Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.
By Eli Berman; Reviewed by James T. Dunne, CPP
By Line:
By Eli Berman; Reviewed by James T. Dunne, CPP
Teaser:
Author and Professor Eli Berman relies on economics rather than religious fanaticism to explain violent Islamist insurgencies and terrorist organizations.
***** Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. By Eli Berman; Published by MIT Press, mitpress.mit.edu; 280 pages; $24.95.
As terrorism has evolved in the decades since it first emerged as a global issue, so too has the social science that seeks to explain it. Eli Berman’s Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism is unquestionably worth reading for two primary reasons. First, it joins a host of other new books emphasizing the view that terrorist actions, although wrong, are mostly rational rather than insane or fanatical. Second, it is a remarkable study of terrorism from an authority with added expertise in a separate field: economics.
Berman argues that terrorists are motivated less by religious fervor or ideology than by cost-benefit analysis. A terrorist assigned to attack a facility, for example, weighs the gains from successfully completing a mission, such as higher status within the group, against the gains from defecting and providing inside information to legal authorities who may grant a reward or provide witness-protection benefits. Similarly, terrorist group leaders choosing an individual to carry out a suicide bombing must avoid selecting someone who might defect. Terrorist groups, according to Berman, aim chiefly to control defection in their ranks and above all seek maximum “defection constraint.”
Terrorists apply cost-benefit analysis not only to life and death decisions but also to issues of daily sustenance. Berman cites Hamas as a terrorist group held together substantially by the glue of mutual aid and social services. The “club model” of terrorist groups includes the notion that providing social services—such as food, education, and medical care—in return for loyalty to the group is effective, especially when other opportunities, such as leaving the group to enter the job market, are reduced or eliminated.
The author proposes a persuasive menu of nonviolent counterterrorism strategies. These include enhancing outside options for rebels and potential rebels, competing directly with rebels in social service provisions, and reducing rebel revenues.
Berman does not ignore the potential pitfalls of these approaches. In one telling anecdote, he recounts how a U.S. officer in Iraq launched a program of paying citizens to sweep local streets. The officer earned high praise, but not for coalition forces. Credit went to Iraqi extremist Muqtada al-Sadr, whose cadres had quietly convinced the citizenry that he, not U.S. forces, was responsible.
However valid Berman’s insights, they illuminate only some of the many variables leading to terrorist action. Studies of terrorists and other extremists suggest that many appear overwhelmed by religious fervor. Also, like all humans, they are motivated by many factors. The text, however, is worthwhile for security professionals in that it offers a novel, intriguing take on a highly complex problem that we all hope to defeat.
Reviewer: James T. Dunne, CPP, is a senior analyst with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. He is a member of the ASIS International Global Terrorism, Political Instability, and International Crime Council. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the State Department or the U.S. Government.
Powered by: Phase2 Technology
Comments