The Indonesian government must quickly develop prevention strategies to combat a new trend toward low-cost, small-scale terrorist attacks committed by tiny decentralized cells of jihadis, according to an international nongovernmental organization.

The recommendation made in a report (.pdf) issued this week by the International Crisis Group (ICG) [1] comes after a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a police station mosque last week in Cirebon, wounding 30 [2], including the Cirebon chief of police, according to The Jakarta Post [3].

Rather than engaging in large, spectacular attacks that kill Muslim civilians and hurt their popularity, Indonesian jihadis have embraced small cells and targeted assassinations, mainly of police officers in retaliation for counterterrorism operations.

The trend toward small groups of jihadis conspiring to commit quick, low-cost attacks in the world’s largest Muslim country [5] is the product of two forces, according to ICG.

One reason for the embrace of “individualistic” attacks owes to security forces’ successful counterterrorist policing strategies against larger terrorist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah.

“Since the 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta and the break-up of a militant training camp in Aceh in February 2010, extremists have been pushed back and cells dismantled to the point that it is much safer to operate in small groups and hit squads than in more structured organisations,” the ICG report explains.  

But pragmatism has also dove-tailed with ideological evolution.

According to ICG, there are two main strains of jihadism--organized and individual. Currently in Indonesia, individual jihad--or jihad fardiyah--has become popular. “Jihad fardiyah...says that if jihad is defensive in nature, such that war becomes an individual obligation for Muslims, no leader or organisation is necessary: children can wage war without their parents’ permission, wives without their husbands’.”

And small cells also get help from the Web, where they can go online and find do-it-yourself manuals devoted to military training and bomb-making, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Webzine, Inspire.

Much like other jihadi terrorists, the ICG finds that these small groups of self-starter terrorists cannot be socio-economically profiled. “Poverty was not what drove them to radical action, but rather ideas, as propounded by persuasive jihadi clerics,” the report notes.

The ICG advises that Indonesia’s newly created National Anti-Terrorism Agency should make community outreach, charting ideological evolution, countering extremist messages, and better prison and post-prison monitoring of militants priorities.

As part of community outreach, the conflict prevention group says counterterrorism authorities should concentrate on youth programs and play up former militants sorrow for waging jihad and bringing shame upon their families to steer other youths away from violent jihad. ICG also notes that concerned adults need to keep an eye on Islamic high school student organizations, which have been used by hardliners to radicalize teenagers.

The ICG stresses that reducing the allure of jihad cannot be accomplished through a law-and-order approach.

“[T]he government needs to recognise that laws are not a panacea,” the report concludes. “This is not a problem that can be fixed by a new intelligence law or a strengthened anti-terrorism law. The effort has to start in communities, by reducing the receptivity to extremist messages, finding alternative activities and role models for young men in their twenties in certain targeted areas, and showing that other approaches produce concrete benefits.”

Most of all, the ICG urges the government to quickly respond to the new threat of small jihadi cells committing smaller, targeted violent attacks. “With jihad fardiyah... being promoted so strongly in radical circles, there inevitably are more plots in the works.”

♦ Photo of Indonesian flag by Mr. T in DC/Flickr [6]

Thumbnail: