined for transshipment to the United States by maritime vessel typically was transported overland to one of three ports: Gonaives, Miragoane, or Port-de-Paix. From these ports, small Haitian cargo ships transported the cocaine to Miami, or to transshipment locations in the northern Bahamas. A number of seizures from cargo ships departing Haitian ports took place in 1996. For example, in August, U.S. and Haitian Coast Guard personnel seized 348 kilograms of cocaine discovered in a forward compartment of the M/V Nuola Express after the ships arrival in Port-au-Prince from Colon, Panama. An even larger seizure took place in September, when a U.S.-Haitian Coast Guard team at the Port of St. Marc discovered 585 kilograms of cocaine aboard the M/V Caribo. The Caribo, which had sailed from Coco Solo, Panama, was intercepted by the USCG Cutter Northland and escorted to St. Marc. Meanwhile, in Miami, USCS inspectors seized 48 kilograms from the cargo ship Tortue Express, which arrived in March from Port-de-Paix, and another 21 kilograms from the cargo ship Andre Paul, which arrived in August from Miragone.

Traffickers also smuggled cocaine both into and out of Haiti by airline courier, with seizures of 45 and 80 kilograms made in March and June from couriers scheduled to board flights to Miami and New York City, respectively. General aviation aircraft reportedly also were used to smuggle cocaine into Haiti, with traffickers either air-dropping cocaine off the coast, or landing and unloading at clandestine airstrips along the northern shore of Haitis southern peninsula.

Jamaica was a transshipment area for both maritime and air shipments of cocaine. This likely was due to the countrys long coastline, its position near international sailing routes, and its thinly stretched security forces. Go-fast boats posed a significant trafficking threat, given their ability to make the journey between Colombia and Jamaica in less than 12 hours. Additionally, aircraft based on Jamaica were used to pick up and deliver cocaine. Airdrops usually were made to boats off the southwest coast in the Pedro Banks area, off the southeast coast to the Morant Cays, and off the northeast coast. Aircraft flying from Jamaica, meanwhile, reportedly were used to transport cocaine to The Bahamas. In 1996, Jamaican authorities seized 236 kilograms of cocaine, compared to 571 kilograms seized in 1995.

Puerto Rico remained the primary eastern Caribbean destination for multiton cocaine shipments. Both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were attractive staging points, given the fact that domestic commercial cargo shipments between these U.S. territories and the continental United States ordinarily are not subject to USCS inspection. Accordingly, most of the cocaine smuggled from these islands to the United States probably was concealed in commercial maritime or air cargo. Several seizures in 1996 supported this theory. In February, for example, USCS and New Jersey National Guard personnel in Newark, New Jersey, discovered 470 kilograms of cocaine in a container shipment of detergent that had arrived from Puerto Rico. Also in February, DEA and USCS agents in Philadelphia seized 227 kilograms of cocaine discovered in a containerized shipment of plumbing supplies imported from Colombia by way of Puerto Rico. And in December DEA special agents in Hialeah, Florida, seized approximately 840 kilograms of cocaine that had been imported into Miami from Venezuela, again by way of Puerto Rico.

In addition to cocaine shipments that transited Puerto Rico in containerized cargo, a significant amount of cocaine was smuggled into Puerto Rico by other methods, for later shipment to the United States. Airdrops by general aviation aircraft originating in Colombia or Venezuela to waiting go-fast boats commonly occurred in waters off the eastern and southern coasts of Puerto Rico and in the area of the U.S. Virgin Islands. In March 1996, for example, USCG personnel, responding to a reported airdrop 120 miles southeast of Point Tuna, Maunabo, intercepted a 25-foot sport fisher and found over 400 kilograms of cocaine aboard. The cocaine had been dropped from a twin-engine aircraft flying from Venezuela. Airdrops also have been made over land to Puerto Rico. In one July case, authorities seized nearly 300 kilograms of cocaine air-dropped from an aircraft flying out of Colombia to waiting vehicles near Santa Isabel. Additionally, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were destinations for cocaine air-dropped elsewhere in the eastern Caribbean--primarily in the Sabra Bank area (St. Martin, St. Kitts, and Sabra), and near Anguilla and Antigua. From these drop zones, cocaine was transported to Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands by go-fast boats.

In some cases, cocaine was delivered to Puerto Rico after first being smuggled into the Dominican Republic. In such cases, Dominican traffickers used yolas to make quick runs across the 90 nautical miles between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. In October, USCS personnel made two cocaine seizures, each of which amounted to approximately 1 metric ton, from yolas intercepted off the Puerto Rican coast. Go-fast boats frequently also were used to smuggle cocaine into Puerto Rico. The potential size of such shipments was demonstrated in December, when USCG, USCS, and DEA personnel seized 1.3 metric tons of cocaine after intercepting a 37-foot go-fast boat 2 nautical miles south of Salinas. The craft reportedly had departed from Santa Marta, Colombia, several days earlier. In another incident, Puerto Rican authorities in July seized over 1 metric ton of cocaine apparently jettisoned by a go-fast boat in waters off Palominos Island, Fajardo. In general, noncommercial maritime smuggling is a frequently used means of transporting cocaine to Puerto Rico. According to one estimate, approximately half of the cocaine moved through the eastern Caribbean by noncommercial maritime vessels may be smuggled directly through Puerto Rico.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean, cocaine traffickers continued to operate in the Lesser Antilles region, in waters near Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Martin, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. This area in general was used as a staging site for airdrops and small vessel smuggling. Maritime vessels sailing from Colombia or Venezuela transited the area en route to Puerto Rico, while aircraft flying out of Colombia or Venezuela air-dropped cocaine to waiting maritime vessels that then transported the cocaine to Puerto Rico. Examples of such smuggling operations included the January seizures of 400 kilograms of cocaine air-dropped 25 miles east of St. Kitts and 300 kilograms air-dropped off the coast of St. Martin.

Fishing vessels, pleasure craft, and commercial maritime cargo vessels also posed a smuggling threat. Fishing vessels and pleasure craft transported most of the cocaine that was smuggled into Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, while commercial cargo vessels carried most of the cocaine smuggled out of these countries. On the island of Saint Martin, which consists of French St. Martin and Dutch Sint Maarten, smuggling by commercial maritime cargo vessels also posed a threat, due largely to the islands free port status. However, airdrops and smuggling by go-fast boats posed greater dangers. The large number of tourists who visited Saint Martin on Caribbean cruises, meanwhile, made smuggling by cruise vessel another concern. Smuggling by couriers on commercial airlines was also a problem, primarily in the movement of cocaine from Saint Martin to the United States. Smuggling by commercial maritime cargo and commercial airlines likewise were problems in Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao. This was illustrated in November 1996, when authorities at Curacao International Airport seized 260 kilograms of cocaine discovered in coolers checked as luggage by 12 Haitian nationals en route to Miami through Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Developments in Source Countries

Official U.S. Government estimates determined that maximum potential worldwide cocaine production in 1996 amounted to 760 metric tons, compared to 780 metric tons in 1995. Actual worldwide cocaine production in 1996, based on data obtained under the auspices of Operation BREAKTHROUGH, was placed at 700 metric tons after deducting the estimates for coca produced for legal uses.*

According to the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System, U.S. Federal authorities seized 108.1 metric tons in Fiscal Year 1996, compared to 102.4 metric tons in Fiscal Year 1995.

Bolivia

Cultivation: In 1996, Bolivia produced the worlds second largest crop of coca leaf. In Bolivia, coca plants, cultivated on over 48,100 hectares of land, had the potential to yield 75,100 metric tons of coca leaf. By contrast, in 1995, 48,600 hectares of cultivation potentially yielded 85,000 metric tons of coca leaf.

Coca-growing areas were in the Yungas de La Paz, the Apolo, and the Chapare regions.

Yungas cultivation primarily served licit coca markets, as did the dwindling cultivation in the Apolo region. [In Bolivia, where chewing coca leaves and brewing coca leaf tea are accepted practices, coca cultivation is permitted in specified areas.] In the Chapare area, however, coca cultivation was dedicated almost exclusively to illicit cocaine production.

In 1996, the Bolivian Government eradicated 7,500 hectares of illicit coca crops, an increase from 5,493 hectares in 1995. Unfortunately, because coca growers planted 7,000 hectares of new coca crops, the net reduction in cultivation was modest. Recognizing the threat posed by new cultivation to achieving any substantial reduction in the total coca crop, the Bolivian Government in late 1996 took aggressive steps to locate and destroy new crops and waged a publicity campaign warning that planters of new crops would be prosecuted.

Processing: In 1996, coca leaf production in Bolivia accounted for a potential 215 metric tons of cocaine HCl, a decrease from 240 metric tons in 1995. [DEA estimated actual production at 172 metric tons in 1996 and 198 metric tons in 1995.]

Essential chemicals used in the production of cocaine base and cocaine HCl were smuggled across Bolivias borders with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay, mostly by road, railroad, and river networks, but occasionally by air. Additionally, precursor and essential chemicals were imported into Bolivia legally, and then diverted to cocaine processing operations. In 1996, Bolivian authorities, working with their Chilean counterparts, took strides toward stemming the flow of chemicals when they dismantled two organizations allegedly responsible for 80 percent of the essential chemicals smuggled into Bolivia from Chile. Other operations yielded significant chemical seizures including the February seizure in Choquecota, Oruro Department, of 3.2 metric tons of acetone, the August seizure in Santa Cruz Department of 18 metric tons of liquid ammonia, the September seizure in Cochabamba of 5 metric tons of sulfuric acid, and the October seizure in the Chapare of 3.4 metric tons of acetone. These measures forced producers to conserve chemicals and research recycling techniques. The price of chemicals in Bolivia also skyrocketed

Historically, cocaine processing in Bolivia did not proceed beyond the production of cocaine base. In the past, cocaine base would be shipped from Bolivia to Colombia, where processing into cocaine HCl would take place, and where arrangements would be made for movement of the cocaine into the international market.

In recent years, however, an increasing quantity of cocaine has been produced in and distributed from Bolivia, as the involvement of Colombian traffickers in Bolivia has decreased, leaving the production of both cocaine base and cocaine HCl primarily in the hands of Bolivians. This has been corroborated by seizure statistics, which have indicated that the previous ratio of coca product seizures consisting of 90 percent cocaine base and 10 percent cocaine has shifted to a ratio of approximately 70 percent cocaine base and 30 percent cocaine. In addition, this shift has been evidenced by intelligence indicating that some cocaine base is being shipped from Peru to Bolivia, rather than to Colombia, for processing. This fact has been substantiated by large-scale seizures of essential chemicals that are used in cocaine processing, and by an increasing number of confiscated cocaine conversion laboratories in Bolivia. In June, for example, federal authorities in Buena Vista seized an active cocaine HCl laboratory, along with 480 kilograms of cocaine and 1.1 metric tons of essential chemicals. Additionally, reports indicated that Bolivian trafficking organizations have established direct contacts with Mexican and European traffickers, to whom they are exporting cocaine directly.

Trafficking: Traffickers generally used aircraft to transport cocaine base from Bolivia to Colombia, where conversion into cocaine HCl took place. Cocaine base was transported from the Chapare by roads, trails, and rivers. Cocaine HCl and cocaine base from outlying laboratories and transshipment sites in El Beni, Panda, and Santa Cruz Departments were transported to Colombia, Brazil, and Paraguay, as well as to staging points elsewhere in Bolivia, primarily by twin-engine aircraft. Bolivian forces responded with roadblocks, mobile patrols, and riverine counterdrug operations.

Groups engaged in cocaine smuggling from Bolivia included independent Bolivian trafficking groups who frequently were engaged in smuggling to Europe by way of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. Mexican and Argentine groups also were engaged in smuggling to the United States.

Brazils role in cocaine smuggling from Bolivia was highlighted by a number of seizures made during 1996. For example, in June, authorities in El Carmen, Bolivia, seized 111 kilograms of cocaine discovered in the ceiling of a train dining car. The cocaine ultimately was destined for Corumba, Brazil. And in October, authorities in Santa Cruz seized 455 kilograms of cocaine discovered in a hidden compartment within a truck en route to Brazil. In December, Brazilian authorities at Brasilias international airport seized 223 kilograms of cocaine found in an air cargo shipment of coffee grounds and pepper that had originated in Santa Cruz. Meanwhile, Mexican and Argentine traffickers played a greater role in the direct exportation of Bolivian cocaine to the United States.

Drug Law Enforcement: In 1996, DEA agents and Bolivia police seized 168 metric tons of coca leaf and 4.3 metric tons of cocaine base, compared with 1995 seizures of 110 metric tons of coca leaf and 4.6 metric tons of cocaine base. Seizures of agua rica--a partially processed form of cocaine base in solution--amounted to 98,360 liters, compared to 14,300 liters in 1995. Seizures of cocaine HCl decreased from 3.6 metric tons in 1995 to 3.1 metric tons of cocaine in 1996. The largest cocaine seizures of the year included those seizures mentioned above, as well as the seizure in August of over 130 kilograms of cocaine from a residence in the Santa Cruz area. In all, Bolivian authorities arrested 955 violators and destroyed 7 cocaine laboratories and 2,033 cocaine base production sites in 1996.

Colombia

Cultivation: In 1996, Colombia was the worlds third largest producer of coca. An estimated 67,200 hectares of coca plant had the potential to yield 53,800 metric tons of coca leaf. This represented a marked increase from 1995, when cultivation covered 50,900 hectares of land, and the potential coca leaf yield stood at 40,800 metric tons. The Colombian Government reported the aerial spraying of approximately 16,000 hectares of coca in 1996--down from 24,000 hectares in 1995--but the amount of coca actually destroyed by the spraying is believed to be far less. Eradication operations by aerial spraying of herbicides were hindered in 1996 by a number of factors, including unusually bad weather, three U.S. Government-mandated groundings of eradication aircraft for security and technical reasons, and insurgent attacks against eradication aircraft.

Coca cultivation was located in the eastern plains, with heavy growth in Caqueta Department, Guaviare and Vaupes Commissariats, and Putumayo Intendency. Coca plants also were cultivated in Bolivar Department and in southwestern Colombia.

Processing: Most of the worlds cocaine is produced in Colombia. In addition to cocaine produced from Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine base, potential cocaine production from domestic Colombian coca leaf cultivation amounted to 110 metric tons in 1996, an increase over 80 metric tons in 1995. Actual production in 1996 was estimated at 100 metric tons.* Processing took place in laboratories that ranged in sophistication from small, simple operations to large, industrial-type facilities employing several hundred workers and producing over 250 kilograms of cocaine per day. Most laboratories were located in remote areas. In recent years, the largest cocaine laboratories discovered by Colombian authorities have been in the remote eastern lowlands, the rain forest, and in trafficker strongholds in the Valle de Cauca and Tolima Departments.

In 1996, the Colombian Government reported the destruction of 523 cocaine HCl and cocaine base laboratories, an increase from the 396 laboratories destroyed in 1995. Eleven of the largest laboratories, located by authorities in the Departments of Caqueta, Guaviare, Meta, and Vaupes, consisted of between 9 and 18 buildings, with housing for between 35 and 80 workers.

The essential chemicals needed by cocaine laboratories in Colombia were imported legally into the country, and then diverted to wholesalers or retailers after delivery. However, in one March operation, authorities seized 200 metric tons of sodium carbonate during a raid at a chemical company warehouse in Barranquilla. In this case, the chemicals had been imported from Poland without valid permits. In an August operation, authorities seized 10 metric tons of essential processing chemicals from a business in Bogota. The owner of the business allegedly falsified business records and documented fictitious transactions to justify the sale of controlled chemicals. A raid in October on a paint shop in Bogota resulted in the seizure of approximately 50 metric tons of controlled essential chemicals.

In 1996, Colombian authorities seized a total of more than 73 metric tons of solid precursor and essential chemicals and over 800 thousand gallons of liquid chemicals. [Note: These figures include chemicals used in the production of both cocaine and heroin.]

In response to increased law enforcement focus on chemical interdiction, traffickers have adopted sophisticated processing techniques and technologies designed to reduce the amount of chemicals required. In particular, the use of recycling systems has allowed traffickers to separate and recover a portion of the solvents used in the cocaine production process.

Trafficking: Although hundreds of Colombian criminal organizations engaged in cocaine trafficking, the handful of Colombian drug trafficking organizations, collectively known as the Cali drug mafia, until recently, held undisputed control over the international cocaine market. In 1996, although the Cali drug mafia continued to play the dominant role in the worldwide wholesale cocaine trade, some analysts noted a trend toward decentralization of the trade. This trend, which was given impetus in 1995 with the capture of kingpins Jose Santacruz-Londono and brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, was spurred on in 1996 with the capture of several additional significant traffickers (see the Drug Law Enforcement section). These arrests by no means crippled the Cali drug mafia. Indeed, reports indicated that the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers and others continued to direct their drug trafficking organizations from prison.

The arrests of the major Cali kingpins, however, were not without effect; they indirectly provided a new generation of Colombian traffickers with the opportunity to assume a larger role in the international cocaine trade. In particular, the Northern Valle del Cauca-based Henao-Montoya trafficking group, directed by brothers Arcangel de Jesus and Jose Orlando Henao-Montoya, moved to increase its power and influence. One result of this heightened competition between rival Colombian trafficking groups was an increase in drug-related violence in Colombia.

Despite the imprisonment of the Cali drug mafia leaders, cocaine trafficking patterns remained largely unaffected. Cocaine base was smuggled into Colombia mostly by single-engine general aviation aircraft capable of carrying loads ranging from 500 to 800 kilograms.

After processing, finished cocaine was smuggled out of the country along a number of routes, as detailed earlier in this report. Seizures in 1996 demonstrated the variety of methods used to transport these shipments. For example, go-fast boats were intercepted off the Colombian coast several times during the year, resulting in significant cocaine seizures. In March, personnel from the U.S.S. Vincennes recovered 1.5 metric tons of cocaine jettisoned from a 35-foot go-fast boat after the go-fast was overflown by a helicopter based aboard the Vincennes. In November, the USCG cutter Campbell intercepted a 44-foot go-fast boat 100 nautical miles north of Colombia, and seized 1.3 metric tons of cocaine. Smuggling attempts using containerized cargo also were detected. In January, for example, Colombian authorities seized a 200-kilogram shipment of cocaine that was to be secreted in a cargo container of blue jeans destined for San Francisco, California.

In other cases, seizures were made from fishing vessels. In August, for example, 2.4 metric tons of cocaine were discovered in secret compartments within the fishing vessel Oyster. The Oyster had been intercepted by the U.S.S. Sides, 15 nautical miles west of the Port of Tumaco, Colombia. The Oyster was escorted to Rodman Naval Base in the Panama Canal, where a thorough, dock-side inspection led to the discovery of the cocaine in a compartment within one of the Oysters fuel tanks.

Authorities also seized a number of cocaine shipments that were to be transported by aircraft. In June, for example, police in Bogota seized 150 kilograms of cocaine that was to be transported to Paris in an air cargo consignment of tropical fruit. And in November, Bogota authorities seized 567 kilograms of cocaine, at least a portion of which was to be sent to an unspecified Canadian city in luggage checked on commercial airline flights.

Drug Law Enforcement: Colombian authorities seized more than 23.5 metric tons of cocaine and 17.5 metric tons of cocaine base in 1996, compared to 21.5 metric tons of cocaine and 19.5 metric tons of cocaine base seized in 1995. More significantly, Colombian authorities captured or killed a number of important Cali drug mafia figures in 1996. In March, the Colombian Government announced that Cali drug lord Jose Santacruz-Londono, who had escaped from prison in January 1996 with the assistance of corrupt prison officials, had been killed in a shoot-out with police at a roadblock outside of Medellin. Also in March, Juan Carlos "Chupeta" Ramirez-Abadia and Carlos "Cuchillo" Ortiz-Escobar, both of whom were considered rising leaders in the Cali drug mafia, surrendered to authorities. More importantly, in October, Helmer "Pacho" Herrera, the last of the old-guard Cali drug mafia leaders to remain at large, finally surrendered.

Despite their incarceration, the Cali drug mafia leaders influenced the Colombian legal system. The initial defeat of bills to reform Colombias sentencing and asset forfeiture laws in the Colombian House of Representatives in December underscored this fact. Following the defeat, allegations surfaced that bribes had been offered to legislators to reject the reform bills. After the discovery of original drafts of the defeated legislation and exact tallies of voting records in Bogotas La Picota Prison, where the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers were being held, the allegations gained added credence. Under the public scrutiny generated by these discoveries, the Colombian Congress reconsidered and passed tough asset forfeiture legislation in mid-December.

Prison sentences imposed in 1996 raised questions regarding the adequacy of the Colombian legal system. For example, Victor Patino-Fomeque, former Cali mafia chief of operations for smuggling in the Port of Buenaventura was arrested in June 1995. Although initially sentenced in February to 18 years imprisonment, Patino-Fomeque received a 9-year sentence reduction. (Later, his sentence was lengthened to 12 years, following an appeal by the Colombian Prosecutor Generals office.) In December, Ramirez-Abadia received the harshest sentence yet imposed on a trafficker, but his sentence also was reduced substantially--from 24 to 13 years--based on his surrender and confession. Also in December, the sentence of Ortiz Escobar was reduced from 20 to 11 years. It is likely these sentences will be reduced further for good behavior and work study. Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela is earning work-study credits by running a small kiosk in prison called Poor Michaels.

Peru

Cultivation: Peru was the worlds leading producer of coca leaf, coca paste, and cocaine base. As in previous years, cultivation was located in the Upper, Central, and Lower Huallaga Valleys; the Apurimac and Aguaytia River Valleys; and in the Department of Cuzco. In 1996, Perus coca cultivation decreased, falling to 94,400 hectares from 115,300 hectares in 1995. Potential coca leaf production in 1996 was placed at 174,700 metric tons, a decrease from 183,600 metric tons in 1995.

There was a limited increase in coca eradication activity in 1996, as the Peruvian Government expanded its eradication campaign beyond seedlings--the exclusive targets of eradication in past years--to crops under 2 years old and to fully mature crops in unpopulated areas or in national parks. [Note: For years, Peru has declined to eradicate mature coca plants until farmers have found viable alternative means of support.]

Eradication eliminated only 1,259 hectares of coca cultivation. Authorities attributed the additional decrease in cultivation of over 19,600 hectares to a drop in cocaine base prices caused by a glut of the product in Peru. This situation was due, at least in part, to the successful interdiction campaign waged by the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) against suspect trafficker aircraft, and the resulting difficulties experienced by traffickers in transporting cocaine base to Colombia.

Processing: In 1996, coca leaf produced in Peru had the potential to yield 435 metric tons of cocaine HCl after processing, down from 460 metric tons in 1995. Actual production, according to DEA, amounted to 428 metric tons in 1996, compared to 443 metric tons in 1995. In 1996, however, most processing that took place in Peru was of coca leaf to cocaine base. As in previous years, traffickers in Peru were major cocaine base producers. Most processing occurred in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Coca leaves were processed into cocaine base in clandestine laboratories set up near cultivation sites. These laboratories ranged from small structures to large complexes. In 1996, Peruvian authorities destroyed 14 laboratories, a decrease from the 21 laboratories destroyed in 1995.

Essential chemicals were diverted from legitimate chemical shipments imported through Perus seaports. Chemicals also entered Peru by land from Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. In one major law enforcement operation that stretched from March to June 1996, Peruvian police seized over 12 metric tons of essential chemicals. These seizures were the culmination of investigations targeting over 270 businesses in the Lima-Callao metropolitan area. And in August, police seized 4 metric tons of acetone, 105 kilograms of hydrochloric acid, and 180 kilograms of ethyl alcohol after a raid on a warehouse in Puente Piedra.

Trafficking: The export of cocaine base from Peru was controlled by Peruvian traffickers who served as middlemen between farmers--many of whom produced cocaine base themselves--and Colombian traffickers. Most cocaine base was transported by air to Colombia, where it was converted to cocaine. However, traffickers responded to air interdiction efforts by increasing their use of land and river routes.

The FAP has been authorized to shoot down suspect trafficker aircraft under specific circumstances, such as when an aircraft flies illegally in Peruvian airspace and refuses to obey instructions to land. After the seizing or downing of 39 trafficker aircraft in 1995, trafficker pilots reportedly were more reluctant to fly shipments of cocaine base from Peru to Colombia. In some cases, these pilots demanded a large increase in pay to fly this route. Pressure on traffickers was maintained in 1996, as demonstrated in January, when FAP fighter aircraft forced down a Piper Seneca that was carrying over 500 kilograms of cocaine base, near Yurimaguas, Peru. After their arrests, both pilots of the aircraft stated that it was a well-known fact among Colombian pilots that the FAP was authorized to shoot down trafficker aircraft flying illegally in Peruvian airspace if the violator did not obey instructions to land.

As a consequence of air interdiction operations, traffickers reportedly relied more heavily on river transport to move cocaine base to airstrips in northern Peru or southern Colombia including airstrips near Iquitos and Estrecho, Peru, and Leticia, Colombia. River traffic in 1996 was noted on the Amazon, Maranon, Napo, Putumayo, and Ucayali Rivers. Shipments, hidden in commercial cargo or covered with river debris, were moved through known areas of law enforcement activity at night, when authorities had a limited ability to patrol the waters. Still, the value of river transport as an alternative to air transport was tempered by the attendant delays and risk of interdiction.

The use of river transportation to smuggle cocaine products was demonstrated by a number of seizures in 1996. For example, in January, the Peruvian Navy seized 472 kilograms of cocaine paste from a vessel intercepted near Puerto Inca, on the Pachitea River. An even larger seizure was made in March, when police intercepted three wooden boats on the Pisqui River and seized 1.2 metric tons of cocaine base. Police seized 356 kilograms of cocaine base in August and 368 kilograms of cocaine base in September of cocaine base from small vessels on the Ucayali River.

Additionally, traffickers who used smaller aircraft attempted to avoid radar by flying at low altitudes, by using flight routes that passed through southern Peru where radar coverage was lighter, by using airfields near the Brazilian border as staging sites, and by making illegal use of legitimate flight plans. The Amazon region, where the borders of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia meet, also was exploited to a greater extent. At least 15 airstrips were reported along the Peruvian-Colombian border, and another 18 reportedly could be found along the Peruvian-Bolivian border. In response to aircraft operations in the area, authorities launched operations in the tri-border area in April and December, attempting to deny trafficker aircraft access to airstrips. In the December operation, Peruvian and Colombian forces destroyed a total of 14 clandestine airstrips, 10 in Colombia and 4 in Peru.

Traffickers used land routes to transport cocaine base, if only to and from consolidation points and airstrips in northeastern Peru. For instance, in January, police in Aucayacu seized 635 kilograms of cocaine base from a hidden compartment in a truck en route to Ucayali, Peru. In August, police seized 255 kilograms of cocaine base from a truck at a checkpoint near Sangapilla, Peru. And in September, authorities seized 171 kilograms of cocaine base discovered in a truck stopped and searched at a checkpoint north of Tarapoto.

Drug Law Enforcement: In 1996, Peruvian authorities seized approximately 18.7 metric tons of cocaine paste and base, an increase from 9.6 metric tons seized in 1995. Significant seizures made in 1996, in addition to those mentioned above, included 411 kilograms of cocaine base seized in April in Cuzco Department, and 250 kilograms of cocaine base seized in March in Huanuco Department. Seizures of cocaine HCl in 1996 decreased to 1 metric ton from 7.6 metric tons in 1995. This drop was not necessarily indicative of decreased effectiveness on the part of Peruvian authorities, however, since 7.5 metric tons of the 1995 total were part of two unusually large seizures made in January and September 1995. Individual cocaine seizures in 1996, by contrast, were much smaller. For example in March, authorities seized 61 kilograms of cocaine discovered in false walls of a shipping container at the Port of Callao in one of the larger cocaine HCl seizures of the year.

Peruvian military personnel were involved in two cocaine smuggling operations disrupted by authorities in 1996. In the first incident, in May, police seized 174 kilograms of cocaine found aboard a FAP DC-8 transport plane; they arrested 13 FAP personnel. The plane was destined for Europe by way of the United States. One of the presidents military aides de camp and three colonels reportedly were relieved from duty for possible involvement. In July, a total of 127 kilograms were discovered aboard two Peruvian-registered merchant marine vessels crewed by Peruvian Navy personnel. Canadian customs officers seized 79 kilograms aboard the M/V Matarani at the Port of Vancouver, British Columbia, and Peruvian navy officials discovered another 48 kilograms aboard the M/V Ilo at the Port of Callao.

In November 1996, Willer "Champa" Alvarado-Linares and three lieutenants in his organization were arrested by authorities in Quito, Ecuador, and deported to Peru. Alvarado-Linares directed a Cali-linked cocaine trafficking organization tied to over 5 metric tons of cocaine seized worldwide since 1993. Subsequent to his arrest, raids in a number of cities throughout Peru resulted in the arrests of an additional 31 key members of the Alvarado-Linares organization. In October 1996, Demetrio "Vaticano" Chavez-Penaherrera, once considered the main Peruvian supplier of cocaine base for the Cali drug mafia, was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. Chavez-Penaherrera was arrested in Colombia and expelled to Peru in 1994. He began serving a 30-year sentence for treason in 1994, after a military court convicted him of collaborating with the Shining Path terrorist organization in coca-growing regions of the Upper Huallaga Valley.

Developments in Other Areas

South America

Transshipment through Argentina continued in 1996 as cocaine was smuggled into the country by general aviation aircraft from Bolivia, and by land vehicles and couriers on commercial airline flights from Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay. From Argentina, cocaine reportedly was smuggled to Europe and the United States through containerized maritime cargo, or by couriers aboard commercial airliners.

Argentine authorities seized a total of 2 metric tons of cocaine in 1996. Significant seizures included 40 kilograms of cocaine seized near Escobar, Buenos Aires Province, from a tractor-trailer en route from Bolivia to Salta, Argentina, and 30 kilograms of cocaine seized by authorities at Ezeiza International Airport in Buenos Aires from the luggage of two individuals scheduled to board a flight to Italy.

In addition to serving as a transshipment point, Argentina was the site of laboratories for the conversion of Bolivian cocaine base to cocaine HCl, which then was shipped to Europe and the United States. Argentina also produced essential chemicals, which occasionally were sold legally to legitimate businesses and then diverted to illicit cocaine production, or were sold illegally to front companies for use in clandestine laboratories in Bolivia.

During the year, traffickers flew air routes through Brazil in an attempt to avoid traditional trafficker flight routes between Colombia and Peru. By transporting cocaine base to airstrips in the tri-border area of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, traffickers were able to circumvent Peruvian airspace altogether. Flights reportedly originated from the area of Bolognesi, Peru, with refueling stops near Leticia, Colombia. Usually, Vaupes Department, Colombia, was the destination for such flights. In addition, traffickers used Brazil as a staging location for cocaine HCl refined in neighboring countries and in transit to the United States and Europe.

Maritime smuggling occurred from the Ports of Belem, Manaus, and Sao Paulo, while Corumba, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo served as land and air transshipment points. Cocaine also reportedly transited Brazil en route to ports in Suriname. Couriers flying out of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, meanwhile, were used by organized crime groups from West Africa to smuggle cocaine to Europe and southern Africa.

Brazilian authorities seized 3.1 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, a decrease from the 5.7 metric tons seized in 1995. The 1996 total included several multihundred-kilogram seizures. For example, in April, police seized 200 kilograms of cocaine after a raid on a house in the Piadade District of Rio de Janeiro. The cocaine reportedly was transported to Brazil from Colombia by truck, and was to be broken down and smuggled to Europe by couriers. And in September, authorities seized 245 kilograms of cocaine, 225 kilograms of which was found in a vehicle in a Sao Paulo parking lot. Additionally, several multihundred-kilogram cocaine shipments that originated in Brazil were seized overseas. In January, for example, Portuguese authorities seized 120 kilograms of cocaine that had been smuggled into Lisbon International Airport on a commercial flight from Brasilia. And in September, Italian authorities in Genoa discovered 160 kilograms of cocaine aboard the M/V Calapedra, after the vessels arrival from Brazil.

Additionally, Brazil is a major licit producer of ether, acetone, and other essential chemicals used in cocaine processing. Despite efforts at control, substantial amounts of these chemicals were diverted to illicit cocaine processing laboratories in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The Brazilian Federal Police conducted joint operations with DEA, targeting both Brazilian and foreign firms, in order to interdict the flow of diverted chemicals.

In Chile, authorities seized over 500 kilograms of cocaine, an increase from 346 kilograms in 1995. Cocaine from Bolivia was transported to Chiles northern ports for shipment in commercial cargo to the United States and Europe. These shipments were facilitated by a bilateral agreement prohibiting the inspection of Bolivian goods routed through Chile for export to third countries. Cocaine shipments from Colombia also were routed through Chile. In a July incident, Chilean authorities at the Port of San Antonio seized 486 kilograms of cocaine discovered in a shipment of medical equipment that had arrived from Buenaventura, Colombia. The company to which the shipment was consigned had imported three similar shipments since December 1995, each of which was reexported to Miami, Florida.

Some minor quantities of cocaine base imported into Chile from Bolivia reportedly were processed into cocaine HCl domestically. Chile also continued to serve as a source of essential chemicals for traffickers in Bolivia and Peru. Several significant chemical seizures were made in 1996. In May, police in Santiago seized 8,150 liters of acetone, 125 kilograms of soda ash, 606 liters of hydrochloric acid, and 1,000 liters of sulfuric acid. The chemicals reportedly were destined for cocaine laboratories in Bolivia. In June, police in Arica seized 4,000 liters of sulfuric acid, also destined for Bolivia.

Ecuador was a major transit country for large quantities of cocaine shipped from Colombia, and for smaller quantities shipped from Peru. Cocaine was transported by land into Ecuador, and then shipped to Europe and the United States either in maritime cargo vessels sailing from the Port of Guayaquil, or in air cargo departing international airports in Guayaquil and Quito.

In addition to the Colombian groups, which traditionally have moved cocaine through Ecuador to the international market, Nigerian organizations also played a role in cocaine trafficking through Ecuador. One Nigerian operation smuggled cocaine by courier from Colombia into Ecuador, and then on to the United States or Europe. Couriers were able to walk across the largely uncontrolled Colombian-Ecuadorian border, typically at the Tulcan International Bridge, and then depart on flights out of Ecuador, thereby avoiding the scrutiny usually given by customs officials in the United States or Europe to arrivals from Colombia.

In 1996, Ecuadorian authorities seized 8.75 metric tons of cocaine, a substantial increase from 4.09 metric tons in 1995. This increase was due in large part to the seizure in October of 7 metric tons of cocaine discovered aboard the M/V Don Celso by authorities at the Port of Esmeraldas. The Don Celso was intercepted by the U.S.S. Ticonderoga in international waters off the coast of Ecuador, and was escorted to Esmeraldas after a thorough at-sea search of the ship was impossible because of both a fire below deck and toxic fumes caused by a large spill of ammonia in the vessels engine room. In April, authorities made another significant seizure, when authorities raided a fish-packing plant in Guayaquil and seized 500 kilograms of cocaine that was to be packed in a container shipment of frozen fish. And in May, authorities seized 123 kilograms of cocaine secreted in fruit jars in preparation for shipment to Europe.

Ecuador also was an important transit country for chemicals used by clandestine laboratory operators in Colombia. Chemicals were trucked from Guayaquil into the eastern jungles, and then transported into Colombia by truck or river boat. Significant chemical seizures made at the Port of Guayaquil in 1996 included 14.9 metric tons of sulfuric acid and over 18.3 metric tons of sodium hydroxide seized in January and February; and 2.2 metric tons of sodium carbonate and 2.64 metric tons of calcium chloride seized in April. A June seizure of 350 drums of chemicals in Quito was particularly noteworthy because the chemicals were tied to a cocaine HCl laboratory discovered in Santo Domingo de Los Colorados, Pichincha Province. This was the first cocaine HCl laboratory discovered in Ecuador in the last 10 years. Ecuadorian authorities estimated that approximately 100 kilograms of cocaine in various processing stages were found at the laboratory site.

Authorities in Guyana seized 74 kilograms of cocaine in 1996, an increase from 57 kilograms in 1995. Use of Guyana as a transshipment point for cocaine shipments appeared to be limited, despite favorable conditions, such as a heavily forested and sparsely populated interior, and numerous small and virtually inaccessible airfields. All of these factors presumably would facilitate the transshipment of cocaine from Venezuela, Brazil, and Suriname to the Caribbean, the United States, and Europe.

Paraguay has long unpatrolled borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil that are well-suited to smuggling operations. Smuggling by small aircraft is a particular threat, given the countrys many unregulated and clandestine landing strips near the border with Brazil. Seizures suggest, however, that cocaine smuggling through Paraguay is not yet a significant problem. Approximately 56 kilograms of cocaine were seized in 1996, a slight decrease from the 59 kilograms seized in 1995.

Significant quantities of cocaine were routed through Suriname to Europe and North America, according to Surinamese authorities. Cocaine trafficking organizations in neighboring countries reportedly used Suriname as a staging area. In 1996, cocaine was transported into Suriname through northern Brazil from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Transport was accomplished by small coastal vessels that ferried both licit cargo and contraband between the Amazon delta and other ports along the northeastern coast of South America. Additionally, some cocaine was smuggled into Suriname by private aircraft that used clandestine airstrips and open roads in the interior of the country. Once in Suriname, cocaine was repackaged and exported on commercial ships and regularly scheduled commercial flights. A total of 1.4 metric tons of cocaine were seized in Suriname in 1996, an increase from 63 kilograms in 1995. A record seizure in April contributed to this increase. In that case, police responded to a report of a twin-engine aircraft landing on a road between Jodenssavana and Blakawatra, Suriname, and seized a Cessna Titan aircraft and 1.27 metric tons of cocaine. Surinamese authorities point to this seizure and to the increasing Colombian trafficker presence in Suriname as indications that the country is becoming a more important transit point for Colombian cocaine.

While police officials believed some cocaine is shipped from Suriname to the United States, there was no evidence that such shipments occur in large quantities. Most of the cocaine transhipped through Suriname appeared to be destined for Europe; the Netherlands, in particular, has been a popular destination. In the first 4 months of 1996 alone, authorities in the Netherlands seized over 440 kilograms of cocaine smuggled into the country from Suriname, including one 200-kilogram shipment discovered in an air freight consignment of produce. One large factor in the prominence of the Netherlands as a destination for cocaine shipments from Suriname was the presence of over 200,000 ethnic-Surinamese residing in the Netherlands. Cocaine traffickers have taken advantage of this and of historical links among Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Netherlands, to ship cocaine through Dutch seaports to other countries in Western Europe. Ties between Surinamese and Europeans also may have facilitated the smuggling of precursor and essential chemicals from Europe into Latin America.

Venezuela was a significant cocaine transit country in 1996. Cocaine was smuggled into Venezuela along Colombian rivers, and then transported overland to the coast. Cucuta and Maicao ports of entry on the Colombian-Venezuelan border were the scene of numerous drug seizures. From Venezuela, some cocaine was transported northward by go-fast boats departing Cumana and Isla Margarita. In other cases, cocaine was transported in multiton quantities through maritime containerized cargo and air cargo to the United States and Europe. Examples of such shipments in 1996 included 64 kilograms of cocaine discovered in March in a maritime cargo container shipped from Venezuela to Port Everglades, Florida; 123 kilograms of cocaine discovered in October in the doors of two maritime containers shipped from Venezuela to Miami; and 560 kilograms discovered in December in an industrial cheese-processing machine that was to be shipped from the Port of La Guaira, Venezuela, to Rome, Italy.

In total, approximately 5.6 metric tons of cocaine were seized in Venezuela in 1996, compared to 6 metric tons in 1995. The years largest seizure occurred in March, when authorities found 1.1 metric tons of cocaine following raids on warehouses in Guarenas in the suburbs of Caracas. The cocaine was hidden within a consignment of tennis shoes destined for Montreal, Canada. Other sizeable seizures included 700 kilograms seized in January from a warehouse in Acarigua, Portuguesa State; 505 kilograms seized in May from a vessel off Maurica Beach on the outskirts of Barcelona, Venezuela; and 750 kilograms seized in November from a truck at a checkpoint in San Antonio del Tachira. The May seizure was noteworthy in that several active or retired members of the Venezuelan national guard, the marines, and the customs service were arrested following an investigation.

Venezuela also was used as a transit location for essential chemicals shipped to cocaine processing laboratories in Colombia. Significant chemical seizures in 1996 included 120 metric tons of various chemicals, including acetone and methyl ethyl ketone, seized in March in Valencia, Carabobo State; 43 metric tons of chemicals seized in April in La Victoria, Aragua State; 105 metric tons of urea seized in September at the Del Tachira checkpoint on the Colombian-Venezuelan border; and 1.5 metric tons of acetone seized in September at a checkpoint in Guanare, Portuguesa State.

Europe

The cocaine market in Western Europe has expanded dramatically since 1985. Seizure statistics indicated that Colombian drug mafia elements increasingly targeted this market, where they were able to realize profit margins higher that those in the United States.

Cocaine being smuggled to Europe, in recent years, from time to time, has been transited through U.S. ports in addition to those in the Caribbean. Occasionally, South American traffickers have first shipped cocaine through European ports and then to North Amrican markets. The growing cocaine threat to Europe has brought more interest and involvement on the part of European police agencies in counterdrug activities in the Western Hemisphere. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), European authorities, to include authorities in the Newly Independent States, collectively seized 31 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, compared to 22 metric tons in 1995. Kilogram quantities of cocaine were seized in countries throughout Europe, including countries where the total quantity of cocaine seized during the year was relatively modest. For example, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Hungary, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Turkey reported individual seizures of at least 1.2 kilograms, with seizures typically made from couriers arriving on international flights from South America. In each of these countries, however, seizure totals for 1996 failed to exceed 70 kilograms. In other countries, however, cocaine seizures were more substantial.

Belgium continued to serve as a transshipment point for cocaine destined for markets in the Netherlands and Germany. Cocaine was smuggled into Belgium both by maritime commercial cargo, and by couriers aboard commercial airline flights arriving at Brussels Zaventem International Airport.

Belgian authorities seized over 935 kilograms of cocaine in 1996, compared to 452 kilograms in 1995. The years largest seizures were made from maritime cargo. For example, in January, authorities at the Port of Antwerp seized 100 kilograms of cocaine that arrived from Colombia aboard the banana boat Chiquita Rostock. This was followed in February by the seizure of 70 kilograms of cocaine that had arrived in the Port of Zeebrugge aboard the M/V Swanstream.

France was both a consumer country and transit point for cocaine. Cocaine was smuggled into the country in maritime cargo, by vehicle at border crossings, and by airline couriers.

French authorities seized approximately 1.7 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, compared to 865 kilograms in 1995. In April, authorities at the Port of Le Havre seized 33 kilograms of cocaine that arrived on a container ship from Argentina. The cocaine, which was carried by an Italian national, one of the ships crew, reportedly was destined for Portugal. And in June, authorities in Le Perthus, on the French-Spanish border, discovered 12 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the rear seat of a car en route to Italy. Also in June, authorities at Charles de Gaulle International Airport in Paris seized 3 kilograms of cocaine from luggage belonging to a passenger en route from Colombia to Israel.

Germany likewise was a cocaine consumer country and transit point. German authorities seized 1.37 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, a decrease from 1.8 metric tons in 1995. Seizures were generally under 50 kilograms, with the largest seizures made from air freight, or from luggage arriving on commercial airline flights. In February, for example, 20 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in an air cargo shipment that arrived in Frankfurt from Guatemala by way of Miami. In July, 40 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in the luggage of three individuals arriving from Venezuela en route to Poland. Additionally, two seizures, each of over 20 kilograms, were made in March and April from the luggage of individuals arriving in Stuttgart from Costa Rica. Overseas, meanwhile, authorities seized shipments en route to Germany. In September, for example, authorities in Lima, Peru, seized 30 kilograms of cocaine from the luggage of an individual destined for Frankfurt. Peru, in fact, was the point of origin for 17 cocaine smuggling cases destined for, or routed through, Germany in 1996.

Although Greece is not regarded as a major cocaine consumer or transit country, a record amount of cocaine was seized in April, when Hellenic customs officers at the Port of Pireaus discovered 114 kilograms of cocaine within a container shipment of blue jeans that had arrived from Callao, Peru. Reportedly, the shipment was to be transported to Sofia, Bularia. The last seizure of this size was made in December 1994, when authorities in Pireaus seized 103 kilograms from a container shipment of rice en route from Ecuador to Italy. Authorities seized a total of 156 kilograms of cocaine in 1996.

In 1996, Ireland emerged as a transit point for multihundred kilogram maritime shipments of cocaine en route to Western Europe. The countrys numerous inlets and harbors, and its largely unpatrolled western coastline provided a convenient staging point for off-loading cocaine, as well as a safe harbor for trafficking vessels that encountered rough weather en route to other European destinations.

In the first of two noteworthy seizures in 1996, authorities in August seized 50 kilograms of cocaine discovered aboard the cargo vessel Front Guider, after the Guiders arrival in the Port of Moneypoint, County Clare, from Santa Marta, Colombia. Authorities believe the cocaine was to be off-loaded in Ireland, but was destined for continental European markets. In the years second large seizure, Irish authorities seized a record 610 kilograms of cocaine off Cork from the fishing trawler Sea Mist, which had sailed from Venezuela to Trinidad, and was en route to an off-load point off the French coast, when it sailed into Cork in order to avoid a storm at sea.

Cocaine trafficking to and through Italy continued, with seizures totaling 2.3 metric tons in 1996, a decrease from 2.6 metric tons in 1995. In September, authorities at the Port of Genoa seized 160 kilograms of cocaine discovered aboard the M/V Calapedra, after the vessels arrival from Santos, Brazil. Then, in November, police in Milan seized 350 kilograms as part of an operation that resulted in 48 arrests in Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.

The Netherlands continued to serve as a destination for European-bound cocaine shipments, with smuggling operations facilitated by ties among traffickers in the Netherlands, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles. In 1996, Dutch authorities seized over 8 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 4.9 metric tons in 1995. The years largest seizure was made in July, when authorities boarded the private yacht Odermirense off the coast of Ijmuiden and discovered 1.1 metric tons of cocaine. The cocaine reportedly had been transferred to the Odermirense from a go-fast boat in waters in the vicinity of Trinidad and Tobago. Other significant seizures in 1996 included 113 kilograms of cocaine seized from the M/V Jostelle, and 137 kilograms seized in October; both seizures were made by authorities in Rotterdam.

Authorities in Portugal seized 673 kilograms of cocaine in 1996, a decrease from 2.1 metric tons in 1995. Most seizures in 1996 were made from couriers arriving at Lisbons international airport. In the years largest seizure, police in January seized 120 kilograms of cocaine that had been smuggled into the country through the Lisbon airport. In most cases, however, cocaine shipments smuggled into the country by courier were under 20 kilograms. Seizures from maritime vessels were rare in 1996, although Portugals long and desolate coastline traditionally has been an attractive target for maritime smuggling attempts. The years most significant maritime seizure was made in October, when authorities in Ponta Delgada, Saint Miguel Island, the Azores, seized 46 kilograms of cocaine after a search of a sailing vessel that just had completed a round-trip voyage to Venezuela.

Spain served as a gateway for cocaine shipments destined for the European market. Smuggling into Spain was facilitated by the multiple points of entry available to traffickers, including 15 international airports, 23 major and 175 minor seaports; by northwestern Spains rugged coastline; and by the large number of tourists who visited the country. Cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties between Spain and Latin America also played a role.

Spanish authorities seized a record 13.7 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, a substantial increase from the 6.8 metric tons seized in 1995. Several seizures were made of multiton cocaine shipments. In January, Spanish authorities seized 2.6 metric tons of cocaine from the fishing vessel Me Yemaja, after intercepting the vessel 15 miles off the coast of Corme and escorting it to the Port of La Coruna for inspection. In May, authorities discovered over 1.6 metric tons of cocaine from the M/V Siva after boarding the vessel in international waters 900 miles off the coast of the Canary Islands. In August, authorities in Puerto de Raos, Santander Province, seized 1.2 metric tons of cocaine that had been smuggled into the Port of Bilbao from Colombia in a shipment of lumber. And in November, authorities seized 1.1 metric tons of cocaine after boarding the M/V Anita, 70 nautical miles off the Galician coast. Other significant seizures included 900 kilograms of cocaine found in June floating off the northwestern Spanish coast, 280 kilograms of cocaine found in February in a shipping container imported into Barcelona from Colombia, and 240 kilograms of cocaine discovered in June in a container shipment of coffee that arrived in Barcelona from Colombia. In addition, in July, Spanish authorities on the island of Gran Canaria, the Canary Islands, seized 640 kilograms of cocaine discovered in a container shipment of coffee and liquor imported from Venezuela.

Traffickers continued to use Switzerland as a transit location for smuggling cocaine to Italy and other countries in Western Europe. Cocaine was smuggled into the country by couriers traveling on commercial airline flights arriving at international airports in Zurich and Geneva. Individual cocaine seizures were of kilogram quantities or less. For example, in May, authorities in Zurich seized 2.2 kilograms of cocaine from a courier who arrived on a flight from Sao Paulo, Brazil, by way of Barcelona, Spain. In 1996, Swiss authorities made 122 cocaine seizures, totaling 255 kilograms, compared to 262 kilograms of cocaine seized in 1995.

The United Kingdom was both a transit country and a destination for cocaine. British authorities seized 1.16 metric tons of cocaine in 1996, compared to 963 kilograms in 1995. Most seizures were made from air freight shipments or from couriers arriving on international flights from South America. In the largest such seizure, in September, authorities at Londons Heathrow International Airport seized 180 kilograms of cocaine discovered in the false sides of two cargo containers that arrived on a commercial airline flight from Bogota, Colombia. In a February investigation, noteworthy because of the method of concealment, authorities at Heathrow discovered 30 kilograms of cocaine in the nose cone of a British Airways 747 that had arrived from Bogota. Typically, seizures of cocaine from the luggage of couriers ranged from 3 to 5 kilograms, although authorities did seize 25 kilograms from a courier arriving from Brazil in April, and 27 kilograms and 22 kilograms from unclaimed luggage arriving on flights from Trinidad and Tobago in July and September, respectively.

Africa

Nigerian trafficking groups were responsible for most cocaine trafficking activity in Africa. Nigerian trafficking groups are entrenched deeply in the U.S. heroin trade. Their exposure to and increasing involvement in moving cocaine to Europe and Africa is an outgrowth of their U.S. drug activity. As of May 1997, no statistics were available as to the amount of cocaine seized in Nigeria in 1996, or in the last half of 1995. In the first half of 1995, only 1.9 kilograms of cocaine were seized.

Typical seizures of cocaine controlled by Nigerian organizations consisted of quantities of under 10 kilograms carried by couriers. Most of the cocaine moved by Nigerian-controlled couriers was obtained in Brazil, although in 1996 Nigerian organizations also obtained cocaine from countries in the northern Andean region such as Colombia and Ecuador. Evidence of the Nigerian organizations presence in Colombia was demonstrated in April, when police in Bogota arrested 24 West Africans who were prepared to smuggle over 50 kilograms of cocaine to Europe. In addition to taking direct flights to Europe, couriers also smuggled cocaine to Nigeria and other West African countries, as well as to South Africa. From these countries, cocaine was reshipped to major markets in Europe.

South Africa has developed into a cocaine destination and transshipment location, due in part to its well-developed infrastructure and international air links. South African authorities continued to seize regularly kilogram quantities of cocaine in 1996. In 1995, 188 kilograms were seized. Statistics for 1996 are not yet available. Seizures ranging from 2 to 7 kilograms typically were made from couriers arriving on flights from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In at least two cases, however, seizures also were made from individuals arriving from Buenos Aires, Argentina. Nigerian criminals are involved widely in cocaine distribution in South Africa. These criminals probably introduced into South Africas townships methods of producing crack cocaine learned while in the United States.

Other African countries were used as transit points for cocaine smuggled into South Africa or Europe from South America. The most common method of transport was by couriers who smuggled kilogram quantities of cocaine concealed in their personal effects, or who ingested latex-encased pellets of cocaine. Individual seizures of between 2 and 4 kilograms were made from couriers arriving on international flights into Benin, Cote dIvoire, Kenya, Namibia, and Zambia. In addition, in March, authorities in Morocco seized 62 kilograms of cocaine from a container ship docked in the Port of Casablanca. The container in which the cocaine was secreted, however, was not destined for Morocco, but instead was to be unloaded at a later port of call in Genoa, Italy.

Seizures of cocaine or cocaine base in Lebanon amounted to 166 kilograms in 1996, compared to 13.6 kilograms in 1995. Of this amount, 41 kilograms were discovered in January in a containerized shipment of wooden doors imported into Beirut from Brazil, and 122 kilograms were seized in late October and early November after importation in a two-container maritime shipment of ceramic tiles.

Lebanon was one of the few countries outside South America that processed cocaine base into cocaine HCl. Lebanese traffickers living in South America reportedly facilitated the importation of cocaine base into Lebanon, principally from Colombia, but also from Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. Most of the cocaine processed in Lebanon was refined in conversion laboratories in the Bekaa Valley. Past reports have indicated that 80 percent of the cocaine produced in Lebanon is exported, with the remainder used domestically. Exported cocaine was packaged and then shipped--sometimes through Jordan or Syria--to Europe, or to markets in the Persian Gulf where cocaine prices were high. Lebanese traffickers also used Lebanon as a staging area for refined cocaine base being shipped to the Persian Gulf or Europe.

There have been a number of reports that criminal groups in Israel are involved in cocaine trafficking. Traffickers based in Israel reportedly have established links with Colombian drug cartels. In 1996, 43 kilograms were seized in March from a shipping container that arrived in the Port of Haifa from the United States. The cocaine reportedly was hidden in the container in the Los Angeles area and then shipped to New York, where it was repacked in household effects being shipped to Israel.

The Far East

The level of cocaine trafficking in Southeast Asia and the Pacific remained low. Nonetheless, local authorities were concerned by reports of contacts between cocaine trafficking organizations and local organized crime groups. In particular, there have been reports of contacts between Colombian cocaine traffickers and elements of Japanese organized crime groups (collectively known as the Boryokudan or Yakuza) that control Japans illicit drug trade. Moreover, cocaine is transported into the region by U.S. criminals and by Asian criminals who obtain the drug in the United States.

Both Australia and Japan have been targeted by traffickers as lucrative cocaine markets. For example, one group in Sydney, Australia, composed of individuals who emigrated to Australia from Medellin, Colombia, reportedly attempted to establish a local market for cocaine. Southeast Asias largest cocaine seizure in 1996 was made in June by authorities at the Port of Mackay, in Queensland, Australia. In that case, 20 kilograms of cocaine were discovered in a bulk coal carrier that arrived from Port Victoria, Brazil, by way of Taiwan. In Japan, on the other hand, seizures remained small.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, seizures of between 300 grams and 10 kilograms were made from couriers arriving in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand on flights from South America. Authorities in Thailand also seized 7 kilograms of cocaine from a parcel mailed from Colombia.

OPIATES

In the United States, heroin remained readily available to addicts in all major metropolitan areas throughout 1996. Stable wholesale prices per kilogram and high retail-level purities indicated increasing supplies--a development consistent with nationwide trends over the past several years.

Analysis of price, purity, and seizure data, and other intelligence and abuse indicators revealed that there were two general, but distinct, heroin markets within the United States, roughly divided geographically by the Mississippi River.

In the East, high-purity white powdered heroin--from South America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia--was the predominant form of heroin available. Ethnic Chinese and West African traffickers smuggled high-purity heroin from Southeast Asia (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) for distribution in the northeastern United States and along the East Coast.

Data obtained from DEAs Domestic Monitor Program (DMP)* confirmed that South American heroin was widely available in the northeastern United States. In fact, in the first 6 months of 1996, at least 90 percent of all identifiable DMP heroin purchases made in Boston, Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia were of South American origin. The DMP also showed the geographic distribution of South American heroin to other areas, such as San Juan, Puerto Rico; Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Miami, Florida; and New Orleans, Louisiana.

DEAs Heroin Signature Program(HSP)** for 1995 revealed that 62 percent of the heroin seized was from South America, 17 percent from Southeast Asia, 16 percent from Southwest Asia, and 5 percent from Mexico.* The high percentage of South American heroin was due, in large part, to numerous seizures from couriers transporting small quantities of South American heroin into Miami and New York, combined with the absence of large seizures from Southeast Asia, the predominant source area for heroin seized in the United States in recent years. The HSP is not a direct measure of U.S. market share by heroin source of origin.

In the West, by contrast, "black tar" and, to a lesser extent, brown powder heroin from Mexico were predominant. (Black tar heroin is so named because it resembles roofing tar or coal in appearance. Black tar has this unique consistency because Mexican processors skip chemical treatment and filtering steps in the production process; steps that enable processors in other source areas to produce a white powdered form of heroin.)

Kilogram prices for heroin ranged widely, reflecting several variables, including buyer-seller relationships, quantities purchased, frequency of purchase, purity, and transportation costs. Nationally, in the first half of 1996, Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin ranged in price from $95,000 to $210,000 per kilogram. South American heroin sold for between $85,000 and $185,000. Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin ranged from $80,000 to $260,000. Wholesale-level prices for Mexican heroin at the bottom end of the range were the lowest of any type, selling for as low as $50,000; the high for Mexican heroin was $250,000.

At the street or retail level, purity is related directly to availability. Heroin purity is tracked by DEAs DMP. These purchases are made on a quarterly basis in 22 major metropolitan areas of the United States. Preliminary analysis of DMP data showed that the nationwide average purity for retail-level heroin for the first 9 months of 1996 was 35.9 percent, lower than the 1995 average of 39.7 percent, yet much higher than the single-digit average purity of a decade ago.

The rise in average purity corresponded directly to an increased availability of high-purity South American heroin and, to a lesser extent, increases in the purity of Mexican heroin. In much of 1995 and the first 9 months of 1996, the purity of South American samples obtained through the DMP were higher than that from any other source, averaging 56.4 percent and 50.3 percent, respectively. SEA heroin averaged 44.6 percent pure in 1995 and 35.1 percent in the first 9 months of 1996. Mexican heroin purity averaged 24.7 percent in 1995 and 30.4 percent in the first 9 months of 1996. The purity of SWA heroin also was high, averaging 35.3 percent in 1995 and 30.9 percent in the first 9 months of 1996.

Abuse

An estimated 600,000 hard-core drug addicts use heroin as their principal drug of abuse. Various drug supply and demand indicators, including seizure statistics and observations by drug law enforcement officials and treatment specialists, show that heroin use in the United States continues to increase. Use has increased not only among existing heroin addicts, but also among users of other drugs of abuse, particularly crack cocaine users, who consume heroin to enhance the euphoric effects of crack and to ameliorate the depressive effects associated with crack withdrawal. Despite the increase in heroin abuse, however, there is no evidence of a heroin epidemic.

Heroin-related emergency room admissions, as reported by DAWN, increased during 1995, the most recent year for which information is available. The data showed sharp increases in combined heroin and cocaine use, which resulted in addicts seeking treatment. The annual number of heroin-related emergency room mentions increased from 42,000 in 1989 to 76,000 in 1995, an 80-percent increase. The main reasons given for seeking treatment were overdose and the need to detoxify.

Injection continued to be the predominant method of heroin administration used by patients admitted to emergency rooms nationwide. However, the percentage of patients indicating injection as their primary means of administration decreased from 93.0 percent in 1989 to 77.4 percent in 1995. Meanwhile, the proportion of patients snorting heroin increased from 4.3 percent in 1989 to 18.4 percent in 1995. This trend toward increased intranasal use was due primarily to the wider availability of high-purity SEA and, more recently, South American heroin.

Trafficking to the United States

The availability of South American heroin, produced almost exclusively in Colombia, has increased in the United States since 1993. South American heroin presented a potentially serious threat to the United States primarily because of the extensive trafficking resources controlled by Colombian cocaine mafias. Although undercover negotiations and seizures suggested that Colombian traffickers were unable to supply multikilogram quantities of heroin on a regular basis, reporting indicated that these traffickers increased their efforts to supply multikilogram quantities at source and transit country locations for delivery to the U.S. market. Some analysts speculate that as the cocaine mafias recognize the potential of developing Colombian heroin production and distribution, they likely will attempt to exert greater influence and control. It would be relatively easy to convert cocaine trafficking networks to accommodate heroin smuggling. Nonetheless, heroin smuggling currently remains under the control of independent Colombian traffickers, rather than the cocaine mafias.

South American heroin was smuggled principally into the U.S. East Coast by couriers aboard commercial airliners. Traffickers employed numerous couriers, each generally carrying 1 to 2 kilograms per trip. Quantities of under 1 kilogram were smuggled into the United States by "swallowers" who ingested latex-wrapped heroin pellets. Larger quantities were smuggled into the United States concealed in luggage. These smuggling methods made Colombian smuggling networks highly susceptible to U.S. interdiction efforts, and may account for the high proportion of annual heroin seizures in the United States that have originated in South America. In 1995, for example, 62 percent of U.S. heroin seizures were from South America. In 1996, both DEA and the USCS continued to arrest numerous couriers transporting small quantities of South American heroin.

Miami and New York were the primary entry points for South American heroin couriers. While most couriers arrived on direct flights from Colombia, couriers increasingly have transited airports in the neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as in Central America and Mexico. For example, in March 1996, Ecuadorian authorities at the international airport in Quito seized 6.2 kilograms of South American heroin discovered in two false-sided suitcases. In another example, evidence indicated a Colombian heroin smuggler moved several kilograms of product per month through Costa Rica to the United States. Couriers traveling through Mexico flew to Mexican cities and then crossed the U.S. border on foot before boarding U.S. domestic flights for New York City.

Colombian heroin traffickers have established distribution outlets in the United States. While the principal U.S. market for Colombian heroin was in the northeastern metropolitan areas, Colombian heroin traffickers expanded distribution throughout the U.S. East Coast, carving a growing niche for their product. High purity was essential to establishing a clientele and maintaining user loyalty in the fiercely competitive U.S. heroin market. In Boston, Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia, street-level purity for heroin from other regions averaged over 60 percent. Consequently, Colombian traffickers smuggled heroin that was 80 to 99 percent pure.

As previously mentioned, data obtained from DEAs DMP confirmed that South American heroin was widely available in the northeastern United States.

Colombian traffickers used a variety of tactics to establish mid- and retail-level outlets for their heroin. They offered free samples to potential distributors; they offered to front ounce and multiounce quantities to first-time buyers; and they insisted that some established cocaine distributors purchase and sell heroin as a condition of doing business. Finally, Colombian traffickers undersold competitors in some cities in an effort to win over customers. This was most evident at the mid- and retail-level in cities where South American heroin was most available, such as New York City. Ounce and gram prices in New York City for South American heroin were well below those for SEA heroin.

From Southeast Asia

Large Southeast Asia-based heroin trafficking organizations, often controlled by ethnic Chinese criminal groups, organized the transportation of high-purity heroin from Southeast Asia to the United States. Distribution within the United States, principally in the Northeast and along the East Coast, was controlled largely by independent United States-based ethnic Chinese traffickers with links to these international organizations.

SEA heroin shipments destined for U.S. and other international markets reportedly were transshipped through a variety of countries, including Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. Traffickers, using commercial cargo that originated in source countries, frequently attempted to disguise the origin of the cargo by first transshipping containers through third countries or by falsifying container documentation. For example, some shipments were transported to the northeastern United States by way of Canada.

Most large heroin shipments seized in recent years ultimately were destined for New York City, the largest heroin importation and distribution center in the United States. Since 1986, roughly half of the heroin seizures made by DEA and the USCS nationwide have occurred in the New York City metropolitan area. In addition to New York City, other U.S. cities in the Northeast, including Boston and Philadelphia, were used as entry points. Additionally, traffickers used West Coast cities, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, as entry points for heroin shipments destined for the Northeast.

Ethnic Chinese groups are among the most sophisticated traffickers in the world, capable of delivering multihundred-kilogram shipments to the United States concealed within commercial cargo. Traffickers also use couriers as well as mail and package delivery services to smuggle multigram to multikilogram quantities of heroin. In 1996, the largest domestic seizures of SEA heroin were made from couriers. In July, USCS inspectors at New Yorks JFK International Airport discovered 12.6 kilograms of heroin in wooden wall plaques belonging to a British national who arrived from London. This was followed by a seizure in September of 12.5 kilograms of heroin discovered in wood carvings belonging to a British national who arrived on a flight from France en route to New York City. In both cases, the heroin originated in Southeast Asia.

From Mexico

Mexican black tar and brown powder heroin were smuggled into and distributed throughout the western United States by polydrug trafficking groups operating from Mexico. The extensive U.S.-Mexican land border provided numerous entry points for smuggling operations. Smuggling methods included concealment in motor vehicles, public transportation vehicles, internal and external body carry, and commercial package express services. Females were used more frequently than males as couriers for transporting heroin and money across the border.

Traffickers took advantage of easy access to the border, and stored large quantities of heroin in Mexico, where the perceived risk of discovery and seizure was low. When a transaction was arranged, the contracted amount, usually 1 to 2 kilograms, was smuggled into the United States, frequently by illegal immigrants and migrant farm workers. By keeping quantities small, traffickers hoped to minimize the risk of losing a significant quantity of heroin in a single seizure. Even large polydrug Mexican organizations, capable of smuggling multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, limited smuggling of Mexican heroin into the United States to kilogram and smaller amounts. Nevertheless, during 1996, there were several significant, multikilogram-quantity seizures of Mexican heroin at the border and within the United States, in stark contrast to the smaller quantities typically seized in previous years. For example, in June the USCS seized approximately 20 kilograms of black tar heroin discovered in hidden compartments within a vehicle crossing the border at the San Ysidro port of entry. And in August the USCS at San Ysidro seized 19.3 kilograms of black tar heroin discovered during a routine inspection in a false compartment under the floor of a vehicle.

Other significant seizures in 1996 included 22 kilograms seized in Del Rio, Texas, in January; 8.5 kilograms seized at the Columbus, New Mexico, port of entry in March; and 13.6 kilograms seized in San Jose, California, in July.

Aside from these cases, the size of Mexican heroin shipments smuggled across the Southwest border generally remained small. Nevertheless, trafficking organizations were capable of regularly smuggling significant quantities of heroin into the United States. For example, a criminal organization based in Chicago allegedly smuggled 150 to 200 kilograms of black tar heroin on a monthly basis from Durango, Mexico, to E Paso, Eagle Pass, and Laredo, Texas.

Once heroin was smuggled into the United States, transportation was arranged to metropolitan areas in the western and southwestern States with sizeable populations of Mexican immigrants. Heroin also was transported to primary markets in Chicago, Denver, and St. Louis. Mexican heroin distributors within the United States are generally Mexican immigrants, primarily from the States of Durango, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, and Sinaloa. Mexican organizations controlled distribution at the wholesale level, while local Hispanic gangs often managed street sales. Mexican black tar heroin usually was sold by the piece or Mexican ounce, which weighs 25 grams.

From Southwest Asia

Limited quantities of SWA heroin from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, were available in the Northeast, the Midwest, and, to a lesser extent, on the West Coast. Importation and distribution of SWA heroin was much less centralized than that for SEA heroin, both geographically and in regard to trafficking groups. A number of ethnic groups from Southwest Asia and the Middle East, including Afghans, Greeks, Iranians, Israelis, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Turks were active in smuggling to the United States and in distribution. Most SWA heroin trafficking groups in the United States were highly cohesive and difficult to penetrate because they were based on ethnic, familial, religious, and tribal relationships. The traffickers and wholesale distributors generally were cautious, rarely conducting business with persons not of Southwest Asian or Middle Eastern ethnicity. Due to this ethnic aspect to the heroin trade, importation and distribution of SWA heroin was more prevalent in areas with large populations of Southwest Asian origin. Examples included the Northeast, particularly New York City; Mid-Atlantic cities, such as Baltimore and Washington, DC; certain West Coast cities, such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco; and some midwestern cities, including Chicago and Detroit.

The United States was a secondary target for Southwest Asias largest heroin trafficking organizations that generally considered Europe their primary market. Most of these organizations stored heroin supplies in secure European locations and only sent shipments to the United States after a buyer had been identified and partial payment received. By contrast, smaller independent SWA heroin traffickers, attracted by the higher price for SWA heroin in the United States versus Europe, sought to maximize profits on the smaller quantities in which they dealt by smuggling heroin directly to the United States. In addition to routes stretching through Europe and directly from Southwest Asia, traffickers exploited Africa and Canada as transshipment points for SWA heroin destined for the United States.

Traffickers avoided bulk shipments to the United States, instead smuggling quantities ranging from 1 to 20 kilograms, although larger amounts were smuggled on occasion. Transportation methods used included commercial cargo or couriers on commercial airlines. During 1996, there were two significant seizures of SWA heroin within the United States: one of 50 kilograms in Miami and the other of 55 kilograms in Spokane, Washington. In addition to the relatively large size of these two shipments, the purity of the heroin in both cases exceeded 80 percent, unusually high for this source area. More typical was the September seizure by authorities in the New York City area of 4 kilograms of SWA heroin from an individual with connections to an India-based smuggling organization.

Smuggling by Nigerians

Nigerian heroin trafficking organizations continued to use couriers to smuggle heroin to the United States aboard commercial airlines, as they have for the past decade. Nigerian heroin trafficking organizations were among the largest trafficking groups involved in the importation of SEA heroin into the United States. Typically, couriers controlled by Nigerian traffickers entered the United States at airports with connections to several international locations. Couriers used body-carry techniques and ingestion to conceal heroin, smuggling between 1 and 10 kilograms per trip.

Over the past 10 years, Nigerian drug trafficking organizations have posed an increasingly sophisticated threat to the United States. Their use of couriers of diverse nationalities, backgrounds, genders, and ages, as well as their continuous altering of courier routes and methods of concealment serves as evidence of their adaptability. Nigerian-controlled couriers have varied the routes as circumstances have demanded. For example, until the U.S. Government suspended direct flights between Nigeria and the United States in August 1993, Nigerian-controlled heroin couriers smuggled heroin into New Yorks JFK International Airport on direct commercial flights from Nigeria. Traffickers adapted to the suspension of flights by flying into JFK from neighboring West African countries, such as Ghana and Senegal. Nigerian traffickers also increasingly used South Africa as a transit point by taking advantage of direct flights between South Africa and Miami International Airport, and indirect flights between South Africa and JFK. In addition to JFK and the Miami airport, Nigerian-controlled heroin couriers expanded their routes to include entry points on the U.S. West Coast and the Southwest border, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Hawaii also has been used, as demonstrated in January 1996, when USCS officials at Honolulu airport discovered 700 grams of heroin on the person of a Nigerian woman who had arrived from Vietnam by way of Taiwan.

Wholesale distribution in the United States usually was handled by Nigerian traffickers who had established themselves in the United States. Typically, Nigerian traffickers left distribution at the retail level to street dealers such as members of African-American street gangs or Jamaican posses. Nigerian traffickers were most active in U.S. cities and areas with well-established Nigerian populations, such as Atlanta, the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area, Dallas, Houston, New York, Newark, and Chicago. [Chicago is the hub of heroin trafficking activity by Nigerian groups in the United States.] Nigerian traffickers supplied between 70 and 90 percent of the SEA heroin available in Chicago. Operation Global Sea, a joint USCS-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-DEA investigation initiated in June 1996, targeted a Nigerian heroin trafficking organization that successfully transported several hundred kilograms of SEA heroin from Bangkok, Thailand, to Chicago between 1993 and 1996. In October 1996, this investigation culminated in the arrests of 24 individuals in Chicago, Detroit, New York City, and Bangkok, and the seizure of 2 kilograms of heroin and $200,000 in currency. Operation Global Sea also led to the seizure of an additional 72 kilograms of heroin by authorities in France, Mexico, and the Netherlands.

Global Developments

Heroin is refined from illicit opium. Burma, Afghanistan, and Laos remained the three largest producers of illicit opium in the world in 1996 with Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand producing lesser amounts. Heroin is supplied to the United States from four source areas: Southeast Asia (principally Burma), South America (Colombia), Mexico, and Southwest Asia/Middle East (Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon).

Maximum potential worldwide opium production in 1996 amounted to 4,285 metric tons, an increase from 4,165 metric tons in 1995. The amount of heroin and morphine base seized outside the United States, meanwhile, amounted to some 23 metric tons. According to preliminary figures gathered by the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System, U.S. Federal authorities seized 1.5 metric tons of heroin in Fiscal Year 1996. Approximately 1.2 metric tons were seized in Fiscal Year 1995.

Southeast Asia

Illicit opium production and, by extension, heroin conversion activity, continued at record levels through 1996. On the periphery of the traditional opium source areas in Burma, Laos, and Thailand, illicit opium production continued in Vietnam and probably to a lesser extent in China. China was not included in worldwide assessments in 1996, and only a partial estimate was completed for Vietnam, due to a lack of reliable estimates for opium poppy cultivation within their borders. Cultivation was believed to be relatively modest, although it had the potential to expand to meet any increase in worldwide heroin demand.

Burma was the worlds largest producer of illicit opium and heroin in 1996. Most cultivation was located in eastern Burmas Shan State in remote mountainous areas controlled by armed ethnic groups. Other areas of cultivation were located in the States of Kachin and Kayah. An estimated 163,100 hectares of opium poppy were under cultivation, with an estimated opium yield of 2,560 metric tons. This was an increase from 1995, when the opium yield from an estimated 154,000 hectares of cultivation was placed at 2,340 metric tons. Indeed, in 1996, traffickers reportedly encouraged an increase in cultivation by organizing growers, purchasing fertilizer for crops, and paying advances. This expanded cultivation more than made up for the 2,000 hectares the Burmese Government claimed to have eradicated in 1996.

Heroin refineries were located primarily in the Shan State near the China border, as well as on Burmas borders with Laos and Thailand. Traditionally, this area has been controlled by ethnic groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang Chinese, and the Shan United Army (SUA), rather than by the Burmese Government. Cease-fire agreements reached between the Burmese Government and the various ethnic insurgent groups in the region since 1989 have had little effect on trafficking activity. Rather, these agreements have encouraged such activity by granting a large amount of local autonomy to the groups that are engaged in trafficking in the region. For example, the UWSA, with which the Burmese Government reached an accord in 1989, operated their own heroin refineries near the Thai-Burmese border and permitted independent traffickers to operate refineries farther north in exchange for "taxes" for "protective services."

Heroin production and trafficking continued in 1996. Essential chemicals, including acetic anhydride, were smuggled into the region primarily from China and India. Heroin, on the other hand, was transported out of the region to international markets along a variety of routes across the Chinese and Thai borders and, to a much smaller extent, the Indian, Bangladesh, and Lao borders. Trafickers also continued a trend noted last year of transporting heroin through central Burma to Burmese ports such as Rangoon and Moulmein for shipment by sea to Singapore or Malaysia.

In late 1995, under pressure caused by the arrests of 13 high-level SUA associates as part of the joint DEA-Thai Royal Police Operation Tiger Trap, the cutting of supply lines due to the closure of the Burmese-Thai border, attacks by the Burmese Army and the UWSA, and the defection of thousands of ethnic Shan troops, SUA leader Chang Chi-fu (aka Khun Sa) entered into negotiations with the Burmese Government. A settlement was reached in December 1995, and by early January 1996, Burmese Army troops were garrisoned at key SUA bases. Chang, meanwhile, apparently was granted amnesty from prosecution or extradition. (Chang was indicted in the Eastern District of New York in December 1989 for conspiring to import heroin into the United States.) Chang now lives in Rangoon, where he lives under "protective custody" on a government compound. Some information suggests that Changs illicit wealth has or will be invested in commercial infrastructure building in Burma.

The SUA surrender disrupted trafficking patterns in the Shan State, as traffickers were forced to abandon long-established trade routes. Burmese authorities were able to seize a record 505 kilograms of heroin and destroy 11 heroin refineries, a significant increase over the 70 kilograms of heroin seized and the three refineries destroyed in 1995. Opium seizures in 1996 exceeded 1 metric ton. As a result of such developments, opium prices in some locations plummeted, and refining activity slowed. Nevertheless, trafficking activity continued, as evidenced by reports of extensive drug caravan activity along the Burmese-Thai border. Remnants of the SUA were able to continue operating, due partly to actions taken by SUA members to prepare for the surrender once negotiations began in the fall of 1995. These actions included the dismantling and relocation of refineries to sites on the Burmese borders with Laos and China, and the caching of weapons. Additionally, some soldiers who did not surrender moved to Laos to continue operations there.

Thailand served as a transit area for heroin shipments en route from Burma to international markets. While Thailand once was the main transit country for such shipments, an increasing quantity of heroin has been shipped along alternate routes in recent years, particularly since the Burmese Armys occupation of former SUA territory along the Burmese-Thai border. Traffickers have turned primarily to China, although Cambodia and Laos also have witnessed increased heroin trafficking. Despite such developments, however, Thailand continued to serve as a center of operations for heroin traffickers, due, in part, to that nations modern communications and transportation systems that facilitated illicit drug transactions.

Opium poppies continued to be cultivated by hill tribe farmers in northern Thailand. In fact, net cultivation increased from 1,750 hectares in 1995 to 2,170 hectares in 1996, despite a stepped-up eradication campaign that resulted in the destruction of 880 hectares of opium poppies, as opposed to the 580 hectares destroyed in 1995. Potential opium yield in 1996 stood at 30 metric tons, an increase over 25 metric tons in 1995. These increases were attributed to a temporary rise in the offering price for opium in Burmese border areas in mid-1996, following the destabilization of normal trafficking patterns with the capitulation of the SUA.

For the first time in several years, there was some heroin refining activity in Thailand, as refineries formerly situated in Burma apparently relocated to Thai territory as Burmese forces occupied territory formerly controlled by the SUA. Evidence of this trend was provided in April 1996, when Thai authorities seized a SUA heroin refinery in Thailands northern Mae Hong Son Province. This operation resulted in the seizure of 60 kilograms of morphine base and 100 barrels of ether and acetic anhydride. Authorities estimated the refinery had produced between 700 and 1,400 kilograms of heroin in the 2 months preceding the raid. In August, another heroin refinery was seized in the same area. Altogether, in the first 9 months of 1996, authorities seized 370 kilograms of heroin, compared to 690 kilograms seized in all of 1995.

In other significant drug law enforcement events, the Thai Government in 1996 extradited three individuals wanted on heroin trafficking charges to the United States. The first native-born Thai citizen to be extradited from Thailand was turned over to the United States in January. Two other traffickers, arrested in 1994 as part of Operation TIGER TRAP also were extradited to the United States in 1996.

Laos maintained its position as the third largest opium producer in the world, and the second largest in Southeast Asia. Opium poppy cultivation in Laos actually increased in 1996, rising to 25,500 hectares compared to 19,650 hectares in 1995. Consequently, potential opium production in Laos increased from 180 metric tons in 1995 to 200 metric tons in 1996. The increase in opium poppy cultivation was centered in traditional growing areas in the nations 10 northernmost provinces. The increase in cultivation has been attributed to favorable weather conditions, as well as to an increase in opium prices at a time when Lao income was being battered by rising inflation.

In addition to its role as an opium producer, Laos also served as a transit point for heroin shipments being transported along routes stretching from Burma through Laos and such third countries as Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam.

In response to drug trafficking activity in Laos, the Lao Government organized several counter narcotics police units. Two such units, based in Savannakhet and Bokeo Provinces, were established in 1996. These units, along with the previously established Vientiane unit, were responsible for the 16 kilograms of heroin seized in Laos in the first 9 months of 1996. Other significant government actions in 1996 included the approval of changes to the Lao decree dealing with narcotics violations, which officially banned the production of opium, heroin, and other drugs, and which increased the possible prison sentences for trafficking from a maximum of 8 years to life.

West African heroin couriers transited Cambodia en route to Western markets. In addition to flying directly to Phnom Penh, couriers also traveled by way of Kaoh Kong Island, using some combination of aircraft, boat, or land conveyances. Use of the Phnom Penh route was highlighted in early 1996, when, in February, Phnom Penh police seized 8 kilograms of heroin and, in March, seized 700 grams of heroin from Nigerian couriers. A total of 40 kilograms of heroin were seized in Cambodia in 1996.

China continued to serve as a major transshipment country for heroin en route from Southeast Asia to Western markets. Chinese authorities seized 3.5 metric tons of heroin in the first 10 months of 1996. Heroin shipments routed through China typically were smuggled across the Chinese-Burmese border into Yunnan Province, and then transported through Guangxi Province to Guangdong Province. In Guangdong, heroin was stockpiled prior to shipment to international markets, typically in containerized maritime cargo routed through major container ports located in nearby Hong Kong and Taiwan. Evidence of such stockpiling surfaced in April 1996, when Guangdong police discovered a cache of 600 kilograms of heroin. In addition to supplying the international market, heroin from Guangdong stockpiles also was supplied to Hong Kong for use by that territorys local heroin addict population.

Small-scale opium poppy cultivation probably continued to take place in Chinas Yunnan Province, although no estimates were available in 1996 for the extent of such cultivation. In 1995, cultivation in Yunnan was placed at 1,275 hectares, with a potential opium yield of approximately 16 metric tons. According to some estimates, between 10 and 20 percent of the 3.5 metric tons of opium seized in China in the first 10 months of 1996 was produced domestically, principally to meet the demands of the local addict population.

In 1996, traffickers continued to transship heroin through Malaysia. Authorities seized 167 kilograms of heroin in the first 9 months of 1996, compared to 119 kilograms in 1995. There was considerable smuggling in the area of Penang, Malaysias second largest port. Traffickers blended into the active coastal trade between Malaysia, Burma, and Thailand, carried out by the small, wooden "barter boats," fishing vessels, and coastal traders that operated in the Andaman Sea. In addition to its excellent air and sea facilities, Malaysia also has rail connections to Singapore, and highways leading to Hat Yai, Thailand, the principal transportation node in southern Thailand. Other factors influencing trafficking activity in Malaysia were the presence of a large ethnic Chinese population, and, more importantly, organized criminal groups, such as the Siew Sam Ong or Three Little Emperors Triad.

In 1996, couriers for West African heroin smuggling organizations mailed heroin shipments from Malaysia to Africa, Europe, and North America, under the assumption that packages from Malaysia would not be subject to the customs scrutiny given to packages originating from drug source countries. Couriers typically entered Malaysia through the Sedao border crossing in southern Thailand. This trend was evidenced in March 1996, when authorities in Kuala Lumpur arrested Liberian and Zimbabwean nationals, who attempted to send heroin-laden packages to Brooklyn, New York, and Alicante, Spain, by a commercial package delivery service.

Australia and Singapore also served as transit points. In these countries, significant ethnic Chinese populations hosted well-entrenched Chinese criminal organizations. Generally, couriers smuggled heroin through Australia on flights through Melbourne International Airport. Seizures in Australia amounted to 85 kilograms, compared to 122 kilograms in 1995. Singapore, meanwhile, served as a transit point for maritime shipments of heroin, due, in large part, to the countrys position as the main transshipment hub for containerized sea freight between Asia and the United States. This was demonstrated in March 1996, when authorities in Singapore seized a record 72 kilograms of heroin discovered in a container shipment of air compressors en route from Bangkok, to Suva, Fiji.

South America

In Colombia, opium poppies were cultivated on an estimated 2,100 hectares of land in 1996. However, since three crops can be harvested per year, annual opium poppy cultivation in 1996 was placed at 6,300 hectares. The most significant areas of cultivation were located in the Andean Mountains in the Departments of Cauca, Huila, and Tolima. The higher elevations and rugged terrain of the region provided ideal growing conditions for opium poppies, while hampering detection and access by counterdrug forces.

Potential opium yield in Colombia in 1996 was placed at 63 metric tons, although the accuracy of this estimate is uncertain, given the absence of yield studies in Colombia. Yield figures for other cultivation areas are unlikely to transfer well to Colombia given factors such as the small size of opium poppy capsules, which makes opium collection difficult, and the relative inexperience of opium collectors and laboratory operators. The Operation BREAKTHROUGH* initiative in Colombia is expected to provide the drug intelligence community with the technical data necessary to make more exact estimates of opiate production efficiencies.

Colombian authorities reported spraying 7,400 hectares of opium poppy in 1996, which would surpass Colombias established goal of 4,000 hectares, although the amount of poppy actually killed is not known. The government maintained the eradication campaign despite civic protests over the aerial chemical spraying of drug crops and weapons fire from insurgents wh provided protection for illicit drug crops.

Colombian opiate conversion laboratories produced heroin primarily for the U.S. market. Information suggests the existence of portable heroin laboratories in Colombia, located in urban areas in Cauca, Cundinamarca, Huila, Risaralda, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca Departments; however, relatively few opiate laboratories have been seized. In 1996, Colombian authorities destroyed nine heroin laboratories. All of these heroin-production operations were relatively limited in scope, involving only small quantities of drugs, chemicals, and equipment. This suggested that Colombian chemists remained unable to produce heroin in the bulk quantities seen in traditional heroin source areas. In 1996, Colombian authorities seized 36 kilograms of opium and 183 kilograms of heroin and morphine base. This was a decrease from the 78 kilograms of opium and 419 kilograms of heroin and morphine base seized in 1995.

The Colombian heroin trade is dominated by independent trafficking groups that operate outside of the control of either the Cali or Medellin drug mafias. To date, no single trafficking group has been identified as a principal supplier of Colombian heroin to the United States. However, some analysts anticipate that, in time, certain Cali or Northern Valle del Cauca cocaine trafficking groups will attempt to exert greater control over the heroin trade. Should this occur, these groups would be expected to use the transportation, wholesale distribution, and money laundering networks they have established over the last decade to expand the market for Colombian cocaine in the United States.

Small amounts of opium poppy cultivation have been discovered in Peru and Venezuela. In March 1996, for example, a 12-hectare plot of opium poppies was discovered in a wooded, mountainous area near Miriam, Huanuco Department, Peru. This was the largest opium poppy cultivation site discovered so far in Peru. Despite the presence of such cultivation, heroin production in Peru and Venezuela was believed to be negligible.

Ecuador has been used as a transit point for couriers smuggling Colombian heroin to the United States. Ecuadorian authorities seized 71 kilograms of heroin in 1996, up from 35 kilograms in 1995. Couriers transited Ecuador in the hopes of avoiding scrutiny typically given by customs officials to flights arriving from Colombia. In some cases, couriers obtained heroin in Colombia, and then traveled overland to Quito, Ecuador, where they boarded flights to the United States. In other cases, couriers recruited in U.S. cities, such as New York and Miami, would fly into Ecuador, where they would take delivery of heroin from Colombian couriers.

Mexico and Central America

In Mexico, net opium poppy cultivation in 1996 was 5,100 hectares, with an estimated opium yield of 54 metric tons. Despite the eradication of 7,900 hectares of opium poppies, net cultivation failed to decrease due to the planting of new crops.

Processing activity in Mexico remained concentrated on the production of black tar heroin, which was relatively simple to produce and preferred by users in the western United States. Brown heroin also was produced, although in limited quantities. Although heroin produced in Mexico and Guatemala represented only a small portion of the worldwide total, its impact on the United States was substantial because virtually all production was destined for U.S. consumers. Mexican authorities seized a total of 260 kilograms of heroin and 190 kilograms of opium in the first 10 months of 1996, compared to 203 kilograms of heroin and 220 kilograms of opium seized in 1995.

The entire heroin production process, from opium production and heroin processing to the management of transportation and distribution networks in the United States, was controlled by several polydrug trafficking groups based in Mexico. (These groups were referred to as polydrug trafficking organizations because they smuggled not only heroin, but also cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine.) Other trafficking organizations operated independently, on a smaller scale, limiting their involvement to specific aspects of the trafficking enterprise.

Four major drug trafficking organizations in Mexico controlled drug smuggling across the U.S. Southwest border. Most of the heroin trade was in the hands of the same trafficking organizations--"cartels" directed by Amado Carillo-Fuentes, the Arellano-Felix brothers, Miguel Caro-Quintero, and, until his arrest in January 1996, Juan Garcia-Abrego--that were responsible for cross-border cocaine smuggling.

Opium poppy cultivation in Guatemala was negligible, covering an estimated 12 hectares. According to the Guatemalan Government, manual and aerial eradication programs led to the destruction of virtually the entire opium poppy crop in 1996. In 1995, by contrast, opium poppies were cultivated on an estimated 125 hectares of land, 86 hectares of which were eradicated.

Southwest Asia

Despite the countrys political shift to Islamic fundamentalism, Afghanistan maintained its position as the second largest producer of opium in the world. Official U.S. estimates indicated that in 1996, 37,950 hectares of opium poppies were under cultivation, with potential opium production totaling 1,230 metric tons. This was down slightly from 1,250 metric tons produced in 1995. These figures represent a stabilization of the crop--at least for the moment--after 6 straight years of increases during which the crop more than tripled. According to the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), total opium production is much higher. Relying on an in-country survey of Afghan opium poppy farmers, the UNDCP estimates a potential opium yield of 2,336 metric tons from 56,824 hectares of opium poppies.

The absence of a universally recognized central government in Afghanistan made opium poppy control programs, such as eradication, impossible to enforce. A number of factions continued to contend for power. Although one faction, the Taliban, has gained control over major portions of the country, it has yet to form a government. Moreover, despite early pronouncements on their aversion to drug cultivation and production, the Taliban appears to have reached an accommodation with opium poppy farmers. Indeed, there have been few reports reaching the West from Afghanistan concerning eradication and punishment for opium farmers and drug traffickers.

Reports indicate that opiate processing activity in Afghanistan is increasing. Most laboratory activity involved the processing of opium to morphine base for local consumption and for transport to Turkey. However, there are indications that minor heroin laboratory activity, possibly to supply traffickers using routes through Central Asia and Russia, increased.

In 1996, potential opium production in Pakistan fell to 75 metric tons, a sharp drop from 155 metric tons in 1995. Officially, this decrease was attributed to government eradication programs and the extension of a government-imposed poppy cultivation ban. The estimated 867 hectares of cultivation eradicated in 1996, however, accounted for only a small part of the drop in net cultivation from 6,950 hectares in 1995 to 3,400 hectares in 1996. The decease in opium production instead was likely more attributable to a considerable drop in the price of opium due to increased Afghan production, and to a concurrent rise in the price of food crops making them attractive alternatives to opium production for farmers. While less opium, and, by extension, heroin was available, less also was seized. In 1996, the Pakistani Government reported seizing 5.4 metric tons of opium and 2.03 metric tons of heroin, down from 215.5 metric tons of opium and 18 metric tons of heroin reported in 1995.

Major opium conversion laboratory activity in Southwest Asia was concentrated in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan, a semiautonomous region governed by tribal jirgas or councils that were fairly independent of the Pakistani Government. Thus the central Pakistani Government had little control over the region. Pressure on tribal leaders from the Pakistani Government, the UNDCP, and DEA, however, reportedly led to the eviction of some laboratory operators. Additionally, in December 1996, tribal forces moved against a drug bazaar in the NWFP and razed the entire facility. Since laboratories in the NWFP were generally crude, "kitchen" laboratories, usually situated in remote areas, mounting any type of raid on these facilities required extensive planning and logistical support, which usually led to a compromise of the mission.

Much of the heroin trade in and from Pakistan is controlled by a loose consortium of three Quetta-based families, referred to as the Quetta Alliance. While these groups appear to be independent, they cooperate with each other when such cooperation is to their mutual benefit. For example, they often have bought and sold raw materials and drugs through each other, established clandestine opium conversion laboratories in proximity for mutual protection, and, on occasion, pooled their resources to meet multiton drug orders. Meanwhile, the Quetta Alliance has shielded itself from drug law enforcement through payoffs, bribes, and the political power afforded the wealthy. Payoffs and bribes have ensured advance notification of raids and virtual veto power over plans to expand local drug law enforcement capabilities. Members of the alliance also hold district- and provincial-level political offices, which provide access to federal officials.

India remained the worlds largest supplier of pharmaceutical-grade licit opium gum, produced under the direct control of the Indian Government. Reports of licit opium diverted to the illegal market persisted, with some estimates placing the portion of licit production diverted to illicit markets as high as 30 percent. Opium also was supplied to the illicit market from illicit cultivation in northern and northeastern parts of the country. Both diverted and illicit opium were destined largely for the local South Asian heroin market, with opium usually converted to a low-grade heroin, referred to as "brown sugar," in small clandestine laboratories believed to be located near licit opium poppy cultivation sites. Brown sugar heroin had no real market outside of the region. Although limited quantities of Pakistani- produced heroin, intended for the international market, were routed through India, this heroin usually was destined for Europe, rather than the United States. Smaller quantities of heroin were smuggled into India from Burma, then smuggled to the international market by Nepalese traffickers. In addition, Nigerian traffickers continued to use India as a transshipment location. In the first 9 months of 1996, Indian authorities seized a total of 1 metric ton of heroin and 2.2 metric tons of opium, compared to 1.7 metric tons of heroin and 1.3 metric tons of opium seized in all of 1995.

Iran claims that opium production has been eliminated; however, actual conditions in the country are unknown. The Iranian Government did take steps to address the countrys drug problem. For instance, the government constructed elaborate walls and dug pits to block trafficking routes. Nonetheless, drug smuggling by caravans, private automobiles, buses, and trucks continued without interruption. Smuggling from Iran to Turkey and Western Europe has been facilitated by Iranian communities in Turkey and Euroean countries such as Germany. These populations include Iranian addicts who fled the draconian treatment meted out by the new regime. These new communities have formed an excellent basis for ethnic-based trafficking networks. Significant 1996 seizures tied to Iran included the June seizure by Pakistani authorities in Chagai District, Baluchistan, of 2 metric tons of morphine base apparently being transported across the Iranian-Pakistani border en route to Kurdish areas in the northwest. And in September, Turkish authorities seized approximately 750 kilograms of morphine base from two tractor-trailers crossing the Iranian-Turkish border.

The Middle East

An inspection of traditional opium cultivation areas by United Nations representatives in 1995 confirmed that opium poppy cultivation in Lebanon has been eliminated. However, heroin processing continued in laboratories in the Bekaa Valley. Opium and morphine base were imported from Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan by way of Turkey and Syria, while heroin was exported through Lebanese ports, or through Israeli ports after being smuggled through the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon. Couriers aboard commercial airline flights also smuggled heroin out of the country. In some instances, couriers transited African and European airports en route to the United States. Authorities in Lebanon seized 51 kilograms of heroin in 1996.

Syria was a known transit country for heroin. In addition to serving as a transit point for opium and morphine base en route to the Bekaa Valley, Syria also was a transit point for Lebanese-produced heroin en route to the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and the United States. Moreover, smuggling allegedly was tolerated and even facilitated by Syrian military officials. (Syrian troops controlled Lebanons northern Bekaa Valley where heroin was produced.) In 1996, heroin seizures by Syrian authorities totaled 10 kilograms, compared to 17 kilograms in 1995.

Central Asia

The major opium poppy-growing areas in Central Asia were located in remote and mountainous regions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Although no estimates were available as to the extent of cultivation, opium poppy plots were believed to be small. Most illicit opium seized was in the form of dried opium poppy bulbs and stems, referred to as opium poppy straw. (By grinding poppy straw into a fine powder, boiling the powder, adding chemicals, and finally filtering, addicts are able to prepare an injectable solution with a high morphine content.) Kilogram quantities of opium poppy straw were seized throughout the region. All five Central Asian nations have instituted antidrug programs. Unfortunately, efforts to eradicate illicit crops have met with limited success due to shortages of personnel and equipment. Although this opiate activity has little direct impact on the United States, the U.S. Government has become involved in the training and equipping of counterdrug forces in the region.

Reports indicated that opiate processing activity in Tajikistan increased. Mot laboratory activity involved the processing of opium to morphine base for local consumption and for transport to Turkey. However, there were indications of an increase in minor heroin laboratory activity in Tajikistan, possibly to supply traffickers using routes through Central Asia and Russia.

Trafficking through Central Asia was facilitated by loosely controlled borders among the Central Asian States and Afghanistan. This traffic may increase as Afghan traffickers respond to a tightening of security along the Afghan-Pakistani border, especially given the growing economic and cultural ties among Afghanistan and the Central Asian States. In this context, smuggling through Uzbekistan emerged as an alternative to traditional smuggling routes through Iran and Turkey. The Silk Road, which once made Uzbekistan the center of trade between Asia and Europe, now threatens to make the country the center of regional drug trafficking, given its strategic location adjacent to Afghanistan.

Europe

Turkey played a major role in the trafficking of SWA heroin to Europe. Heroin laboratories processed large amounts of morphine base imported from Southwest Asia by way of Iran. At one time, heroin laboratory activity was concentrated in remote areas of eastern and southeastern Turkey, but increasing civil unrest led to the shifting of operations to the Istanbul region. Still, some laboratory activity in the eastern and northeastern areas continued, as illustrated by the December 1996 seizure in Yalova, Turkey, of an operational heroin laboratory, along with 240 kilograms of morphine base and approximately 1.2 metric tons of acetic anhydride. Laboratory seizures in the Istanbul area, meanwhile, included the February seizure of a facility in Tekirdag Province, where authorities found 234 kilograms of suspected heroin, 16 metric tons of acetic anhydride, and assorted laboratory equipment. Altogether in 1996, Turkish authorities destroyed seven laboratories, and seized 1.2 metric tons of morphine base and 2.6 metric tons of heroin.

According to some estimates, between 3 and 10 metric tons of morphine base were smuggled into Turkey monthly. Morphine base was smuggled using three methods: by sea on merchant ships that sailed into the Ports of Istanbul, Ismir, Samsun, and Trabzon after loading heroin consignments off the coasts of Pakistan and Iran; overland by motor vehicle from Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, into northwestern Iran, and then by vehicle, horse, or backpack across the border into Turkey; and finally, overland by vehicle from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States, across the Caspian Sea by ferry, through Georgia into Turkey. Much of the morphine base and heroin traffic in Turkey is controlled by ethnic Kurdish elements. Iranians living in Istanbul also comprise a major drug trafficking group.

Heroin was shipped from Turkey primarily to European countries and, to a much smaller extent, the United States. Bulk heroin shipments destined for European markets were transported along a combination of numerous land and sea routes collectively known as the Balkan Route. Smaller quantities destined for the United States were shipped directly, or transshipped through Europe. The Balkan Route encompasses highways running from Turkey through Greece, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, Romania, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, to Austria, Germany, and Italy, as well as ferry routes between Greece and Italy. From Italy, heroin shipments were routed to markets elsewhere in Western Europe.

Nigerian heroin smugglers in Italy sought out U.S. servicemen based there to act as couriers bringing heroin from Turkey to Italy or distribution there and elsewhere in Europe. Seventy-five percent of the heroin seized in Europe in recent years, however, was transported by way of the Balkan Route. Significant 1996 seizures of heroin en route from Turkey to Western Europe included 190 kilograms seized in January by Turkish police from a tractor-trailer bound for Germany; 217 kilograms of heroin seized in May by Italian authorities from a truck aboard a passenger ferry that arrived in Venice, Italy, from Izmir; and 65 kilograms seized in June by German customs authorities from a truck that had arrived from Turkey by way of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria.

Drug trafficking organizations composed of ethnic Albanians from Serbias Kosovo Province were considered to be second only to Turkish groups as the predominant heroin smugglers along the Balkan Route. These groups were particularly active in Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Serbia. Kosovan traffickers were noted for their use of violence and for their involvement in international weapons trafficking. There is increasing evidence that ethnic criminals from the Balkans are engaged in criminal activities in the United States and some of that activity involves theft of licit pharmaceutical products for illicit street distribution.

Destination countries for shipments of SWA heroin included France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Seizures reflected the flow of heroin to these markets. A total of 4.89 metric tons of heroin were seized in these eight countries in 1996. In individual countries, 47 kilograms were seized in Portugal, 360 kilograms in the Netherlands, 405 kilograms in Switzerland, 533 kilograms in Spain, 612 kilograms in France, 780 kilograms in the United Kingdom, 900 kilograms in Germany, and 1.25 metric tons in Italy. By contrast, in 1995, a total of 4.78 metric tons of heroin were seized in these eight countries. This included 67 kilograms seized in Portugal, 212 kilograms in Switzerland, 351 kilograms in the Netherlands, 499 kilograms in France, 546 kilograms in Spain, 933 kilograms in Germany, 952 kilograms in Italy, and 1.3 metric tons in the United Kingdom.

European drug law enforcement officials often cited Turkish groups for their control over mid-level wholesale distribution of heroin in consumer countries. In many cases, Iranian, Kurdish, and Turkish criminal organizations worked with members of local ethnic-Turkish communities to control distribution. Italian organized crime families also played a large role in heroin distribution. In addition, Nigerian trafficking organizations were responsible for a growing amount of heroin smuggled into Europe using commercial air connections. These Nigerian criminals have traded, on occasion, heroin for cocaine in the United States.

Neither SWA nor SEA heroin was abused to any significant extent in Russia or other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Rather, drug abuse consisted mainly of the consumption of opium poppy straw tea or injectable morphine solutions, both of which were made from opium poppy straw smuggled into the region by rail from Central Asia, Ukraine, and Latvia. Russia served as a transit point for kilogram quantities of SWA and SEA heroin smuggled through Moscows Shermetyevo International Airport by couriers en route to Western Europe. In the past, Russian criminals have been involved in shipping heroin to the United States. However, no such arrests were made in 1996. In one February 1996 case, authorities at Shermetyevo seized 61 capsules of heroin from a Liberian courier en route from Malaysia to Switzerland.

Opium poppy straw and opium were smuggled by organized criminal groups of the region. After initially expanding their activities on the periphery of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, ethnic Russian criminals were more active throughout Europe and in the United States. Other ethnic criminal groups tied to drug trafficking included groups composed of Armenians, Azeris, Chechens, and Georgians. Ethnic gangs continued to expand globally in 1996. In fact, increased organized crime activities in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Centra Asian States led to greater contact between smuggling organizations regionally and internationally.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Crimean Ports of Odessa and Sevastopol were used to stage shipments through Ukraine and Belarus to Poland, according to a EUROPOL study. Pole and Czech traffickers were mentioned frequently, along with traditional smuggling organizations composed of Iranians, Italians, Kurds, Turks, and Yugoslavs.

Seizures in 1996 indicate that some opiates, to include heroin, are being smuggled by North Korean criminals, mainly into China and Russia. Some reports suggest that such criminal activity is tied to a concerted government effort to earn hard currency. Methamphetamine also allegedly is manufactured in North Korea and shipped to markets in Japan.

Nigeria was a major transshipment country for SEA and SWA heroin being smuggled to Europe and the United States. Trafficking organizations based in Lagos capitalized on a lack of law enforcement resources in neighboring countries to transport heroin into Nigeria and subsequently on to major U.S. and European markets. Another factor in trafficking through Nigeria was a perceived lack of commitment in the Nigerian Government to fighting drug trafficking. For example, in December 1996, the Nigerian Attorney Generals office ordered the release on bail of nine Nigerian citizens who were being held pending extradition to the United States to face drug trafficking charges. These suspects were among 11 alleged drug traffickers arrested by Nigerian authorities in 1995. Two of the 11 eventually were expelled to the United States.

Nigerian trafficking groups also were successful because of their methods of operation. These groups were organized along familial and tribal lines, and traffickers seldom dealt with outside persons. Traffickers employed such security-conscious measures as using multiple identities and communicating only by pay telephones. Moreover, high-level traffickers insulated themselves from direct involvement in trafficking activity by assigning tasks, such as recruiting couriers and organizing courier travel, to lower-level members.

Since the late 1980s, Nigerian drug trafficking organizations have obtained much of their heroin from sources in Bangkok, Thailand. Operations in Thailand were facilitated by a Nigerian community in Bangkok, which in December 1995 was estimated to number approximately 2,000 Nigerian nationals. Nigerian-controlled couriers transiting Thailand en route to Africa, Europe, or the United States primarily used Bangkoks Don Muang International Airport. However, some couriers also transited airports in Phuket and Chiang Mai in order to avoid increased drug law enforcement activity at Don Muang. In addition to using direct flights from Thailand to Africa, Europe, and the United States, reportedly, West African heroin couriers also used routes that passed through Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

In the early 1980s, Nigerian traffickers dealt primarily with SWA heroin obtained in India and Pakistan. Although Thailand has since assumed a larger role in Nigerian trafficking activities, smuggling from Southwest Asia continues. In April 1996, for example, Pakistani customs authorities seized a total of over 15 kilograms of heroin from two couriers who arrived at Lahore International Airport. In April, over 12 kilograms were discovered within 25,000 buttons in the luggage of a South African male who was en route to Johannesburg, South Africa, and 3 kilograms of heroin were seized from the luggage of a Nigerian male en route to Lome, Togo, by way of Bangkok. Additionally, in June, customs officials at the Sust border crossing in northern Pakistan seized 5 kilograms from a Nigerian national destined for China by way of the Khunjarab Pass. Interestingly, this was the first documented heroin seizure in this area and the first incident of a Nigerian courier arrested attempting to cross into China.

Aside from Nigeria, African countries used by Nigerian-controlled couriers as transit locations included Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. While these countries served as transit points for smuggling operations destined for Europe, South Africa may have served as a transit point for heroin couriers en route to the United States.

METHAMPHETAMINE

Developments in the United States

Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse in the United States have been on the rise over the past few years. As a result, this drug is having a devastating impact on many communities across the nation. Although more common in western areas of the country, methamphetamine increasingly is being seen in areas not previously familiar with the harmful effects of this powerful stimulant. Methamphetamine trafficking is increasing in the Southwest, Midwest, and Southeast.

The Methamphetamine Problem

Historically, the suppliers of methamphetamine throughout the United States have been outlaw motorcycle gangs and numerous other independent trafficking groups. Although these groups continued to produce and distribute methamphetamine in 1996, organized crime polydrug trafficking groups operating from Mexico dominated wholesale methamphetamine trafficking in the United States. Over the past few years, these groups have revolutionized the production of this drug by operating large-scale laboratories--both in Mexico and the United States--capable of producing unprecedented quantities of methamphetamine. The groups have saturated the western U.S. market with this product, increasingly moving the product to markets in the eastern United States.

Relatively small quantities of methamphetamine are produced by licit drug manufacturers in the United States. There is little diversion of these legitimate products because they are subject to strict controls. Clandestine production accounts for nearly all of the methamphetamine trafficked and abused in the United States.

Domestic methamphetamine production, trafficking, and abuse were concentrated primarily in the western and southwestern regions of the United States. The cities encountering the most significant problems with abuse included Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, and, to a lesser degree, Dallas, Denver, and Seattle. Much of the clandestine laboratory activity was centered in California where the methamphetamine problem was most acute. Methamphetamine also was available consistently in wholesale quantities in some cities in the Midwest and the South.

Within certain areas of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and portions of the Pacific Northwest, methamphetamine traditionally has been the drug of choice among a portion of the illicit drug user population. The involvement of Mexico-based criminal organizations in methamphetamine trafficking clearly has expanded the market in those areas and beyond. Areas of the Pacific Northwest, Midwest, Southeast, and some portions of the South, particularly Georgia and the surrounding States, experienced a dramatic increase in the availability of methamphetamine supplied by organized crime groups operating from Mexico. For example, organized crime drug groups operating from Mexico transported large quantities of the drug to the Midwest, which led to the expansion of the existing methamphetamine market. Within the Midwest, Kansas and Missouri experienced an increase in the number of methamphetamine laboratories operating in those States, which would indicate that methamphetamine production expanded eastward. However, these laboratories were small-scale operations, particularly when compared to the large-scale laboratories operating in California. The rise in laboratory seizures in these States does not reflect a concerted effort by major traffickers to shift production from sites in California. Rather, it reflects an increasing effort by local entrepreneurs, who operated on the periphery of the methamphetamine market, to exploit the expanding demand for the drug. Laboratories in California, controlled by organized crime drug trafficking groups operating from Mexico, remained the predominant sources of supply for the West, Midwest, and much of the rest of the United States.

Methamphetamine Use

Traditionally, methamphetamine users have suffered the same addiction cycle and withdrawal reactions as those suffered by crack cocaine users. Both drugs, after prolonged use, lead to binging, which is consuming the drug continuously for up to 3 days without sleep. The user then is driven into a severe depression, followed by worsening paranoia, belligerence, and aggression, which is a period known as tweaking. Finally, the user collapses from exhaustion, only to awaken days later to begin the cycle again.

The new ephedrine-based methamphetamine, however, has a usage pattern unlike that of traditional methamphetamine or crack cocaine. Several times more potent than its other forms, todays methamphetamine produces a reaction far more severe than even crack cocaine, with sleepless binges that last up to 15 days and end with sudden crashes.

Chronic, high-dose methamphetamine abusers, often called "speed freaks," are generally undernourished and have a gaunt appearance, poor hygiene, and rotten teeth. These individuals inject methamphetamine every 2 to 3 hours and often as much as 1,000 milligrams each time. Due to the high level of methamphetamine in their systems, "speed freaks" are extremely paranoid.

According to the latest information available from the DAWN, the estimated number of nationwide emergency room drug abuse episodes involving methamphetamine decreased from 1994 to 1995. However, despite this decrease, the number of nationwide emergency room episodes remained well above the level of 1992. Moreover, there were preliminary indications that methamphetamine abuse is again increasing. The areas hardest hit by methamphetamine abuse in 1996 included Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle.

Pharmacology

Methamphetamine can be a lethal, dangerous, and unpredictable drug. Methamphetamine, like cocaine, is a potent central nervous system stimulant. It can be smoked, snorted, injected, or taken orally; the most frequent method of methamphetamine use is injection. The drug increases the heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature, and rate of breathing; dilates the pupils; produces euphoria, increased alertness, a sense of increased energy, and tremors. High doses or chronic use have been associated with increased nervousness, irritability, and paranoia. Withdrawal from high doses produces severe depression.

Effects: In large doses, methamphetamines frequent effects are irritability, aggressive behavior, anxiety, excitement, auditory hallucinations, and paranoia (delusions and psychosis). Abusers tend to engage in violent behavior. Mood changes are common, and the abuser can change from friendly to hostile rapidly. The paranoia produced by methamphetamine use results in suspiciousness, hyperactive behavior, and dramatic mood swings.

Duration: Compared with cocaine, which is metabolized rapidly in the body, methamphetamine is metabolized slowly; up to 2 days are required to eliminate a single dose. Rapidly absorbed when taken orally, the effects of the drug peak within 2 to 3 hours and are measurably effective in the body for up to 8 hours.

Addiction: One of the main arguments in determining whether or not a substance is capable of producing physical addiction (dependence) is the ability to produce a withdrawal syndrome similar to that of narcotics and central nervous system depressants. Once it was discovered that each drug produces its own unique pattern of effects, more drugs then were identified as having addiction potential. Repeated use of high-dose methamphetamine produces such a pattern. Several hours after the last use, the individual experiences a drastic drop in mood and energy levels. Sleep begins and may last for a long period and, upon awakening, severe depression exists that may last for days. While users are in this depressed state, suicide is a major concern. These symptoms occur after use and may be reversed by taking another dose of methamphetamine, thereby fitting the definition for a withdrawal syndrome.

"Ice" is a large crystal form of high-purity

d-methamphetamine hydrochloride. Ice derives its name from its appearance: large, clear crystals that resemble chunks of ice, shards of broken glass, or rock candy.

It was not until 1988 that ice became widespread in Hawaii. By 1990, ice spread to the U.S. mainland, although distribution remained limited to retail amounts in just a few regions of the country. In the early 1990s, Koreans served as the principal supply source for ice that was smuggled from Asia directly to Hawaii and the U.S. mainland. In 1996, intelligence data indicated that traffickers from Mexico were supplying Asian organizations/gangs on the West Coast and in Hawaii with methamphetamine for conversion to ice.

Analyses of all samples of ice seized to date in the United States have shown purity levels of 90 to almost 100 percent. In 1996, ice sold for $200 to $450 per gram, from $5,000 to $8,500 per ounce, and $35,000 to $50,000 per kilogram. Abusers in the United States ingested ice almost exclusively by smoking the drug in glass pipes.

Other terms for ice included quartz, glass, crystal meth, shabu, kaksonjae, hanyak, hiropon, batu, and crack meth.

Laboratory Seizures

The number of methamphetamine laboratory seizures in the United States reported to DEA increased dramatically during 1996. The significant increase reflects the widespread proliferation in the manufacture, trafficking, and use of the drug across the West, Midwest, and portions of the South. DEA special agents in concert with State and local law enforcement authorities seized a record-breaking 879 methamphetamine laboratories in 1996, the highest figure ever reported by DEA. This compares to 327 laboratories seized in 1995, 263 in 1994, and 218 in 1993. The 1996 figure represents a 169-percent increase over 1995 seizures, and marks the most significant annual increase in the number of seizures ever reported by DEA.

According to seizure data, the manufacture of methamphetamine was based primarily in the West, Midwest, and portions of the South. DEA field divisions in Dallas (77), Denver (88), Los Angeles (52), New Orleans (81), Phoenix (83), St. Louis (292), San Diego (53), and San Francisco (87) accounted for approximately 92 percent of the methamphetamine laboratory seizures nationwide. The significant increase in the number of methamphetamine laboratory seizures was most pronounced in the St. Louis Field Division where 235 laboratories were seized in the State of Missouri alone. Most of these laboratories, however, were capable of producing only small quantities ranging from half an ounce to 1 pound.

Although there were a large number of seizures reported by the St. Louis Division, California remains the predominant area for methamphetamine production in the United States. According to the Western States Information Network (WSIN), preliminary data indicate that 892 methamphetamine laboratories were seized in California during 1996. (WSINs figure may include seizures counted by DEA; however, DEA currently does not maintain a system to capture WSINs data. The development of a nationwide database to capture this data is underway at EPIC). In addition, Mexican-operated laboratories continued to be based in California where they produced large quantities of methamphetamine. According to DEA figures, Mexican-operated laboratories accounted for approximately 26 percent of all laboratories seized in California and, for the most part, were capable of producing anywhere from 10 to 150 pounds per cook.

Production Methods

Methamphetamine is produced most commonly by using either an ephedrine/pseudoephedrine reduction method or a P2P method. However, only 3 percent of the methamphetamine laboratories seized during the year used a P2P method of synthesis. The use of pseudoephedrine for synthesizing methamphetamine increased dramatically over the past several years due to the relative ease of purchasing pseudoephedrine tablets and the subsequent decline in the availability of ephedrine. Preliminary data indicate approximately 51 percent of the laboratories seized in 1996 were identified as, or suspected of, using pseudoephedrine compared to 45 percent for ephedrine. (Initial reporting of ephedrine as a precursor at the laboratory site often is confirmed later through laboratory analysis to be pseudoephedrine.)

Pseudoephedrine/ephedrine was obtained from various sources. Illicit laboratory operators obtained/diverted pseudoephedrine (in tablet form), and in a number of cases ephedrine, from over-the-counter (OTC) products often designed for legitimate use such as OTC cold preparations sold in retail stores and through mail-order distributors. These varied sources indicate the increasing diversion and use of OTC products to manufacture methamphetamine.

The Federal Government has prepared regulations to further reduce the diversion of pharmaceutical products containing chemicals, such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which can be used to produce illegal drugs. DEA has consulted with corporations within the pharmaceutical industry to develop a solution to the diversion problem that does not restrict unduly the availability of these chemicals for legitimate use. The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 was formulated so that retail sales of legitimate ephedrine/pseudoephedrine products for normal medical use will not be affected.

Use of the "Nazi method," which uses ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, sodium/lithium, and anhydrous ammonia to produce methamphetamine, has been identified in approximately 12 percent of the laboratories seized in 1996. Use of this method has increased significantly from 5 laboratories in 1995 to 104 in 1996. While most Nazi-method laboratories were seized in Arkansas and Missouri, these operations were encountered in eight other States and as far west as California and Washington. This method has become popular because it is quick, inexpensive, requires little setup time or equipment, and produces a high yield of pure methamphetamine.

The significant rise in the number of methamphetamine laboratory seizures not only demonstrates that increasing numbers of individuals are becoming involved in the methamphetamine trade it also underscores the expanding influence of this drug in many communities across the nation. The growing methamphetamine problem in the United States is one that is not fueled only by Mexico-based organizations but also by a large number of independent traffickers/groups that operate the majority of illicit laboratories in the United States. While these laboratories are small, for the most part, in comparison to the Mexican-operated laboratories in California, they are nonetheless a source of supply to the illicit drug market. In addition, they are extremely hazardous and they endanger the safety and well-being of many citizens.

In addition to domestic manufacture, methamphetamine increasingly is being produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. This is confirmed by seizure data from EPIC and the DEA Mexico City Country Office. According to EPIC, the amount of methamphetamine seized in transit from Mexico to the United States increased dramatically beginning in 1993. In 1993, 1994, and 1995, 329, 683, and 697 kilograms, respectively, were seized along the Southwest border. During 1996, 795 kilograms were seized. By comparison, only 6.5 kilograms were seized in all of 1992. Likewise, the amount of methamphetamine seized in Mexico has increased in the past 3 years.

Laboratory Operations

Clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the United States usually are operated on an irregular basis rather than on a consistent production schedule. Operators often produce a batch of finished product, disassemble the laboratory, and either store it or move it to another location while they acquire additional chemicals. Relocating the laboratory affords some protection against detection by drug law enforcement authorities. Storage facilities often are used to house or safeguard chemicals, glassware, and finished product. It is not uncommon for operators to have multiple laboratory sites.

Cooperative efforts by law enforcement agencies and chemical suppliers have made obtaining the necessary chemicals more difficult for methamphetamine laboratory operators. In order to circumvent these joint efforts, laboratory operators have sought alternative chemicals, routes of synthesis, and sources of supply to fulfill their needs. Laboratory operators have manufactured their own chemicals, employed "runners" to purchase necessary chemicals under the "threshold amount" (the amount at which record-keeping and reporting of chemical transactions are required), or experimented with alternative, nonregulated chemicals. They also have obtained chemicals from rogue chemical companies, from sources of supply located in States without strict chemical regulations, or from other countries.

Locations: Small-scale methamphetamine laboratories are being operated increasingly in single and multifamily residences in urban and suburban neighborhoods, where they pose a significant threat to public health and safety. Although traditionally the laboratories were located in sparsely populated or isolated rural areas in order to avoid detection, as laboratory seizures reported to DEA indicate, 52 percent of the clandestine laboratories seized in 1995 were located in urban and suburban sites. Rural locations were reported in 38 percent of the seizures and industrial or commercial sites in 5 percent. (Locality information was not available for the remaining 5 percent of the laboratory seizures.)

Operators: Methamphetamine laboratory operators often are well-armed, and their laboratories occasionally are booby-trapped and equipped with scanning devices employed as security precautions. Weaponry, ranging from single firearms to arsenals of high-powered weapons and explosives, are found commonly at laboratory sites. Laboratory operators, or "cooks," frequently display little concern for public safety or the environment. Cooks vary from high school dropouts with no real chemistry education to professionals with graduate degrees in chemistry. Typically, however, these cooks have little formal training. Instead, they follow a handwritten recipe or have learned to produce methamphetamine from underground publications, apprenticeships, or fellow inmates during periods of incarceration.

Chemists: Some laboratory operators act as their own chemists, while others hire chemists to run the laboratories for them. Many manufacturers are independent producers who cook for various organized groups. This is particularly true of larger organizations that may hire or contract chemists to manufacture methamphetamine in return for cash, finished product, or a combination of both. Other cooks manufacture for themselves rather than for a particular organization.

Networks: Leasing storage facilities, procuring chemicals, securing the laboratory site, and setting up glassware and equipment may be the responsibility of one person or many different individuals. Several individuals may work together to combine their expertise, chemicals, etc., on an ad hoc basis. The number of individuals that comprise an operation, and the function each performs, differs from one organization to the next. Illicit manufacturers often develop and maintain associations with other laboratory operators. In certain areas, they function as a loosely interconnected community or network, sharing, selling, or exchanging chemicals, recipes, glassware, or the finished product.

Laboratories Operated by Traffickers from Mexico

Typically, laboratories operated by traffickers from Mexico were set up in remote areas in parts of northern California and throughout Southern California. Organizations may purchase property or pay for the short-term use of a site to acquire a secure location where they can manufacture. In the Fresno area, in 1996, for example, laboratories usually were constructed on property rented out by farm laborers who were paid up to $10,000 for use of the property. Cooking most frequently occurred during the weekend when the farms were not in operation. An organization may utilize one location many times. The same location may be used by numerous organizations. Some individuals make money simply by renting out laboratory sites to various organizations. Organizations assisted each other in obtaining chemicals, glassware, and the finished product. Chemists may manufacture for numerous organizations. Chemical brokers supply numerous manufacturing organizations with chemicals.

An individual, acting in a supervisory capacity, may be responsible for the overall management of the laboratory, such as ensuring that the necessary chemicals and equipment are present and are set up for the operation to proceed. Generally, chemicals were stored in stash houses and brought to the laboratory site as needed. The amount of chemicals present at the laboratory usually is restricted to that amount required to complete a particular cook. Once the process is complete, the laboratories were dismantled, and the equipment is put into storage.

Numerous 22-liter setups were used frequently in laboratories operated by traffickers from Mexico to produce up to 150 pounds during each manufacturing process. Furthermore, these organizations operated many laboratories simultaneously. Illegal aliens were encountered most frequently at the laboratory site. In some cases, they were hired as helpers or to maintain the reaction process, while the actual chemist visited the site periodically to ensure the operation was functioning properly. In other cases, they were responsible for all facets of the manufacturing process.

Clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in Mexico

appear to be run in a manner similar to their counterparts in the United States. For example, temporary laborers typically are hired to perform the production process, laboratories often are located in remote areas (e.g., ranches), and large-capacity laboratory equipment is used.

The increase in production in Mexico was a result of an increased demand in the United States and ongoing enforcement efforts in California. It is likely that increasingly strict chemical controls and enforcement efforts in the United States will result in an additional increase in production of methamphetamine in Mexico, depending upon access to chemicals in that country.

Health and safety hazards, site contamination, and the environmental impact

Not only are methamphetamine laboratories used to manufacture illegal, often deadly drugs, but the clandestine nature of the manufacturing process and the presence of ignitable, corrosive, reactive, and toxic chemicals at the sites, have resulted in explosions, fires, toxic fumes, and irreparable damage to human health and to the environment. Every year, fires or explosions occur at a number of clandestine laboratory sites, which lead to their discovery.

The chemical reactions that occur during the manufacture of illegal drugs may produce toxic vapors that permeate into the plaster and wood of buildings or may be vented outside. The problems are further complicated when the chemicals are stored at off-site locations such as rental lockers. The lack of proper ventilation and temperature controls at these off-site locations adds to the potential for fire, explosion, and exposure to humans.

Methamphetamine laboratories may contaminate water sources and/or soil. In some cases, contamination may spread off-site. Careless or intentional dumping by the laboratory operator is one source of contamination. Spilling chemicals on the floor or dumping waste into bathtubs, sinks, toilets, or on the grounds surrounding the laboratories, and along roads and creeks are common practices. Surface and groundwater drinking supplies could be contaminated, potentially affecting large numbers of people. Perhaps the greatest risk of long-term exposure is assumed by unsuspecting inhabitants of buildings formerly used by clandestine drug laboratory operators where residual contamination may exist inside and outside the structure.

Operators also dispose of hazardous chemical wastes by pouring the wastes into local sewage systems or septic tanks, or burying them. Law enforcement personnel engaged in clandestine drug laboratory seizure and analysis require specialized training in the investigation of such facilities, including training in appropriate health and safety procedures and in the use of personal protective equipment. Cleaning up a seized clandestine drug laboratory site is complex, dangerous, expensive, and time consuming. The amount of waste material from a clandestine laboratory may vary from a few pounds to several tons depending on the size of the laboratory and its manufacturing capabilities.

When a methamphetamine laboratory is seized, hazardous wastes and materials, such as chemicals, contaminated glassware and equipment, by-products, and the drug products themselves are found at the site and must be disposed of properly. These hazardous materials can weigh from a few pounds to several tons and include solvents, reagents, and precursors. Many of these materials are reactive, explosive, flammable, corrosive, and/or toxic. The danger is compounded by the fact that many Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers lack adequate training in clandestine laboratory safety procedures and regulations, hazards, and other related health and safety issues.

Although the quantities of hazardous materials found at a typical methamphetamine laboratory are relatively small when compared to waste generated from a major industry, the substances to which law enforcement personnel and others may be exposed present very real public health concerns. Methamphetamine laboratories present both acute and chronic health risks to individuals involved in the seizure and cleanup of the facility, to those who live and work nearby, and to the violator operating the facility.

Trafficking

As noted, the suppliers of methamphetamine in the United States traditionally were outlaw motorcycle gangs and other independent trafficking groups. While they continued to produce methamphetamine and controlled a share of the market, in 1996 methamphetamine smuggling into the United States from Mexico was controlled primarily by the same major organizations that dominated the production/trafficking of other illicit drugs from Mexico into the United States.

These groups operating from Mexico were composed of combinations of Mexican nationals residing in Mexico and the United States, Mexican-Americans who operated on either side of the border, and illegal aliens residing in the United States. Often, these organizations were directed by well-established families that have been involved in smuggling contraband for decades. They produced and/or transported large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana into the United States on a daily basis. They regularly demonstrated their flexibility and adaptability, modifying smuggling routes and methods as needed to handle virtually any drug. The younger generation within some of these families expanded into methamphetamine trafficking.

There were numerous border points of entry for Mexican-produced methamphetamine into the United States. Most methamphetamine was seized at the San Ysidro, California, port of entry. The most common method of transporting methamphetamine across the border was by passenger vehicles. The passenger vehicles most frequently used to smuggle methamphetamine were cars, but also include pickup trucks and 4-wheel-drive vehicles.

Domestically, methamphetamine was distributed by a wide array of organizations that vary greatly in size, structure, and degree of sophistication--from small, local independent groups that operate on a limited scale to large organizations that controlled all aspects of the traffic. Intelligence indicates that many of the newly established distribution networks around the country were supplied by sources in California. In addition, as previously described, there are organizations involved solely in chemical acquisition.

Organized crime drug groups operating from Mexico dominated distribution in many areas of the West and Southwest in 1996. For example, these groups operating from Mexico have been identified as operating in States such as Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, and Washington, beyond their strongholds in California and Mexico.

Unquestionably, the large-scale move by these organized crime drug groups operating from Mexico into methamphetamine production is a conscious decision of the leaders of these powerful organizations. Should demand for methamphetamine in the United States continue to increase, these trafficking organizations are in a position to control the smuggling and distribution of the drug into and within the United States.

Several enforcement events highlight the expanding role of organized crime drug groups from Mexico in trafficking methamphetamine. Mexican criminal drug groups, based typically in California, extended their methamphetamine distribution operations farther eastward. One indicator of the extent to which California-based Mexican criminal groups supply methamphetamine to distributors in other States is seizure data collected through Operation PIPELINE, the U.S. highway interdiction program managed by EPIC. Operation PIPELINE seizure statistics show that of 447 kilograms of methamphetamine seized from vehicles nationwide in 1996, 335 originated in California. The following enforcement actions highlight the increasing presence of Mexican organizations in the trafficking of methamphetamine eastward:

Based on DEA information, the Carroll County, Georgia, Sheriffs Department seized 63 pounds of methamphetamine on October 16, 1996, from a Mexican national traveling by vehicle from Riverside, California.

A DEA investigation in Idaho, in coordination with other Federal, State, and local authorities, terminated in early December 1996, with the arrest of five Mexican nationals. Authorities confiscated 19 pounds of methamphetamine as well as other drugs in this investigation.

On December 11, 1996, 10 pounds of methamphetamine were seized in Las Vegas by State authorities from a Mexican male traveling by vehicle from California to Omaha, Nebraska.

On December 31, 1996, DEA Atlanta arrested two members of an organization capable f distributing approximately 40 pounds of methamphetamine per month. Subsequently, the source of supply was arrested with 16 pounds of methamphetamine. Further investigation determined the source of supply was linked to a California-based Mexican polydrug trafficking organization. It has been estimated that this source was responsible for wholesaling up to 100 pounds of methamphetamine per month to various retail groups in the Atlanta area. Most of the methamphetamine was transported from California by automobile.

During 1996, methamphetamine prices nationwide ranged from $4,000 to $20,000 per pound, $500 to $2,700 per ounce, and $40 to $200 per gram.

The extensive involvement of polydrug trafficking organizations from Mexico in methamphetamine production and distribution has redefined the methamphetamine problem in the United States. These polydrug organizations control well-established cocaine, heroin, and marijuana distribution networks throughout the western United States, enabling them to supply methamphetamine to a large retail-level market. Presently, these organizations are poised to supply methamphetamine to the rest of the country in response to any increases in demand. The major methamphetamine trafficking organizations operating from Mexico include:

The Arellano-Felix organization, the most violent of the gangs from Mexico, supplies methamphetamine to distributors in U.S. cities such as San Ysidro and San Diego, routinely employing gang members from Mexico to act as U.S. distributors. They operate on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border and smuggle between 50 and 100 pounds of methamphetamine into the United States monthly.

The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization currently is the most powerful drug group in Mexico and operates from Hermosillo in the west across the border into Arizona and from Juarez into Texas. A seizure in Las Cruces, New Mexico, in 1995 of 315 kilograms of methamphetamine was tied to the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. Parts of this shipment were destined for Washington, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Georgia. Methamphetamine from this shipment was analyzed at 98-percent pure and had an estimated street value of over $50 million. This organization also is tied to a 3-metric-ton shipment of ephedrine destined for Nicaragua is connected to the Amezcua organization. The Carrillo-Fuentes organization provides large quantities of methamphetamine to the Phoenix, Arizona, area through the Jorge Ortiz-Caro organization, which operates in Sonora, Mexico, as well as Phoenix. The Ortiz-Caro organization has been identified as a methamphetamine source of supply for organizations based in the Chicago and Milwaukee areas. Ortiz-Caro reportedly is a supplier of methamphetamine to associates and members of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang in Phoenix.

The Amezcua-Contreras organization has been identified as the largest known importer of ephedrine into Mexico and across the U.S. border. Since September 1992, in excess of 5 tons of ephedrine, ordered by Jesus and Luis Amezcua, have been seized. These brothers have been documented since 1988 as trafficking in cocaine and methamphetamine in both the San Diego and the Los Angeles areas. This organization operates primarily out of Guadalajara, but, through agreements with other Mexican gangs, has extended its trafficking operations all along the border. It controls methamphetamine laboratories in Guadalajara and Tijuana and employs associates across the border in ephedrine and methamphetamine trafficking, especially in Southern California. Luis was indicted in the Central District of California in December 1994 for methamphetamine-related violations. Jesus was indicted in the Southern District of California in February 1993 for cocaine-related violations in a joint DEA-FBI investigation. Although indictments and arrest warrants have been issued for both individuals, investigations continue to indicate that they and their organization remain deeply involved in methamphetamine trafficking from Mexico to the United States.

The Caro-Quintero organization, a major transporter of cocaine and marijuana, has expanded to methamphetamine trafficking and may be aligning with the Arellano-Felix organization. This organization operates from Hermosillo, Agua Prieta, Guadalajara, and Culiacan, as well as the Mexican States of San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, and Sonora. The organizations smuggling routes extend into California, Arizona, Texas, and Nevada and it is responsible for trafficking 100-pound quantities through Arizona ports of entry.

The major Mexican trafficking groups outlined above operate within a fluid, flexible, and elastic system. Alliances shift or shake-ups in the hierarchy occur with the divergence of interests and eruptions of internecine violence. But while the precise roles of specific groups and individual group members often blur, there is an overarching structure within which drug trafficking operates: the Federation.

The Federation evolved from the Guadalajara cartel, which was formed in the 1980s by Rafael Caro-Quintero and Miguel Felix-Gallardo in order to ship heroin and marijuana to the United States. Among the first of the Mexican drug trafficking groups to work with the Colombian cocaine mafias, the Guadalajara cartel prospered from the cocaine trade, eventually broadening into todays Federation. Currently, its leadership consists of Chapo Guzman and Hector Palma-Salazar (both jailed in Mexico) and Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, now the dominant force. The Arellano-Felix brothers--laying claim to Felix-Gallardos former leadership position and by virtue of their control over smuggling in Sonora--also are battling for influence.

As a loose consortium of smuggling groups, managers of the Federation generally have the following functions.

Cartel heads make the major decisions, broker security with corrupt officials, and negotiate at the international level. They retain overall authority over land, sea, and air movement of all drugs, form connections with the influential political families, establish major front operations, and generally facilitate cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and now methamphetamine movement to major U.S. markets.

Division chiefs, the working arm of the Federation, are responsible for all stages of smuggling into the United States. It is this level on down that law enforcement confronts directly through investigations, seizures, and arrests.

Gatekeepers, who control major ports of entry, facilitate trafficking on both sides of the border. Although they may owe allegiance to a certain division chief or cartel head, they will move drugs for other gangs at a price.

Family syndicates, small time brokers at the bottom of this informal structure, operate along the border and in the United States and are employed to off-load, transport, store, and distribute drugs.

Violence

Methamphetamine traffickers disputes, acts of retribution, and attempts to eliminate competition have led to violence and murder that echo the gruesome crack gang turf wars of the mid-1980s. Violence of this magnitude has become an alarming characteristic of the methamphetamine trade. Increasingly, the major methamphetamine traffickers operating from Mexico recruit local U.S. street gangs to distribute methamphetamine in many areas of the country.

In general, most methamphetamine was transported into the Northeast from outside suppliers. Distribution remained in the hands of traditional outlaw motorcycle gangs, such as the Hells Angels, and the user population remained stable. Nevertheless, there were slight indications of an emerging group of younger, independent entrepreneurs distributing methamphetamine. A handful of investigations, for instance, demonstrated local distributors connections to California- and Mexico-based methamphetamine suppliers.

The regions current methamphetamine problem pales in comparison to that experienced in other regions of the country. Only in the Philadelphia area did methamphetamine surface as a serious concern. Four groups have been identified as active in its manufacture--primarily using the P2P method--and distribution: traditional organized crime groups operating in southern New Jersey as well as Philadelphia; African-American criminal gangs; outlaw motorcycle gangs, namely the Pagans, Breed, and Warlocks; and independent operators. Some production spilled over into New Jersey, where one laboratory was seized in 1996. But, overall, the New Jersey-New York area remained relatively untouched by methamphetamine trafficking. Methamphetamine trafficking in the Boston area was controlled by outlaw motorcycle gangs, but availability remained limited.

Despite limited methamphetamine trafficking and production in the Northeast, the large number of chemical companies in the region made it difficult for law enforcement to deny methamphetamine manufacturers access to precursor chemicals.

Southeast

Methamphetamine availability increased significantly throughout the Southeast over the previous 2 years. Law enforcement agencies in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee reported increases in methamphetamine seizures and case initiations. In Atlanta, for example, methamphetamine was transformed from "poor mans cocaine" to the drug of choice in upscale nightclubs. It was more profitable for sellers than cocaine.

Methamphetamine supplied from the West Coast surpassed local production as the leading source for regional distribution. Florida law enforcement officials indicated that their methamphetamine problem was fueled by Mexican trafficking groups that engaged California-based suppliers and exploited existing marijuana distribution channels. In Atlanta and other regional cities, Mexican drug trafficking organizations used established cocaine distribution networks to move methamphetamine. Traffickers most commonly transported methamphetamine by vehicle along interstate highways. In addition, operators used couriers traveling on commercial airlines to smuggle the drug from the West Coast, particularly into Florida where couriers using rail services also were encountered.

In contrast to the general regional trend toward reliance on outside suppliers, clandestine methamphetamine production continued in Arkansas, southern Alabama, and sections of Tennessee. Manufacturers in these areas tended to be rural, low-income whites. In Alabama, white supremacists were active in methamphetamine production, while in Tennessee some third-generation bootleggers took to methamphetamine production like their grandfathers took to moonshining and their fathers took to the marijuana trade. Regional groups involved in methamphetamine production were increasingly violent, well-armed, and knowledgeable about explosives.

Midwest

Areas of the upper Midwest were hard hit by the spiraling growth of methamphetamine trafficking and use. In Iowa, methamphetamine was cited as a contributing factor in an estimated 80 percent of domestic violence cases, and as a major reason behind violent crime. The user population consisted primarily of young white adults from lower-middle income families. Many started by snorting methamphetamine and progressed to injecting. Methamphetamine cases now account for 80 percent of the police departments drug investigations. Most of the methamphetamine available in the upper Midwest was trafficked by Mexican-controlled criminal organizations--connected to sources of supply in California and Mexico--that were based in smaller Midwestern cities with existing Mexican-American populations. Smuggling routes into the region incorporate a variety of transportation means, but the profit is a constant--a pound of methamphetamine purchased in California for $5,000 sells for as much as $16,000 in Iowa.

Methamphetamine was also a leading drug of abuse in Missouri. Local clandestine manufacture furnished most of the supply, and it was supplemented by California-based sources. Law enforcement agencies regularly seized clandestine methamphetamine laboratories throughout Missouri, where, almost without exception, they encountered caches of weapons. Since 1993, in a trend unique t Southwestern Missouri, clandestine laboratories have been manufacturing methamphetamine by the sodium ammonia or "Nazi" method, previously described.

West

Arizonas methamphetamine problem exploded. Law enforcement officials blamed the upsurge in trafficking and related violence on Mexico-based trafficking groups and their associates. The California-Arizona border became the focus for law enforcement authorities, as interstate highways were used increasingly to move methamphetamine from suppliers in California to Arizona.

In the Pacific Northwest, Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations spearheaded methamphetamine distribution along established black tar heroin and cocaine networks. Since 1993, methamphetamine traffickers have stretched their routes from California to Oregon in 1994 and on to Washington and Idaho in 1995. Outlaw motorcycle gangs, the regions traditional suppliers, purchased their methamphetamine from the Mexican trafficking organizations. Accompanying the influx into the Northwest were drive-by shootings, assaults, and other acts of violence spawned by the methamphetamine trade. Similarly, parts of Colorado were inundated in methamphetamine and violence. The escalation in local methamphetamine trafficking generated its own criminal subculture. Violence--not only homicides, but also kidnappings, mutilations, and torture--was a core element of methamphetamine trafficking.

CANNABIS

Developments in the United States

Availability, Price, and Potency

Marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance and product of the Cannabis sativa L. plant, remained the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States. Two additional Schedule I controlled substances derived from the cannabis plant--hashish and hashish oil--were in limited demand in the United States. Marijuana remained readily available in the continental United States during 1996.

Both the cannabis plant and delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the plants primary psychoactive chemical, are controlled substances. Marijuana is made from the flowering tops and leaves of the plant, which are collected, trimmed, dried, and then smoked in a pipe, or as a cigarette called a "joint." The flowering tops, also known as colas or buds, are prized because of their higher THC content. Some users hollow out commercial cigars and replace the tobacco with marijuana. On the street, such marijuana cigars are known as "blunts." While joints contain an average 500 milligrams of marijuana, blunts may contain as much as six times this amount. The smoking of blunts, once limited to East Coast cities, is now widespread throughout the United States. In 1996, the use of cigars filled with a combination of marijuana and crack cocaine or PCP was reported in several large metropolitan areas. Marijuana often is smoked in combination with methamphetamine on the West Coast.

During the early 1980s, prices for commercial grade marijuana ranged from $350 to $600 a pound. In the first six months of 1996, the absolute price for a pound of marijuana ranged from $200 to $4,000, though it typically sold for $800 a pound. The cost of sinsemilla, the unpollinated flowering tops of the female plant with an inherently higher THC content, ranged from $1,000 to $2,000 per pound over a decade ago. Through mid-1996, the price ranged from $700 to $8,000 per pound, though the sale price typically did not fall blow $1,300 per pound.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the THC content of commercial grade marijuana averaged below 2 percent. By comparison, the average in 1996 was just above 4.62 percent. The average THC content of sinsemilla in 1996 was 8.9 percent, up from 1995s 7.5 percent. Marijuana with significant THC content was seized most frequently from indoor cultivators who focus their efforts on hybridizing, cloning, and growing high potency material. The most potent material analyzed to date was seized in 1993 at an indoor site in Copper Center, Alaska, and found to have a THC content of 29.8 percent. In 1996, marijuana seized in Alaska, where indoor cultivation was predominant, had a THC content of 23.4 percent. High-potency marijuana (with a THC content over 20 percent referred to as "skunk," "skunkweed," "or nederweed" also was available from Dutch and Latin American sources. Similarly named hashish products had THC contents of almost 40 percent.

According to the 1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, approximately 65.5 million Americans--about one third of the general population--reported that they had tried marijuana at least once in their lifetime; and 17.7 million reported that they had used marijuana at least once in the past year. Current use of marijuana, defined as any use during the past month, declined steadily from 1979, when there were 22.5 million current users, through 1993. Marijuana use increased from 9.6 million current users in 1993 to 10.1 million in 1994. In 1995, past month use declined to 9.8 million users.

In 1996, past-month marijuana use by 12th graders stabilized, while marijuana use increased among 8th and 10th graders at all prevalence levels. According to the 1996 Monitoring the Future Study, 44.9 percent of high school seniors claimed to have used marijuana at least once, up from 41.7 percent in 1995. Annual use also increased from 21.9 percent of 12th graders in 1992, to 34.7 percent in 1995, and 35.8 in 1996. Current use, which increased to 21.2 percent in 1995 from 11.9 percent in 1992, remained stable in 1996 at 21.9 percent. Among 10th graders, lifetime marijuana use increased to 39.8 percent from 34.1 percent the previous year. Annual use increased to 33.6 percent in 1996 from 28.7 percent in 1995, and current use increased to 20.4 percent from 17.2 percent of 10th graders in 1995. Marijuana use among 8th graders increased for the fifth consecutive year. In 1996, 23.1 percent of respondents admitted to lifetime use compared to 19.9 percent in 1995 and 11.2 percent in 1992. Annual use increased from 15.8 percent in 1995, to 18.3 percent in 1996, and current use from 9.1 percent to 11.3 percent.

Upward trends in marijuana use among 8th and 10th graders were discouraging. Within the context of marijuanas widespread availability and the perception that its abuse causes minimal harm, the increase in reported use among this impressionable population group especially was troubling. The newest trend in marijuana use, the smoking of blunts, appeared to be confined to younger users and may have been responsible for the rise in many marijuana use indicators among this age group.

Trafficking to the United States

Drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico have smuggled marijuana into the United States for over 20 years, and are responsible for supplying most of the foreign marijuana available in the United States. Virtually all marijuana smuggled into the United States, whether grown in Mexico or transhipped through Mexico from other locations such as Colombia, was smuggled across the Southwest border. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) reported that U.S. authorities seized a record 478 metric tons of marijuana along the Southwest border in 1996--a 50-percent increase over the 319 metric tons seized in 1995. Of the 1996 total, law enforcement authorities seized 211.3 metric tons in Texas, 168.7 metric tons in California, 70.7 metric tons in Arizona, and 27.3 metric tons in New Mexico.

Drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico employed a wide variety of transportation and concealment methods for smuggling marijuana. Most of the marijuana smuggled into the United States was concealed in vehicles--often in false compartments--or hidden in shipments of legitimate agricultural products. Marijuana also was smuggled across the border by horse, raft, and backpack. There were sporadic reports of marijuana being smuggled to the United States by private aircraft. U.S. detection and monitoring of air traffic and air interdiction efforts along the Southwest border, as well as the relative ease of overland smuggling, kept land movement at the forefront of drug smuggling across the border over the past decade. Shipments of 50 kilograms or less were smuggled by pedestrians who entered the United States via border checkpoints and by backpackers who crossed the border at more remote locations. Drug trafficking organizations operating from Mexico also concealed marijuana in an array of vehicles, including commercial vehicles, private automobiles, pickup trucks, vans, mobile homes, and horse trailers driven through border ports of entry. Larger shipments, up to multithousand kilogram amounts, usually were smuggled in tractor-trailer trucks.

In addition to overland smuggling, trafficker vessels often sailed up the coast of Mexico, either to U.S. ports, drop-off sites along the U.S. coast, or to rendezvous points with other boats bound for the United States. For example, during November 1996, USCG assets observed several large bundles inside two suspect vessels off the coast of Mazatlan, Mexico. Mexican authorities launched a joint search with the USCG that resulted in the seizure of 1.5 metric tons of marijuana and two Yamaha 150 horsepower vessels by the Government of Mexico. Three Mexican nationals from the State of Sinaloa, were arrested.

While significant quantities of marijuana were seized in the Southwest border states in 1996, there was some indication that drug traffickers altered their smuggling routes subsequent to increased drug interdiction initiatives along the U.S.-Mexican border. Intelligence reporting and data from the Federal-wide Drug Seizure System (FDSS) indicated that traffickers routed large quantities of marijuana, along with cocaine, from Mexican and Colombian sources through the eastern Caribbean and Puerto Rico, to destinations in Florida and along the East Coast. According to FDSS, significant marijuana seizures in 1996 occurred in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (5.8 metric tons in March and 14 metric tons in April); Nogales, Arizona (6.4 metric tons); San Bernardino, California (5.1 metric tons); Key West, Florida (4.7 metric tons); and Maverick, Texas (3.5 metric tons).

Although Mexico has superseded Colombia as the primary source country for marijuana sold in the United States, multiton quantities of marijuana continued to be smuggled by sea from Colombia to the United States during 1996. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) reported in 1996 that U.S. authorities seized 32.3 metric tons of cannabis transported by commercial maritime traffic from Colombia to the United States. The total amount of cannabis seized in the United States in 1996 from maritime shipping was 170.9 metric tons--19 percent of which was of Colombian origin. Colombian marijuana also was transported by vessel to Mexico for onward land transshipment to the United States. It is unknown how much Colombian marijuana reached the United States over this smuggling route.

In addition to groups operating from Mexico and Colombia, traffickers from Jamaica and Venezuela also smuggled marijuana to the United States. Marijuana from these sources was transported to the United States by cargo vessel, pleasure boats, and fishing boats via traditional maritime routes. Marijuana shipments originating in the Far East were confined to the West Coast.

There was no evidence that the United States was used as a transshipment point for foreign source marijuana. Rather, all marijuana smuggled into the United States from foreign sources was destined for and distributed within the U.S. drug market. Likewise, virtually all U.S.-cultivated marijuana was consumed by drug users in the United States. Only very limited quantities of U.S.-cultivated marijuana were shipped to foreign markets, and almost all of this was smuggled to the Canadian drug market.

Distribution in the United States

Once marijuana was smuggled successfully across the border, traffickers consolidated the shipments at central sites in cities such as Tucson, Arizona; El Paso, Houston, and McAllen, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and Las Cruces, New Mexico. From these distribution hubs, marijuana was shipped to cities in the Midwest, North, and along the Gulf Coast and eastern seaboard. Distribution was accomplished by using a wide, ever-changing variety of methods, including motor vehicles, couriers aboard public ground and air transport, and package delivery services.

Domestically, distribution was controlled by a variety of groups and individuals, ranging from large, sophisticated organizations that controlled cultivation and interstate trafficking, to small, independent traffickers operating at the local level. At the wholesale level, marijuana was trafficked in multihundred kilogram to metric-ton quantities by both international and domestic polydrug trafficking organizations. Mid-level marijuana distributors, who often sold other drugs as well, typically purchased 10 to 50 pound quantities of marijuana, and then sold single-pound quantities to retail sellers. Retail sellers, in turn, repackaged the drug for sale on the streets in quantities ranging from a single joint, to $5 and $10 bags of loose plant material. These retail sellers were capable of selling multiple ounces of marijuana over time. In addition to selling marijuana, retail dealers frequently sold PCP, crack, cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine in single dosage units. According to State and local police, small groups (5 to 10 individuals) controlled distribution at the retail level. Polydrug groups, domestic street gangs, as well as ethnic groups (usually immigrants from source countries), supplied a wide range of retail dealers.

Domestic Cultivation/Production

It was difficult to estimate the amount of marijuana actually produced in the United States in 1996, as there were no national surveys conducted on cannabis cultivation. However, preliminary data from the Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program (DCE/SP) indicated that the 3 million cultivated plants eradicated in 1996 precluded approximately 1,389 metric tons of marijuana from becoming available on the U.S. drug market. Furthermore, FDSS seizures of marijuana in Fiscal Year 1996 totaled 528.5 metric tons, compared to 483.7 metric tons in 1995.

As in the past, domestic growers most frequently planted cannabis in remote areas, often camouflaging it in surrounding vegetation. Major outdoor cannabis cultivation took place in Hawaii, Kentucky, Tennessee, California, and New York. Growers also planted cannabis in suburban and rural gardens, interspersed with legitimate crops.

Indoor production in the United States continued, spurred primarily by ongoing successful drug law enforcement efforts to curtail outdoor cultivation. Indoor growing also provided a controlled environment conducive to the production of sinsemilla. Because of user preference for sinsemilla, indoor cultivators frequently selected and isolated female plants for sinsemilla production. According to DEA reporting, a healthy indoor-grown sinsemilla plant can produce about a pound of high THC-content marijuana. Indoor cultivation also permitted year-round production in a variety of settings, ranging from several plants grown in a closet to thousands of plants grown in elaborate, specially constructed (sometimes underground) greenhouse operations. The five leading States for indoor growing activity included California, Florida, Oregon, Washington, and Kentucky. These States accounted for 62 percent of the indoor grown marijuana eradicated in the United States in 1996. Indoor-grow operators cultivated 57 plants on average. In 1996, drug law enforcement authorities seized 3,770 indoor-grow operations, compared to 3,348 in 1995, and 3,210 in 1994.

Indoor cultivation also permitted domestic cultivators to continue efforts to enhance the potency of marijuana through selective breeding and cloning of high-potency cannabis cultivars. Rates of vegetative growth and maturation were enhanced by special growing media, fertilizers, plant hormones, steroids, and insecticides. Indoor cannabis cultivators frequently employed such advanced agronomic practices as hydroponics, automatic metering of light, water, and fertilizers, and the provision of an atmosphere enriched with carbon dioxide.

Domestic Eradication

In 1996, the annual DEA-sponsored DCE/SP was conducted in conjunction with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities, the Civil Air Patrol, and the National Guard in all 50 States. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs conducted programs to combat cannabis cultivation on public lands. Past-year data indicated that the DCE/SP resulted in the eradication of 422.7 million plants, including 2.8 million outdoor-cultivated cannabis plants, 419.6 million low-potency wild (ditchweed) plants, and 215.7 thousand cannabis plants grown indoors. Moreover, 18,500 violators were arrested and 4,690 weapons were seized.

In recent years, the DCE/SP has placed increasing emphasis on the investigation and prosecution of major domestic cannabis cultivators and marijuana trafficking organizations. The net result during 1996 was the forfeiture of assets valued at over $35.4 million, a 16-percent decrease from the value of assets seized in 1995 ($42.2 million).

The success of Hawaiis Operation WIPEOUT, conducted by law enforcement authorities with assistance from the U.S. Pacific Command, was one of the DCE/SPs major accomplishments. In 1996, Operation WIPEOUTs success was evidenced by reports that traffickers smuggled marijuana to Hawaii to meet domestic demand. In 1996, prices for sinsemilla in Hawaii remained high as a result of the shortages caused by the use of herbicidal eradication and the need to import marijuana from the mainland.

Hashish

The United States on occasion has served as a transit point for hashish shipments destined for Canada. In 1996 for example, DEA agents in Jacksonville, Florida, seized 15 metric tons of hashish, which had been delivered to a vessel off the west coast of Africa. The smuggling venture was financed and organized by a group of Dutch hashish traffickers who intended for the shipment to reach Montreal, Quebec.

Hashish seizures in the United States have fluctuated widely during the last six years but remain low compared to the amount of marijuana seized. As a point of comparison, data derived from the FDSS indicated that nearly 15 metric tons of hashish were seized domestically in FY 1996 compared to over 528 metric tons of marijuana. All indicators suggest that hashish is available only on a very limited basis in the United States and does not represent a significant drug problem. General unfamiliarity with hashish and user preference for the higher potency sinsemilla form of cannabis continue to limit hashish to a very minor niche in the market for cannabis in the United States.

Canadian drug law enforcement authorities confiscated a total of 23.4 metric tons of hashish in 1996. There were a few singularly large seizures that inflated this figure somewhat including one in October 1996, when the Canadian Navy seized about 10 metric tons of hashish from a sailing vessel off the coast of Nova Scotia near Cape Breton Island. Three U.S. citizens were arrested.

Global Developments

Mexico and Central America

Mexico was the major foreign source for marijuana imported into the United States. Cannabis was cultivated in every state in Mexico by subsistence farmers who relied on it as their only cash crop. The heaviest concentrations were located in the western States of Durango, Jalisco, Nayarit, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, and Sonora. With the exception of regions with high elevation, cannabis typically was cultivated throughout the year. While most of the marijuana produced was of the commercial variety, Mexican farmers increasingly cultivated more high-grade sinsemilla cannabis because it commanded a better price in the U.S. market.

Efficiency in cannabis cultivation increased, causing a revision in the estimate of cannabis produced per hectare. Estimates now place Mexicos average marijuana yield at 500 kilograms per hectare. Some fields in southwestern Mexico reportedly produce from 800 to 1,000 kilograms per hectare. Cannabis plants often were intermingled with legitimate crops such as corn and beans. After reaching maturity, cannabis plants were harvested and the marijuana was sold to Mexican traffickers who organized transportation from Mexico to the United States.

The Mexican Government has conducted an active eradication campaign for a number of years that consisted of aerial spraying and manual destruction. The Mexican Government eradicated 12,200 hectares of cannabis plants in 1996, leaving 6,500 hectares available for harvest. In 1995, by contrast, authorities eradicated 11,750 hectares of cultivation, leaving 6,900 hectares of harvestable cannabis. Some traffickers responded to the governments eradication campaign by introducing more advanced agricultural technology and more education for farmers on how to avoid or nullify the effects of aerial eradication. Additionally, as in the United States, some cannabis growers shielded their crops from aerial eradication by establishing indoor cultivation operations. In March 1996, for example, the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) seized 300 cannabis plants from a sophisticated indoor grow operation at a large residential and commercial property in Tijuana. The MFJP also seized 60 high intensity lamps and a number of climate control devices at the site.

The major Mexican drug trafficking groups arrayed along the U.S.-Mexican border that control cocaine and heroin smuggling into the United States also traffic marijuana. The Sonora-based Caro-Quintero organization, for example, specializes in the cultivation, production, and distribution of marijuana. The organization, headed by Miguel Caro-Quintero, is believed to own many ranches in Sonora, where drugs are stored. The organization also stages drug smuggling incursions into the United States from these ranches.

Mexican- and Colombian-produced marijuana transported through Mexico was smuggled into the United States primarily across the Southwest border. In November 1996, one large-scale marijuana transportation group based in the State of Oaxaca, Mexico, was identified. This group allegedly was planning to transport several tons of marijuana from Oaxaca to Reynosa, Mexico, located on the U.S. border near McAllen, Texas. MFJP agents executed search warrants at four residences in Oaxaca, seizing approximately 1,800 kilograms of marijuana, several marijuana presses, and assorted packaging paraphernalia.

In addition to seizures made by U.S. authorities at the border, Mexican authorities also made large marijuana seizures from vehicles bound for the United States. Mexican officials seized 1,150 metric tons of marijuana during 1996, up from 780 metric tons in 1995.

While Belize ranked fourth in worldwide marijuana production a decade ago, cannabis cultivation since then has been reduced greatly. Cannabis fields of modest size were grown in Belize. It was not known precisely how many hectares of cannabis were cultivated or what amount of marijuana was produced in the country, although quantities did not appear to vary from previous years.

The Belize Government conducted aerial reconnaissance missions followed by manual eradication of cannabis fields and seedlings. Manual eradication, which the government viewed as more effective and more environmentally sound than aerial eradication, targeted modest-sized fields ranging from 500 to several thousand plants. In one April 1996 operation, the Belizean police eradicated 15,900 cannabis plants. The total number of cannabis plants destroyed during 1996 was 129,771, compared to 135,216 plants destroyed in 1995.

Cannabis was cultivated in Costa Rica in mostly small and widely dispersed plots located in mountainous areas in the northern and southern parts of the country. While overall production remains low, Costa Rican drug law enforcement authorities indicated that cultivation was intended for export, instead of merely for domestic consumption. Public Security Ministry personnel eradicated some 110,000 cannabis plants in 1996. A total of 450 kilograms of marijuana was seized.

The expansive Peten region of northern Guatemala, bordering on Belize and Mexico showed significant cannabis cultivation during 1996. A large seizure of processed, packaged marijuana that comprised most of the 16.4 metric tons of marijuana seized in 1996 strongly indicated that more marijuana production was intended for export than in previous years. Small amounts of cannabis also were grown throughout the country for domestic consumption. The Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations (DOAN) units in both the highlands and the Peten region specialize in manual eradication operations and other drug-related investigations. The DOAN conducted a very successful cannabis eradication campaign in 1996 that resulted in the destruction of 213 hectares of cannabis plants. This equates to approximately 84 percent of the countrys cannabis crop. The remaining areas of cannabis cultivation had a potential yield of 5 metric tons.

South America

Colombia, historically, has been a major foreign source for the marijuana available in the United States. Cannabis cultivation flourished during the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the most extensive concentrations located in the Sierra Nevada and Serrania de Perija Mountains of northern Colombia. In 1984, the Government of Colombia responded to this drug threat by launching an aggressive aerial eradication campaign. Thousands of hectares of cannabis in the Sierra Nevada and Serrania de Perija Mountains were destroyed using chemical herbicides. In response, traffickers moved cannabis cultivation to new areas, particularly Colombias west and north-central regions. Today, significant cannabis cultivation has resurfaced in areas previously thought to be inactive. In 1996, cannabis cultivation in the Sierra Nevada and Serrania de Perija Mountains conservatively was estimated at approximately 5,000 hectares. Significant quantities of high-quality cannabis also have been located in the mountains of Huila and Cauca Departments. An insignificant amount of cannabis eradication takes place in Colombia because of the need to deploy limited eradication resources against coca and opium poppy cultivation.

The potential amount of Colombian marijuana available for worldwide consumption (total production minus seizures) stood at 3,915 metric tons in 1996, compared to 986 metric tons in 1990. Joint police and military operations in 1996 seized 241 metric tons of marijuana. Most of that marijuana was destined for export to the United States, Europe, and Latin America. Metric-ton seizures of marijuana in Colombia were commonplace and occurred on a regular basis.

Colombias marijuana trade is dominated by independent trafficking organizations not affiliated with the Cali or Medellin drug mafias, though many are involved in both marijuana and cocaine trafficking. The United States traditionally has been the primary market for Colombian marijuana. In 1996, the continuing importance of the United States to Colombian marijuana traffickers was evidenced by the 32 metric tons of marijuana seized either in the United States or en route to the United States from maritime vessels sailing from Colombia. At the same time, multiton seizures of Colombian marijuana in Europe indicated that Colombian marijuana trafficking organizations established markets on the European continent. Some specific examples in 1996 highlight this trend:

During August, police in Rouen, France, seized approximately 20 metric tons of marijuana imported into the country from Cartagena, Colombia in a shipment of blue jeans.

In late August, authorities in Cartagena searched the Dutch-flagged vessel Needlloyd Musi 6561, and discovered 27.3 metric tons of marijuana in a container shipment of fertilizer destined for Rotterdam, the Netherlands. This seizure was only slightly smaller than the European-record 27.5 metric tons of Colombian marijuana seized in Rotterdam in November 1995.

In July, police in Barcelona, Spain, seized 12 metric tons of marijuana. Seizures of such large quantities of marijuana in Spain are quite unusual, given the ready availability of Moroccan hashish at much lower prices.

Even though Brazil was a major producer of marijuana, most of its production was for domestic consumption. The small amount of marijuana not intended for domestic consumption usually was trucked from Brazils interior to port cities on the northeast coast such as Belem. According to Brazilian authorities, marijuana is exported to Suriname and French Guiana and, occasionally, to the Netherlands for distribution there and the rest of Europe. Belem is a natural link for marijuana traffickers because of its large Surinamese community and the considerable commercial activity, both legal and illegal, conducted between Brazil and Suriname. Nevertheless, Brazilian marijuana exports have remained minimal due to strong domestic demand and the low quality of Brazilian marijuana relative to other source areas.

Cannabis is the only illicit crop cultivated in Paraguay. An estimated 2,500 hectares were under cultivation. Cannabis is grown in small plots, primarily in the northeastern, thickly forested region of Paraguay along the Brazilian border. Crops are harvested throughout the year. Harvesting the cannabis crop is a labor intensive effort as growers take care to winnow out the stems, seeds, and trash. The result is a high-quality marijuana, most of which is exported to Brazil and Argentina where it is in demand and commands a handsome price. Marijuana was compressed into small packages for easy shipping to Brazil, Argentina, and Europe. Only a small amount of Paraguayan marijuana reached the United States.

The Caribbean

Although limited quantities of cannabis usually are cultivated in The Bahamas, a surprising amount of cannabis cultivation was discovered in 1996 at fields in the Andros Islands, Eleuthera, and Grand Bahama. Altogether, authorities located and destroyed more than 11,500 cannabis plants. Of this total, 8,875 plants were eradicated in one October operation, when three cannabis fields were located about 11 miles east of Freeport, Grand Bahama. Testing indicated that cannabis cultivated in The Bahamas had a low THC content and was believed to be primarily for domestic consumption.

The Bahamas long have served as a transit country for marijuana shipments to the United States from Colombia and Jamaica. Although maritime drug smuggling through the area decreased considerably in 1996, antidrug forces made some significant seizures. For example, in August, authorities confiscated over 900 kilograms of marijuana and arrested five suspects in a maritime operation near the Raged Island Chain. A total of 2.6 metric tons of marijuana were seized in The Bahamas in 1996.

Jamaica is a major producer of marijuana, much of which is destined for North American markets. Jamaicas climate, soil, and rainfall encourage the production of highly marketable varieties of marijuana, locally known as ganja. About four to six crops of cannabis were grown and harvested during the year. Both sinsemilla and commercial grade marijuana were produced. Cultivation areas were located primarily in the wetlands of the western and central region and the remote mountain areas in the east. As a result of successful eradication campaigns since 1987, cannabis farmers virtually have ceased large-scale cultivation by shifting to half hectare plots or less. Additionally, some plots were located along the bases of steep, narrow ravines and canyons in order to conceal cultivation and evade helicopter-borne eradication operations. In other cases, cannabis was grown intermixed with legitimate crops to make detection from the air more difficult. In 1996, harvestable cannabis cultivation remaining after eradication was estimated to be 527 hectares, up significantly from 305 hectares in 1995. The estimated potential yield in 1996 was 356 metric tons, up from 206 metric tons in 1995.

The Government of Jamaica maintained its cannabis eradication campaign. In 1996, Jamaican antidrug forces destroyed 473 hectares countrywide, down from 695 hectares in 1995, and well below the target of 800 hectares set out in a bilateral narcotics agreement between the United States and Jamaica. Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth, and St. James Parishes were those areas principally concerned. Political and environmental opposition to aerial or platform herbicide spraying forced Jamaican authorities to rely upon manual eradication. Even so, eradication teams still use helicopters to reach remote cultivation sites. During a 3-month period when the helicopters were grounded, the eradication teams unfortunately had to rely on trucks for transportation.

In 1996, Jamaica was the only significant Caribbean source for marijuana found in the United States. The island also served as a transit point for shipments of Colombian marijuana en route to the United States or Canada. Marijuana was smuggled out of Jamaica by sea, either in containerized cargo, in commercial fishing trawlers, or pleasure craft. It was commonplace for multiple shipments of marijuana weighing in the 500-kilogram range to be shipped from Jamaica to North America, often with legitimate exports such as agricultural products or apparel. Smaller quantities of up to 4 kilograms routinely were smuggled to the United States by tourists and professional couriers traveling on commercial airline flights. Altogether in 1996, Jamaican authorities seized 53 metric tons of marijuana, up from 37 metric tons in 1995, and above the 50 metric ton benchmark specified in the bilateral U.S.-Jamaican narcotics agreement.

In addition to marijuana, hashish oil also was produced in Jamaica, mostly by a group of traffickers on the north coast. Jamaican authorities seized 267 kilograms of hashish oil in 1996, and 47 kilograms of hashish. Canada has been the traditional market for hashish oil from Jamaica. A total of 690 kilograms of hashish oil were seized in Canada last year, most of which was of Jamaican origin. Approximately 80 percent of the people arrested for hashish oil smuggling in Canada arrived at Torontos Pierson International Airport from flights originating in Jamaica. Hashish oil available in the United States came principally from Jamaica and normally was sold in gram quantities to maximize profits.

Trinidad and Tobago, located just 7 miles from the Venezuelan coast, was a significant producer and exporter of marijuana. Cannabis was cultivated extensively in the forest and jungle areas of northern, eastern, and southern Trinidad, and to a minor extent in Tobago. In the past, joint eradication efforts with the United States under the cannabis eradication program Operation WEEDEATER uncovered many multiacre cannabis plantations, as well as previously undiscovered airstrips. A total of 5.8 million mature cannabis plants and 351,000 seedlings were eradicated manually in 996. (Authorities did not engage in aerial eradication due to a policy against the aerial application of herbicides.) Meanwhile, marijuana seizures increased substantially from 1.6 metric tons in 1995 to 14.5 metric tons in 1996.

Southeast Asia

Since the mid-1980s, Southeast Asia has been a limited exporter of marijuana to the United States. Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, and, increasingly, Cambodia, are the principal cannabis producing countries in the region.

In Thailand, 24 metric tons of cannabis were seized, and 85 hectares of cannabis plants were eradicated in 1996. The availability in the San Francisco, California, and Seattle, Washington, areas of "Thai sticks"--a unique Thai form of marijuana made by binding marijuana buds on short sections of bamboo--was an indication of marijuana smuggling activity between Thailand and the United States.

Laos also is a major source country in Southeast Asia for marijuana. In the late-1980s, many Thai cannabis financiers shifted their cultivation operations across the Mekong River into Laos to avoid the enforcement and eradication campaigns taking place in Thailand. Today, cannabis is cultivated throughout Laos, with cultivation concentrated in the southern provinces of Champasak, Khammouan, Salavan, and Savannakhet. No estimates were available as to the size of the annual cannabis crop in Laos. Lao authorities reported the destruction of 104.6 metric tons of cannabis as the result of eradication, and the seizure of over 1.1 metric tons of processed marijuana in 1996. Laotian marijuana reportedly was shipped to Western markets through both Thailand and Vietnam.

Cambodia has become the most prominent producer of cannabis in Southeast Asia. Cannabis, locally known as kancha, was the major illicit drug in Cambodia. Cannabis cultivation most often was supported by Thai financiers who provided cash advances, seed, spray, and experienced Thai cannabis cultivators to assist the Cambodians in the growing and production process. There were no surveys to determine the extent of cannabis cultivation, and reliable production estimates were not available. In 1996, cultivation primarily took place in the Provinces of Kampot, Kaoh Kong, and Pouthisat. Kaoh Kong, which lies on the Gulf of Thailand adjacent to the Thai Province of Trat, also served as a storage site and staging area for Cambodian, and, to a limited extent, Thai and Laotian marijuana.

The Cambodian Government continued its eradication program in 1996 and destroyed 180 hectares of cannabis. Raids were carried out in Kaoh Kong and Kandal Provinces, with one Kaoh Kong raid resulting in the destruction of approximately 32,000 plants.

At least 56 metric tons of Cambodian cannabis products were seized worldwide in 1996. In May through August alone, authorities in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Malta, Mauritania, and the United Kingdom seized over 45 metric tons of Cambodian cannabis concealed in containerized maritime cargo. Additionally, in May, authorities in Frankfurt, Germany, seized 1.3 metric tons of Cambodian marijuana shipped by air cargo from Bangkok, Thailand, to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Also in 1996, Hong Kong authorities discovered 7.9 metric tons of marijuana in a maritime cargo container that had arrived in Hong Kong from Cambodia via Singapore and was destined for Europe.

Some cannabis cultivation occurred in Vietnam; however, there were no available figures on the number of hectares under cultivation or potential yield. According to the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), cannabis cultivation occurred in the southern Provinces of An Giang, Dong Thap, and Can Tho. Marijana trafficking was limited exclusively to the south of Vietnam, to and from Cambodia, especially in Tra Vinh, An Giang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, and Kien Giang.

Because of ideal growing conditions and limited drug law enforcement, the Philippines remained a major producer of marijuana. Marijuana not consumed domestically was exported mainly to Australia and Japan, and also to other areas of Asia and the Pacific, as well as to Europe and the United States. In addition, hashish and hashish oil were produced, with production destined for markets in Australia and Europe, or for domestic users and tourists. Even though cannabis was grown throughout the Philippines, the major areas of production were concentrated in the mountainous regions of northern Luzon, Mindanao, and Central Visayas. Despite an active government-run eradication program assisted by the U.S. Government, it is unlikely that eradication efforts taken to date will have a significant impact on cannabis cultivation. In addition to inadequate funding, rough and isolated terrain spread throughout several islands posed a geographical challenge to eradication efforts. During the first half of 1996, Philippine drug law enforcement authorities eradicated 968 metric tons of cannabis seedlings and plants, and seized over 340 kilograms of harvested cannabis. (Quantities eradicated are calculated in terms of the weight of seedlings and plants destroyed rather than hectares.)

Cannabis was cultivated in Australia, but production was for the local market, where marijuana and methamphetamine were the principal drugs of choice. Despite vigorous eradication efforts in recent years, crop size has not decreased. However, Australian drug law enforcement authorities have noted an increase in the use of sophisticated indoor and hydroponic cannabis growing operations similar to those used in the United States.

Northern Africa and the Middle East

The principal cannabis product produced in North Africa and the Middle East is hashish. It is most commonly processed and exported from Morocco, and to a greatly diminished extent, Lebanon. The United States does not constitute a large market for hashish. Canada, however, is a major market, with multiton quantities of hashish smuggled into the country on a regular basis. U.S.-based criminals remained active in this trade, arranging for large-scale hashish shipments to Canada.

Morocco is one of the largest cannabis-producing countries in the world. In 1996, unofficial sources estimated that up to 85,000 hectares of land were devoted to cannabis cultivation in the Rif Mountains of northern Morocco and the Souss Valley in the south. The average hectare of cannabis produces 2 to 8 metric tons of raw plant. One hundred kilograms of dry plant material, in turn, will produce 1 kilogram of hashish. Cultivation has increased by a factor of ten over the last decade. In 1996 alone, cultivation reportedly increased by almost 10 percent due to record rainfall.

The Moroccan Government has stated that it is committed to the total eradication of cannabis cultivation. However, the northern part of Morocco is economically dependent upon cannabis cultivation. Eradication is, therefore, only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program. Consequently, there has not yet been any serious attempt at eradication. At the same time, the Moroccan Government has devoted significant resources to law enforcement efforts. During a 1996 campaign to eliminate corruption, contraband, and drug smuggling, authorities reportedly broke up 12 drug networks, and arrested several of their leaders. Still, hashish producers and large-scale traffickers continued to operate, due to widespread corruption and the campaigns budgetary constraints.

Although it is estimated that from 15 to 40 percent of the cannabis grown in Morocco may be used domestically, most of the cannabis cultivated in the country was processed into hashish or hashish oil for export to other North African countries and Europe. European authorities reported that between 70 to 80 percent of all cannabis seized was of Moroccan origin. Although statistics vary widely, it is estimated that over 2,000 metric tons are exported yearly to Europe in the form of hashish.

In Lebanon, cannabis cultivation for hashish production has all but disappeared, due to intensive eradication of cultivation areas by Lebanese and Syrian authorities since 1992. In 1996, there were some small surges of planting but nothing significant. Lebanese security and military officials, with assistance from the Syrian Army, reportedly eradicated approximately 7 hectares of cannabis in the Dar El-Wassiha, Ain El-Baida, Harf El-Madwi, El-Huma, Akkar Heights, and El-Dinnieh villages of the Bekaa Valley during June and July. During many, if not all, of the eradication efforts, large quantities of hashish also were seized along with weapons, ammunition, and other military paraphernalia.

Despite progress in eliminating cannabis cultivation in Lebanon, seizures in 1996 suggested that large amounts of hashish remain stockpiled. For example, in August, Syrian authorities seized approximately 1.7 metric tons of hashish in two separate incidents at the Syrian-Lebanese border crossing of Dabbusiyya. Other seizures included 438 kilograms of hashish discovered in the village of Wadi Faara in August, and 500 kilograms of hashish seized in the town of Laat in November. Lebanese authorities, however, discount the significance to international markets of stockpiled Lebanese hashish. Due to its age, this hashish reportedly is no longer commercially viable outside of the Middle East markets in Lebanon and Jordan.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is a significant source of marijuana for Africa and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Cannabis grows naturally and is cultivated widely throughout the region, particularly in West Africa. Marijuana is the most abused drug in many African countries, although there is limited production and consumption of hashish. Similarly, Southern Africa increasingly is emerging as a region of cannabis production and large-scale consumption. Moreover, many of Africas ports and airports have become transit points for the international traffic in marijuana, with Pakistani hashish transiting the ports of East Africa, and local marijuana being smuggled through Central and West African airports.

In Nigeria, substantial quantities of low-potency cannabis were cultivated by independent subsistence farmers. Cultivation occurred in several areas, with the greatest concentration in central and northern Nigeria, and in Delta State in the southern part of the country. In 1996, the Government of Nigeria took only limited steps to reduce cannabis production in the country by destroying some cannabis fields and recommending crop substitution to farmers in cannabis-producing areas. Marijuana, locally known as Indian hemp, was used as a source of cash or even as currency in illicit cross-border trade for food or consumer products. In 1994, the last year for which full-year statistics were available, Nigerian drug law enforcement officials seized 14.2 metric tons of marijuana. By contrast, in the first 9 months of 1996, Nigerian authorities reported the seizure of 11.4 metric tons.

A large part of Nigerian marijuana production is smuggled in metric-ton quantities to Europe in container vessels, and on a smaller scale to other African countries. Examples of such shipments include 7.4 metric tons of marijuana discovered in a container shipment of canvas that arrived in Prague, Czech Republic. The two-container maritime shipment from Lagos, Nigeria, to Varna, Bulgaria, was later transported by train through Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia, before finally arriving in the Czech Republic. The ultimate destination for the marijuana was Antwerp, Belgium. Also in 1996, authorities at the Port of Szczecin, Poland, in July, discovered 2.5 metric tons of marijuana in a consignment of pepper that had arrived from Nigeria. In the past, Nigerian criminals have smuggled multi-hundred kilogram shipments of marijuana to the United States. However, there were no such seizures in 1996.

According to South African authorities, South Africa is the worlds largest producer of cannabis. Cannabis, known locally as dagga, has been grown as a traditional crop for years by rural South Africans. Cultivation occurred primarily in arable, well-watered areas, especially in mountainous terrain. Specific areas of cultivation included the South African areas of Kwazulu/Natal, Ciskei, Transkei, the eastern Transvaal, and in the neighboring countries of Swaziland and Lesotho. No estimates were available for cannabis cultivation in South Africa in 1996. In 1995, however, South African authorities estimated that over 82,700 hectares of cannabis were under cultivation, primarily in Transkei. The potential marijuana yield from this cultivation was placed at 175,000 metric tons. The total potential yield in South Africa and in the neighboring countries of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland was estimated to be over 180,000 metric tons.

While most of the marijuana produced in South Africa is for domestic or regional consumption, in the past several years there have been a number of instances of South African marijuana being smuggled to Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, particularly in air freight. In 1996, South African traffickers smuggled marijuana to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where they exchanged the marijuana for designer drugs such as MDMA and LSD. Nigerian traffickers are very active in South Africa and the potential exists for shipments of marijuana to be made to the United States. Moreover, there is growing evidence to suggest that large-scale shipments of hashish from Southwest Asia are transiting through southern African ports such as Maputo in Mozambique. The establishment of a DEA country office in Pretoria, South Africa, will facilitate additional intelligence collection on drug trafficking through the region that could impact on the United States.

Southwest and Central Asia

Cannabis grew wild and was cultivated in parts of Pakistan. Hashish produced from cannabis was consumed locally or exported, with multiton maritime shipments smuggled to Europe and Canada. (U.S.-based criminals in both California and the U.S. Northeast have been involved in large-scale hashish shipments to the Canadian market.) Pakistani authorities seize multiton quantities of hashish on a regular basis. The total amount of hashish seized in Pakistan during the first nine months of 1996 was 159 metric tons. This was a substantial decrease compared to the 543 metric tons seized during the previous 12 months. In January, Canadian Customs agents n Montreal seized 3 metric tons of hashish that had arrived from Pakistan via Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Cannabis grew wild and was cultivated in Afghanistan. Estimates of cannabis cultivation or hashish production are not available for 1996. In the absence of an effective central government, production, distribution, trafficking, and the financial structure underpinning the drug trade were not curbed in any form during 1996. As in Pakistan, cannabis produced in Afghanistan was processed into hashish. Hashish not consumed locally was transported principally to European markets.

The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988

The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA) was signed into law in November 1988. It placed under Federal control the distribution of 12 precursor and 8 essential chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, as well as the distribution of tableting and encapsulating machines. In recent years, additional chemicals have been added to the CDTA, bringing the total number of listed essential and precursor chemicals to 34.

The CDTA requires firms handling regulated chemicals to maintain readily retrievable receipt and distribution records and makes the reporting of suspicious orders mandatory. Furthermore, all firms importing or exporting regulated chemicals that exceed a threshold amount must notify DEA 15 days prior to the action. The law grants DEA the authority to detain and/or seize in the United States any suspect chemical shipment.

Government actions pursuant to the CDTA in 1996 included an extensive effort to educate U.S. chemical firms on all aspects of the law. The U.S. Government elicited industry cooperation to ensure that all domestic transactions involving listed chemicals were for legitimate business or industrial purposes and took legal action against firms violating the provisions of the act.

The Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993 (DCDCA) became effective April 16, 1994. The DCDCA established a registration system for distributors, importers, and exporters of listed chemicals subject to diversion in the United States. The DCDCA also removed the exempt status of ephedrine products and granted DEA authority to remove exemptions from any other drug products diverted for use in the illicit production of controlled drugs.

On September 17, 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act. Some of the highlights of the legislation are: the addition of iodine to the list of controlled chemicals; the creation of new reporting requirements for dosage form distributors of combination products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolaine; support for international efforts to control drugs; provision for the forfeiture and seizure of chemicals; and increased penalties for the manufacture and possession of equipment used to make controlled substances.

The major impetus of the CDTA on the international level is to ensure that the United States imports only those quantities of chemicals required for legitimate needs, and that the United States does not export chemicals used in foreign countries for illicit drug production. Exports of chemicals to cocaine producing countries by U.S. firms have been reduced by a substantial margin. This has been accomplished partially by DEA investigations, which led to the denial of "regular customer status" to a significant number of Latin American companies, and by more than 70 suspensions of proposed exports.

Through persistent and concerted efforts, DEA obtained the cooperation of the important chemical producing and exporting countries of the European Union. A true partnership has developed between the United States and European Union member countries to prevent the diversion of chemicals for cocaine production. As a result, chemical exports from these countries to drug producing countries in South America have declined dramatically.

DEA continued its close cooperation with concerned international organizations such as the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) by providing support for the development of an international clearinghouse on chemical shipments. DEA and the INCB have established an e-mail link, which allows for real-time information sharing and acts as a clearinghouse. This link played a critical role in DEAs successful effort to halt the massive international diversion of the methamphetamine precursor chemical ephedrine during 1994 and early 1995.

In addition to its own training programs, DEA continued its active support of the chemical training functions undertaken by the Organization of American States (OAS). DEA also worked with the OAS to adopt the Model Regulations to Control Precursors and Chemical Substances, Machines, and Materials, which was approved in April 1990. Moreover, DEA supported the addition (in April 1992) of 10 chemicals to the list of regulated chemicals under Article 12 of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

In 1996, the U.S. Government continued to pursue extensive diplomatic initiatives with user and supplier nations to encourage the enactment of stringent chemical control legislation where none was in place and to encourage more vigorous enforcement of the import restrictions in effect in several Latin American countries. DEA provided training programs and on-site assistance to a number of foreign governments for the establishment of chemical monitoring units.

Diversion of Legitimately Manufactured Controlled Substances

The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) created a closed system for the legitimate distribution of controlled substances. The CSA covers domestic commerce, importation, and exportation of controlled substances. The DEA Diversion Control Program monitors this closed distribution system to safeguard against diversion and to detect, investigate, and stop diversion when it occurs. This includes the diversion or conspiracy to divert controlled substances outside the usual course of professional medical practice.

As of December 31, 1995, there were 911,446 registrants (firms and individuals) in the United States authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances. Periodic investigations by DEA of a registrants record-keeping procedures, security, and general adherence to the CSA serve as a deterrent to diversion. Sometimes during the course of an in-depth cyclical investigation of a manufacturer or distributor, suspicious purchases, sales, or drug destruction patterns are revealed to be criminal diversion.

When violations of the CSA are discovered, guilty registrants are subject to civil and criminal penalties, and/or administrative action. Depending on the seriousness of the violations, DEA can either limit the registrant to drugs in a specific schedule, or revoke the registrants privilege to handle controlled substances altogether. Circumstances that can lead to administrative action against a registrant include falsification of an application, conviction of a drug-related felony, lack of State licensure, and mandatory exclusion of a registrant from MEDICAID, as well as other instances where continued registration would not be in the public interest.

Licit drugs continued to play a significant role in the abusing population. Information based on estimated drug-related hospital emergency room episodes from DAWN showed that among the top 20 controlled substances cited, 28 percent were licitly manufactured drugs. Benzodiazepines were the dominant group of licit drugs abused. Overall, benzodiazepines accounted for 68 percent of the episodes that involved licit drugs. Abuse occurred in several ways: as the primary drug of choice, as a supplement to illicit drugs, and as a substitute for illicit drugs--as is the case with such licit drugs as Xanax and methadone. Most diversion of legitimately produced drugs occurred at the retail rather than the wholesale level.

Benzodiazepines

Depressants including sedatives/hypnotics, tranquilizers, and anti-anxiety drugs often were diverted to illicit use. These substances depress the central nervous system producing a calming effect or sleep, and often are prescribed as tranquilizers. An overdose of this type of drug can lead to respiratory failure and death.

All DEA field divisions reported that the diversion of benzodiazepines, particularly alprazolam (Xanax) and diazepam (Valium), was a significant problem. The most frequently abused benzodiazepines were diazepam, alprazolam, lorazepam, triazolam, chlordiazepoxide, flurazepam, and temazepam. Benzodiazepines seem to be the class of drug most often used in conjunction with other drugs.

Rohypnol

Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol) is a benzodiazepine that is used in the short-term treatment of insomnia and as a sedative hypnotic and preanesthetic medication. Abuse of Rohypnol tablets continued to rise--especially in the southern United States. Rohypnol is neither manufactured nor marketed legally in the United States, and the importation of Rohypnol into the United States is prohibited. Rohypnol has several points of origin including Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. International courier services smuggled Rohypnol into the United States mostly by disguising the drug in large plastic bottles labeled as vitamins or weight loss medication. The drug also was smuggled in its original plastic and foil blister packaging (like cold medicine). Shipments seized in south Florida in 1995 contained from 200 to 17,000 dosage units--usually 2-milligram tablets. Several targets of DEA Rohypnol investigations are known cocaine traffickers. Rohypnol tablets cost from $5 to $8 each and often are combined with alcohol and cocaine.

Narcotics/Analgesics, Stimulants, and Heroin Substitutes/Supplements

Pharmaceutical products containing narcotics were a significant part of the illicit drug trafficking environment in the United States. Whether alone or in combination, these drugs were used both as substitutes for and supplements to heroin. The most commonly abused pharmaceutical drugs were hydrocodone products such as Lortab and Vicodin. Only 3 out of 20 DEA field divisions did not mention hydrocodone product abuse in their reports. Oxycodone (Percodan, Percocet) ranks just behind hydrocodone and ranks with benzodiazepines for frequency of mention as a pharmaceutical drug of abuse. Codeine combinations and hydromorphone (Dilaudid) were the next most frequently mentioned drugs of abuse. The prices for Dilaudid ranged from $30 per 4-milligram tablet in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to $70 per 4-milligram tablet in Louisville, Kentucky. Clinics with high-dosing practices, minimal counseling, and generous take-home privileges provided ample opportunity for the diversion of methadone; thus creating a problem of national proportion. The average price for methadone on the street ranged from $0.65 to $1.00 per milligram. Various drugs, such as clonidine (Catapres), Soma, Klonipin, and Xanax, reportedly were used in combination with methadone to enhance the "high."

DEA conducted an extensive review of methylphenidate (Ritalin) usage. While it always has been diverted and abused by some segments of the population, its nonmedical use by adolescents obtaining it from friends or classmates is of the most serious concern. The 1994 Monitoring the Future Study stated that approximately 1 percent of all high school seniors revealed nonmedical Ritalin use during the past year. Ritalin pills are crushed and snorted like cocaine, and during 1995 two deaths were associated with this practice. It also was reported that Ritalin was used in combination with heroin to make a "speed ball," and with cocaine to potentiate the high.

Noncontrolled Drugs

Soma, a muscle-relaxant normally used to treat acute painful muscle conditions, was formerly the most abused noncontrolled drug. Currently, drug abuse mentions for Stadol, a synthetic opioid analgesic, equal drug abuse mentions for Soma by DEA field divisions. Other noncontrolled drugs that were abused included: nalbuphine (Nubain), a synthetic narcotic analgesic; fluoxetin (Prozac), an antidepressant; butalbital (Fioricet), a barbiturate headache reliever; and Ketamine, an anesthetic most often used in veterinary medicine. Catapres, Soma, and Ketamine also were used as boosters for opiates and other controlled substances.

Illicitly Manufactured Dangerous Drugs

DEA uses the term "dangerous drugs" to refer to broad categories or classes of controlled substances other than cocaine, opiates, and cannabis products. The list of dangerous drugs includes illicitly manufactured as well as legitimate pharmaceutical stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and narcotics. Each class of substance is generally unlike other classes in its primary action and effect on the user.

Hallucinogens

Hallucinogens are psychedelic or mind-altering drugs that interfere with normal perception, sensations, comprehension, self-awareness, and emotions. Hallucinogens have no accepted medical use in the United States. These drugs induce visual hallucinations, disorientation, confusion, paranoid delusions, euphoria, anxiety, panic, and rapid pulse rate.

Drug law enforcement reporting and abuse indicators showed that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) was available in at least retail quantities throughout the United States. The drug commonly was produced from lysergic acid, which is made from ergotamine tartrate, a substance derived from an ergot fungus on rye. LSD was sold under more than 80 street names including acid, blotter, acid, doses, and trips as well as names that reflect the designs on sheets of blotter acid paper.

LSD was manufactured in clandestine laboratories believed to be located in northern California and the Pacific Northwest. Initial distribution sources for the drug virtually always are located in the San Francisco Bay area. LSD produced in crystalline form was mixed with excipients or diluted as a liquid for production of ingestible forms. LSD was sold in tablet form (usually small tablets known as microdots), as thin squares of gelatin (commonly referred to as window panes), and even on sugar cubes. However, LSD most often was encountered in the form of small paper squares, often with printed designs, that have been soaked with LSD.

At the wholesale production and distribution level, LSD was controlled tightly by California-based "syndicates," which have operated with relative impunity for almost 20 years. The last known seizure by DEA of an operating LSD manufacturing laboratory in the United States occurred in 1981 in Bellevue, Washington. That laboratory made LSD tablets known as "Orange Sunshine." In September 1996, in British Colombia, Canada, an operational LSD laboratory was seized capable of producing more than 5 million dosage units of LSD when applied to paper. In all likelihood, much of this production was earmarked for U.S. distribution.

LSD producers fell into two groups. Chemists and distributors located on the West Coast work together closely and normally are major manufacturers capable of distributing LSD nationwide. Independent producers also provided LSD intended for local consumption.

Traditionally, much of the retail-level LSD distribution within the United States took place during concerts and tours by certain rock music bands. However, over the past few years, events such as "raves"--all-night dance gatherings where LSD and other drugs are sold and used by young people--have become popular venues for retail-level LSD distribution. Contacts made at raves are used to secure a steady supply of larger quantities of LSD. While the gatherings may change, the pattern of LSD distribution has not. The hallucinogen is still sold hand-to-hand in quantities of up to 100 dosage units by young adults who have known each other through long association or who share common interests. These individuals typically embrace a counter cultural life-style.

Wholesale quantities of LSD normally are concealed in greeting cards or magazines and sent via the mail or parcel delivery services using fictitious return addresses. Occasionally, wholesale distributors travel to California to meet their sources of supply. Payments to a source of supply usually were made through legitimate money wiring services.

Retail- or user-level quantities ranged from 1 to 10 dosage units. Low-level distributors sold 50 to 100 dosage-unit quantities. Mid-level distributors sold 1,000 dosage-unit quantities as well as multiples of 1,000 units. These distributors normally had more than one source of supply and sold to several lower level dealers. The sources of supply for gram distributors were in all likelihood located in northern California. These sources normally converted LSD from a powder or liquid to blotter form. Multigram distributors traveled to California to obtain LSD personally and were associated with numerous lower level dealers.

Since 1978, the potency of this hallucinogen generally varied from 20 to 80 micrograms per dosage unit, considerably below that encountered during the late 1960s. At that time, users ingested LSD that ranged in concentration from 100 to 300 micrograms or higher, and often had harmful reactions known as "bad trips." Lower potency doses probably have accounted for the relatively few LSD-related emergency room incidents during the past several years.

In 1996, the drug was relatively inexpensive, costing from $1 to $10 per dosage unit or "hit," and often selling for as little as $0.25 or less in wholesale lots. The low cost combined with LSDs ready availability and intriguing blotter acid designs made LSD especially attractive to junior high school, high school, and college populations.

Phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP, is a clandestinely manufactured hallucinogen. The chemicals needed to manufacture PCP were readily available and inexpensive, and the production process required little formal chemical knowledge or laboratory equipment. Manufacturing and wholesale trafficking were controlled by a limited number of criminal groups based in Los Angeles. The drug was sold primarily in urban neighborhoods in a limited number of U.S. cities.

PCP was developed in 1957 as a human anesthetic. Its use for humans was discontinued in 1965 because of adverse side effects including confusion and delirium. It continued to be used in veterinary medicine as a large primate anesthetic for a few more years, but that use also virtually has been discontinued. In 1978, commercial manufacture of PCP was discontinued, though small amounts still are manufactured legally as a drug standard and for research purposes. Since 1978, clandestine laboratories have been the sole street source of PCP available in the United States.

PCP enjoyed popularity in the United States in the late 1960s and a brief resurgence during the mid-to-late 1970s. In 1978, PCP was transferred from Schedule III to Schedule II of the CSA, thus classifying it as a drug with a high potential for abuse. From 1981 through 1985, PCP abuse escalated significantly--particularly among persons under the age of 21. Circa 1986, but continuing through the late 1980s to the early 1990s, demand for PCP was displaced in large measure by the widespread availability and popularity of crack cocaine. Since 1991, however, several metropolitan areas reported increases in PCP-related hospital emergency room episodes that may foretell a resurgent trend towards PCP abuse. For example, hospital emergency room data indicated that PCP abuse grew in Baltimore and Philadelphia--two metropolitan areas that did not have a PCP problem in the 1980s. PCP abuse has been concentrated in several metropolitan areas, including Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, Sa Francisco, and Washington, DC during the last several years.

Reporting indicated that Los Angeles-based street gangs manufactured and distributed most of the nations PCP. Buses, trains, airlines, and private automobiles were used to transport PCP from California sources of supply to secondary source cities located across the country.

PCP has been sold under numerous street names including angel dust, crystal, hog, supergrass, killer joints, ozone, wack, embalming fluid, and rocket fuel, all of which reflect the range of its bizarre and volatile effects. In its pure form, PCP hydrochloride is a white crystalline powder that readily dissolves in water and can be compressed into tablets. Most PCP contains contaminants resulting from its makeshift manufacture, causing its color to range from tan to brown and its consistency to range from a powder to a gummy mass. The liquid form of PCP is actually PCP base dissolved most frequently in ether--a highly flammable, extremely dangerous solvent.

PCP typically was sprayed onto leafy material such as marijuana, mint, oregano, or parsley and then smoked. PCP also was used to adulterate commercially manufactured cigarettes, usually by dipping the cigarette in liquid PCP. The most popular commercial types were dark paper wrapper cigarettes, such as Shermans or Tijuana Smalls. PCP also was injected into cigarettes.

In 1996, PCP liquid, the most common form available in the United States, sold for between $100 and $3,000 per ounce nationally. The price for a gallon of PCP during 1996 ranged from $4,500 to $10,000 in Los Angeles. Among the lowest liquid ounce prices ($200 to $400) were those reported in Los Angeles, the source for most of the PCP trafficked in the United States. Nationwide, the price for PCP powder ranged from $800 to $3,000 per ounce.

In 1996, ketamine, referred to on the street as "Special K," often was used by young people attending dance parties or "raves." Ketamine is an analog of PCP.

3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA),

also known by street names such as ecstasy, XTC, adam, E, clarity, essence, and doctor, is an illicitly produced stimulant possessing hallucinogenic properties. It is a 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine analog of amphetamine and is related structurally and pharmacologically to methamphetamine and to the hallucinogen 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA). It has been described by users, most of whom are college students and recent graduates, as a fast-acting drug that produces feelings of alertness, euphoria, relaxation, and emotional warmth without the resulting hyperactivity produced by stimulants. The abuse potential for MDMA is high because it is viewed by users as neither injurious nor addictive. In reality, tests on animals show that they will self-administer the drug and that it is neurotoxic.

In the United States, MDMA remained popular among college students and middle-class youth. It was sold primarily at legitimate night spots, at underground night clubs (sometimes referred to as acid houses), and at all-night dance parties called "raves." Dosage units of MDMA, often sold in tablet form, varied from 55 to 150 milligrams. MDMA was produced in Mexico for shipment to the United States, but a large amount of it was imported from foreign sources and smuggled through Mexico.

In Europe, there was increased abuse of MDMA, particularly in Great Britain and the Netherlands. MDMA also was used in Greece. British authorities reported increased abuse of MDEA (an analog with a street name of Eve), that was produced in clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands. There also were reports of MDMA abuse in Australia in conjunction with attendance at all-night dance parties.

Controlled Substance Analogs

Notwithstanding the number of users and the extent of distribution, the problem of controlled substance analogs was small when compared to the menace of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Nevertheless, in those areas of the United States where controlled substance analogs were available, substantial numbers of people abused them with some experiencing severe adverse reactions, including death.

Methcathinone is a structural analog of methamphetamine and cathinone. Methcathinone is a potent and easily manufactured stimulant and was increasingly available in parts of the United States, primarily the Midwest. Outside the United States, methcathinone was reported to be a drug of abuse in the former Soviet Union where it was also known as ephedrone. Due to its high abuse potential, on October 15, 1993, methcathinone was placed in Schedule I of the CSA permanently.

Clandestine production of methcathinone was encountered first in 1991 at laboratory sites seized in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. Since 1991, methcathinone manufacturing sites have been documented in several areas of the United States.

Methcathinone was distributed as a powder and primarily administered via nasal inhalation in dosage units of less than a gram. It also was abused by using injection, oral ingestion, or intermixed with marijuana and smoked. Methcathinone is sold under the street name "Cat" and also is known as goob, sniff, star, or wonder star.

The DEA Chicago Division reported that methcathinone sold from $50 to $120 per gram in 1996.

Cathinone is one of the psychoactive components of the khat plant, Catha edulis, which the inhabitants of the countries of eastern Africa chew for its stimulant properties. Khat became familiar to most Americans following the U.S. humanitarian action in Somalia. Khat is chewed routinely by large segments of the Somali population. Traffickers of East African descent now are smuggling khat into the United States concealed in carry-on luggage, apparently for distribution within local East African communities. In 1996, 7.5 metric tons of khat were seized in the United States.

Clandestine Laboratories

Domestic clandestine laboratories produced most of the illicit dangerous drugs available in the United States. Clandestinelaboratories came in all sizes and were found in a variety of locations, from sophisticated underground hideaways to motel rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, and garages. The most productive laboratories often were located in secluded, rural areas at a safe distance from the metropolitan areas that they served. Laboratory operators ran the gamut from high school dropouts to chemists with doctoral degrees.

Clandestine laboratories commonly were operated on an irregular basis. Operators often produced a "batch" of a drug, then disassembled, stored, or moved their laboratories while they acquired additional chemicals. They sometimes traveled great distances to obtain chemicals and equipment in an attempt to evade law enforcement scrutiny. Clandestine laboratory operators frequently were well-armed; weapons, including explosives, routinely were confiscated in raids on clandestine laboratories. Operators usually disposed of their hazardous chemical waste unsafely and illegally, often dumping it on the ground or in nearby streams and lakes, or pouring it into the local sewage system.

[Note: Data derived for this section were taken solely from reporting by DEA field divisions and laboratories. Seizures made by State and local authorities independent of DEA participation are not included.]

DEA special agents in concert with State and local law enforcement authorities seized 901 clandestine laboratories in 1996 compared to 362 in 1995. This represented a 149-percent increase over 1995, and marked the most significant increase in the number of seizures ever reported. Methamphetamine remained the most prevalent clandestinely manufactured drug in the United States. Authorities seized 879 methamphetamine laboratories during 1996, accounting for 98 percent of all clandestine laboratory seizures.

The clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine was based primarily in the West, Southwest, and Midwest. In 1996, DEA field divisions in Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Phoenix, St. Louis, San Diego, and San Francisco accounted for about 92 percent of the methamphetamine laboratory seizures nationwide. Five clandestine amphetamine laboratories were seized in 1996; three in Texas, and one each in Oregon and Wisconsin. One PCP laboratory in California was seized by DEA in 1996, compared to a total of six in 1995. DEA field divisions in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and St. Louis, seized 10 methcathinone laboratories in 1996. This compares to 19 seized in 1995 and 20 seized in 1994. Three MDMA laboratories were seized in 1996, one each in the DEA Dallas, New Orleans, and San Diego divisions. Three P2P laboratories were confiscated in 1996.

The Money Laundering Process

Definition

Money laundering can be defined as the process by which illicit funds are made to appear licit. The term has been extended to include the handling of illicit funds. The process usually involves three stages: placement, layering, and integration. Ill-gotten funds are placed into the commercial financial system, layered to obscure their origins, and finally reintroduced into the economy as "clean" money.

Bulk Movement

In the placement stage, ill-gotten money is put into the financial system in the form of cash. In the case of drug trafficking, proceeds earned from street sales are almost invariably in the form of cash, and generally are comprised of small denomination bills. The most convenient means of placement is to deposit the money into a bank. This reduces the sheer bulk of the cash and allows the currency to be moved and converted easily into other negotiable instruments or currencies. In countries with currency transaction reporting requirements, such as the United States, money launderers must devise methods of depositing drug proceeds without being detected. The simplest method, of course, is to smuggle the cash out of the country to a country without such regulations or where the regulations are not enforced. Whether smuggled by couriers, carried by mail and delivery services, or concealed in commercial cargo, such methods are considered "bulk movement" of cash or monetary instruments.

Financial Institutions

In 1996, use of financial institutions was still the safest and most efficient means to launder money. When banks were used, reporting requirements had to be circumvented. One method of doing that is called structuring; that is, conducting numerous cash deposits under the reporting threshold. [NOTE: In the United States, all banks are required to fill out a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for any transaction--deposit or withdrawal--over $10,000.] Money launderers regularly make large cash deposits under the pretense of operating flea markets, restaurants, and other cash-intensive businesses. Some o these businesses, due to their nature, are placed on the banks "exemption list" and thereby afforded a cash reporting threshold above $10,000. The banks themselves determine which businesses qualify for the exemption.

Frequently, nonbank financial institutions (NBFI) also are used in the placement stage. In most countries, including the United States, NBFIs receive much less scrutiny than do banks. Not only do these enterprises deal in large volumes of cash, they also deal in other financial instruments such as securities, commodities, Treasury Bills, bearer bonds, "omnibus accounts," and futures brokers. Examples of NBFIs that make up this parallel banking system are currency exchange businesses (casas de cambio or bureaux de change), check cashing shops, and remittance companies.

Nonfinancial Institutions

By exploiting nonfinancial businesses, traffickers avoid reporting requirements that regulate banks, cash transmitting businesses, and other financial institutions. Legitimate businesses used for criminal activities are called "front" companies and some companies primary activity is illicit money laundering. "Shell" companies are facades for legitimate business, existing solely for criminal activity, such as money laundering.

Front companies can be art dealerships, precious metal stores, jewelry shops, real estate investment companies, car and boat dealerships, and fiduciary institutions--the list constantly expands and changes as law enforcement officials identify suspect businesses and money launderers branch into new ones. Trading companies often are used as fronts for illicit money movement. Fraudulent invoicing is a popular means for money launderers to move drug funds to traffickers source countries or to tax havens. Letters of credit are used in the layering process because they provide apparent justification for international money transfers.

Between financial and nonfinancial institutions are casinos, whose services include exchanging currency denominations, issuing checks for "winnings," and wire transferring funds to other casinos. Money launderers take advantage of all of these services.

Underground Banking System

The more formalized system of using ordinary businesses as fronts is called the underground banking system. These companies--unlike remittance companies and other parallel banking institutions--are not registered as financial institutions. Moreover, because they are not subject to CTR reporting requirements, these companies are difficut to regulate. Traffickers bring money to an underground banker to purchase drug supplies, and within hours the source of supply receives the funds, unburdened by an official paper trail. Underground bankers are faster, more efficient, and charge less for services than banks; they also offer customers unmatched confidentiality. In Asia, underground banking systems are so extensive and have operated for so long that they move more licit money than the commercial banks. Within this licit stream of money, flow illicit proceeds.

Layering Stage

Once cash has been placed into the financial system, it goes through a process of layering that attempts to hide the moneys origin through numerous interbank transactions that convolute the paper trail. One of the most effective means of layering is the wire transfer because it moves money quickly from country to country. The source of illicit funds also is hidden by moving money to international bank secrecy havens through shell corporations.

Integration Stage

After placement and layering, funds are integrated into the legitimate economy to further distance drug traffickers from their ill-gotten gains. In the integration stage, drug money is filtered into the economy through legitimate business transactions and is passed into the hands of unrelated third parties. Additionally, in many drug source countries, drug traffickers use laundered money to pay employees and buy supplies, properties, and businesses. This contributes to the economies of the source countries, albeit only temporarily.

Money Laundering Trends

Money laundering methods vary by country and region of the world due to a number of factors, including the following: relative sophistication of banking and financial centers; the existence of underground banking systems; and, perhaps most importantly, the degree of enforcement pressure. The continuing evolution of money laundering legislation and worldwide economic development have spawned a new generation of money laundering methods.

United States

Traffickers who have been smuggling their drugs into the United States have been shipping their profits out of the country in smaller amounts, although bulk seizures of cash continued to be made particularly in the U.S. Southwest. These monies were believed to be destined initially for Mexico and then ultimately Colombia. This is reflected in DEAs undercover proprietary money laundering operations.

In recent years, proceeds from drug trafficking in the United States increasingly have been shipped out of the country to financial safehavens or have been smuggled to drug source countries in the form of cash or negotiable monetary instruments. Bulk shipments of such "cash" continues, particularly across the U.S. Southwest border. However, in recent months, traffickers have elected to break very large cash shipments into smaller quantities before smuggling to spread the risk. In addition, enforcement and legislative efforts designed to curtail illicit money movement through legitimate channels has forced traffickers to once again rely on cash smuggling where no paper trails are created. For example, a requirement for money exchange businesses to report electronic transfers exceeding $750 in some U.S. cities has forced traffickers to smuggle cash. Previously, only transactions over $10,000 were reportable. Moreover, seizures at U.S. airports of undeclared cash have doubled as traffickers have sought to circumvent this reporting requirement.

Asset forfeiture and similar enforcement activity directed against international money movement must be revised constantly to keep pace with counteraction by traffickers supported by sophisticated money launderers. Undercover operations today frequently are used but usually are of short duration. Longer term efforts risk exposure in the face of trafficker scrutiny. Raids against commercial front companies employed by trafficking groups are more common today in nations such as Colombia and are effective in disrupting both the flow of drugs and monies. In addition, the implementation of the International Emergency Economics Powers Act in the United States allows enforcement organizations to immobilize trafficker front companies through the imposition of financial sanctions.

Money launderers exploitation of casinos continues to grow as the proliferation of casinos in the United States is not matched by a corresponding growth in resources to monitor them. Riverboat-type casinos have increased but for the most part appear to have abided by cash transaction reporting requirements. However, the Native American casinos that have opened in many States and that are bound under the cash transaction reporting regulation have a spotty record of compliance. There also are the casinos in the State of Nevada that remain exempt from Federal currency transaction reporting.

Various ethnic groups in the United States that are involved in a wide range of criminal activities have introduced their own money laundering schemes or have revised older methods. Ethnic Pakistanis have established businesses in the United States using their hundi underground banking system. They use invoice manipulation as a means of transferring their illicit capital and balancing their books. Newly arrived Russians have closed real estate deals with cash carried in shopping bags and also have used casinos to launder illicit proceeds. Even though some businessmen dealing with the Russians realize they are involved in money laundering activity, they are intimidated into complying.

Some other methods that have the potential for abuse by money launderers include the following: the use of swaps (international urrency transactions); payable-through-accounts held by foreign banks in U.S. banks; "smart cards" for structuring deposits and transferring money internationally; and cyberbanking for instant multinational layering of drug deposits.

Many financial institutions have established their own compliance programs and have cooperated with law enforcement authorities in the reporting of suspicious transactions. Money transmitting businesses, which have had to file CTR reports for years but which have not been regulated closely, now are required to register with the Federal Government.

Latin America

The Colombian drug mafias are the principal source of drug proceeds laundered in North America. Over the past decade, these organizations have shown great resourcefulness in meeting the ever changing demands of dynamic U.S. and Canadian consumer markets. Changes in legislation and an increase in law enforcement efforts aimed at money laundering have forced the drug mafias money brokers to search for alternatives to the U.S. banking system. No longer can drug mafia cell workers enter banks with cash-filled shopping bags to safely begin the money laundering process. Even "smurfing" and structuring deposits have become risky ventures. The drug mafia response to legislation and enforcement pressure is evidenced by a notable increase in the demand for bulk money shipments to Colombia or other countries where the U.S. dollars can be exchanged for the currency of choice.

Using third country currency has become common. Venezuela has emerged as a destination for many bulk money shipments due to the high tariff placed on U.S. dollars in Colombia. The dollars are exchanged into Venezuelan bolivars at casas de cambio, then smuggled into Colombia.

The shipment of large quantities of postal money orders also has increased. These money orders often are sent directly to Colombia where they are sold and resold through networks of casas de cambio. Eventually, the money orders are redeemed at banks outside Colombia. Previously, Panama was the main country of redemption until the U.S. Postal Service stepped in and began to seize the suspect money orders. When banks in Panama then refused to honor them, the money movers returned the suspect money orders to the United States for deposit.

"Dollar discounting" is another money laundering method that does not involve an exchange of cash. Money brokers approach legitimate businessmen in Colombia who need U.S. dollars to buy goods in the United States and "sell" them the cash proceeds from drug sales for 80 cents on the dollar. The businessmen then deposit the equivalent sum in pesos in the traffickers bank accounts in Colombia and have their agents pick up the dollars in the United States. Although this seems very difficult to stop, it does call for collusion on the part of the "legitimate businessmen." To date there have been no prosecutions against these co-conspirators.

Another form of discounting, noted in the Dominican Republic, takes the form of a 10-percent discount on drugs delivered to New York City if traffickers purchased the drugs with pesos in Colombia.

Sophisticated alternatives to the banking system also have surfaced. The use of import-export businesses and other front companies has proven effective for money laundering. Falsified export documents, bills of lading, and invoices for goods being shipped out of Colombia to the United States are used to justify large payments sentto Colombia. Emeralds and other precious stones are difficult to price accurately and therefore lend themselves to invoice manipulation.

Using drug money to buy contraband for the Colombian market not only has been a way to wash drug money but also to increase it. Between $5 and $7 billion in drug monies flow into Colombia each year.

The use of payable-through-accounts held in U.S. banks by foreign banks has made it difficult for law enforcement authorities to trace drug money. These accounts can have hundreds of sub-account holders in foreign countries who have complete access to these accounts but who are unknown to U.S. and foreign bank officials.

The entrance of the Colombian drug mafias into European drug markets has presented the mafias money movers with new money laundering opportunities. It also has served to create alliances between the drug mafias and European organized crime, which is adept at international money laundering. The developing drug market, however, has stimulated European authorities to pay more attention to drug money laundering and to cooperate with international enforcement efforts.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian drug traffickers and money launderers use simple but effective money moving techniques. Profits from the heroin trade have been smuggled from the United States in bulk amounts of up to $1 million. To facilitate handling, many times proceeds are converted to cashiers checks or money orders and carried overseas. Often, these monetary instruments also are mailed overseas by parcel post or private overnight delivery services.

In addition, bank transfers in amounts under CTR reporting thresholds are used. Asian traffickers frequently open accounts under the names of relatives or spouses in both the United States and the receiving country to facilitate the wire transfers. Asian traffickers assets usually are stored in Hong Kong bank accounts or used outright to purchase real estate and businesses in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and other drug transit or source countries.

Among those Southeast Asian countries where heroin smuggling takes place, the well-established and commercially accepted Chinese underground banking system is used to move traffickers operating funds and illicit profits. Consequently, Asian heroin traffickers can transfer proceeds from country to country within hours by simply visiting an underground banker at one of the systems many front companies. For example, a trafficker in Hong Kongs Western Market can transfer funds through one of the areas well-established gold shops or finance companies that have sister companies throughout Asia where the funds are picked up by the traffickers source of supply. Intelligence data from Taiwan indicates that the underground banking system rivals the commercial banking system because it is inexpensive, more confidential, more convenient, and quicker than the commercial banking system.

Newly enacted money laundering, asset forfeiture, and conspiracy legislation in many Asian countries is beginning to have an effect. Measures adopted in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and, most recently, Singapore have impaired heroin trafficking operations. South Korea also is drafting such legislation. Joint Hong Kong-U.S. financial investigations are a strong example of effective international law enforcement cooperation. To date, Hong Kong has seized approximately $47 million in assets ($19 million from U.S. orders), and U.S. authorities have seized more than$11 million based on information developed in Hong Kong. Hong Kong also has prosecuted its first money laundering case successfully.

Southwest Asia

In 1996, Persian Gulf States and Southwest Asia, heroin traffickers extensively used a version of the underground banking system known as hundi or hawala. Like the Chinese system, the system is traditional and well-entrenched in the region. Indian and Pakistani underground bankers not only moved traffickers funds but they also maximized their own profits by investing the funds in gold. For example, a Pakistani underground banker in the United States or Europe transfers drug proceeds--in the form of U.S. dollars--to the United Arab Emirates where they are used to buy gold. The gold then is smuggled into India or Pakistan and sold at a significant profit. These systems operated outside formal banking structures and beyond the scrutiny of government officials. Invoice manipulation also was popular among hundi dealers to move money out of one country and into another under the guise of legitimate commercial transactions.

Law enforcement officials in the United States and Canada increasingly are aware of the extent to which Southwest Asian hundi dealers operate in North America. Much of the proceeds derived from the sale of Southwest Asian heroin in this hemisphere is laundered by underground channels. Although these underground banking systems are used by traffickers, they also are used for the transaction of legitimate business conducted by ethnic Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis. Asian underground banking has a long history, predating the orthodox banking infrastructure. Because the system is based on trust and the fear of community ostracism if that trust is betrayed, law enforcement authorities have found it difficult to penetrate.

Europe

Member nations of the European Community are in the process of enacting antimoney laundering legislation. In countries where legislation has been in place and enforced for a number of years, the effect on money laundering operations has been obvious. Most countries report a noticeable increase in the use of the bureaux de change (money exchange houses) in moving money internationally. The use of stock brokerage houses and insurance companies also has been noted.

Russians, investing in real estate and businesses, have increased the flow of U.S. currency into European countries. Even though these cash transactions are suspicious and are reported as such by banks and other financial institutions, local authorities cannot check the legitimacy of these funds with the Russian police.

International Legislative and Enforcement Efforts

Money laundering is the most international aspect of the global drug trade. International boundaries pose no obstacle to money launderers who are capable of moving funds virtually anywhere in the world. However, national borders often create obstacles in combating drug money laundering.

The 1988 Vienna Convention criminalized the laundering of drug money. A proposed extension to the Vienna Convention would make it a crime to launder money obtained from all crimes--not just drug money. This all-encompassing extension has slowed enactment of money laundering legislation in countries where no legislation presently exists. According to the 1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, as many as 70 governments have adopted or now are considering provisions that criminalize money laundering. Over 50 of these also regulate the flow of currency and monetary instruments, mandate records of currency and other monetary instrument transactions, require declarations of beneficial owners of accounts, and compel disclosure of suspicious transactions. This is due primarily to an international effort led by the Financial Action Task Force.

Money laundering legislation is only effective when complemented by adequate asset forfeiture legislation. In turn, asset forfeiture legislation only can be effective if there is also conspiracy legislation in place. In short, financial laws are interdepent and must be used in concert. Unfortunately, most countries have only piecemeal financial regulations and many do not have effective conspiracy laws to implement other drug legislation.

Even in countries with appropriate legislation, there is still the difficulty of keeping up with ingenious, professional money launderers who always seem to stay one step ahead of legislation. In the United States, authorities are trying to close existing legislative loopholes at the same time that the money launderers are discovering new methods to circumvent the system.

In general, the effectiveness of money laundering legislation greatly varies throughout the world. Even though effective legislation in some countries remains difficult to enact, the issue serves to identify more clearly the influence and reach of the illicit drug trade.